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The present thesis offers a materialist and dialectical framework for under-
standing and influencing the field of use and design of computer artefacts.
The framework is materialist because it insists on the reality of the mate-
rial world and the material character of mental phenomena; it is dialectical
because it rejects the idea that human life is a mechanical product of its
material basis; the mental and the material are mutually determining in a
dialectical relation. The thesis points to activity theory as a possible basic
vocabulary in systems development research; integrating the relevant and
necessary aspects involved in designing computer artefacts, not as being op-
erational at a detailed technical level, but as a general Òworld viewÓ under
which relevant sub-fields are integrated.
The thesis emphasises material mediation in design by introducing the con-
cept of design artefacts as a unifying perspective on systems development.
This concept is based on a dialectical materialist approach comprising ac-
tivity theory as a general perspective (mainly Engestrm), and specifically
the notion of primary, secondary and tertiary artefacts (Wartofsky), this
background is complemented with the notion of boundary objects (Star), as
mediators in boundary zones. The argument of the thesis is based on the
tenet of activity theory that human praxis is mediated by artefacts and is
continually changing in the process of sociocultural development; and the no-
tion of historical crystallisation of praxis into artefacts. Systems develop-
ment is understood as a zone where heterogeneous praxes meet to change a
given praxis though the construction and introduction of new (computer)
artefacts; this zone is mediated by design artefacts, which make different
sense to the various praxes (boundary objects). Based on WartofskyÕs vocab-
ulary, the thesis argues that design artefacts are clusters of primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary artefacts, each class simultaneously mediating different
elements of the design process. As special instances of design artefacts
transformators and abductors are discussed. Transformators are introduced
as the artefacts mediating design as a transformation process emulating
the process of development of artefacts in use. Abductors, as a class of de-
sign artefacts mediating the development of radically new motives, are
briefly proposed.
Four main themes are addressed by the thesis: Firstly, the notion of design
artefacts as an integrating perspective on systems development research
and praxis, is introduced and developed. Secondly, a uniform notion of devel-
opment tying use and design together, is discussed in relation to designing
for development in use, and in relation to the notion of design as the trans-
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formation of artefacts. Thirdly, a radically pragmatic philosophy of science
based on the understanding of theories as design artefacts, is proposed.
Finally, the issue of tertiary artefacts as mediators of innovation and cre-
ativity, setting an agenda for a dialectical materialist theory not neglecting
the individual genius, is programmatically pointed to. This last issue is re-




Den foreliggende afhandling, freml¾gger et dialektisk materialistisk be-
grebsapparat for forstelse og handling i forhold til design af computer arte-
fakter. Begrebsapparatet er materialistisk, fordi der insisteres p den ma-
terielle verdens realitet og p den materielle karakter af mentale f¾-
nomener; dialektisk fordi det afviser forestillingen om at menneskers liv-
sudfoldelser er mekanisk determineret af disses materielle grundlag; det
mentale og det materielle er gensidigt determinerende i en dialektisk rela-
tion. Afhandlingen peger p virksomhedsteorien som et muligt s¾t af
grundbegreber, der integrerer relevante og n¿dvendige aspekter af design af
computer artefakter. Disse er ikke n¿dvendigvis operationelle i forhold til
detaljerede tekniske og matematiske aspekter, men derimod udg¿r de et
overordnet ÒverdensbilledeÓ, under hvilket de forskellige underdiscipliner og
disses teorier kan integreres.
Den materielle mediering af design betones gennem introduktionen af be-
grebet design artefakter som et samlende begreb i systemudviklingsforskn-
ing og -praksis. Det dialektisk materialistiske grundlag for dette begreb
bygger generelt p virksomhedsteorien (is¾r Engestrm) og mere specifikt
p begreberne prim¾re, sekund¾re og terti¾re artefakter (Wartofsky).
Dette fundament kompletteres med begrebet boundary objects (Star) som
mediatorer i gr¾nse-zoner. Argumentationen er baseret p virksomhedste-
oriens grunds¾tninger om at menneskelig praksis er medieret af artefakter,
og at den konstant forandres i l¿bet af den sociokulturelle udvikling, samt
at denne udvikling af praksis er krystalliseret i artefakter.
Afhandlingen fremstiller systemudvikling som en zone, hvor heterogene
praksisser m¿des for at forandre en given praksis gennem konstruktion og
indf¿relse af nye (computer) artefakter. Denne zone medieres af design arte-
fakter, der giver forskellig mening for de involverede praksisser (de er
boundary objects). Baseret p Wartofskys begreber, argumenteres der for at
design artefakter er klynger af prim¾re, sekund¾re og terti¾re artefakter,
der hver is¾r, men p samme tid, medierer forskellige elementer af design-
processen. Transformatorer og abduktorer n¾vnes som specifikke typer de-
sign artefakter. Transformatorer introduceres som den klasse af design
artefakter, der medierer design forstet som en transformationsproces, der
efterligner, eller forts¾tter, den historiske udvikling af artefakter i brug
som l¿bende krystallisering af virksomhed. Abduktorer antydes som en
klasse af design artefakter, der medierer udviklingen af radikalt nye mo-
tiver.
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Afhandlingen forholder sig til fire hovedtemaer: For det f¿rste introduceres
og udvikles begrebet design artefakter som et integrerende perspektiv i sys-
temudviklingsforskning og praksis. For det andet diskuteres et uniformt
udviklingsbegreb, der binder brug og design sammen, dels i forhold til de-
sign, der st¿tter udvikling i brug, og dels i forhold til forstelsen af design
som transformation af artefakter fra genstandsomrdet. For det tredie
foresls en radikalt pragmatisk videnskabsteori baseret p forestillingen
om, at teorier kan forsts som design artefakter. Endelig peges der pro-
grammatisk p terti¾re artefakter som et centralt begreb i en dialektisk
materialistisk teori om kreativitet og innovation, der ikke negligerer indi-
videts betydning. Dette sidste punkt relaterer sig til igangv¾rende foran-
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Preface
ÒAll that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is
at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of life and
his relations with his kind.Ó (Marx & Engels 1848).
The field of systems development research and praxis is haunted by a set of
intertwined problems. Firstly, the accelerating development of basic tech-
nology and the constant rearrangement of societal relations imply that we
cannot expect the field to develop as a craft. Secondly, the sociocultural con-
stitution, in use, of meanings of computer artefacts implies that very few
features of these are stable across time and context. Thirdly, the field tends
to adopt any invention Ð technical, methodological, or conceptual Ð in a rela-
tivistically pragmatic way; thus, turning systems development into a mess
of multi-paradigmatic babel. These fundamental problems point to the ur-
gent need for a strong theoretical foundation for the integrated field of de-
sign and research. In order to be both practically viable and a proper guid-
ance in this maelstrom, such a foundation has to be value-based, and it has
to be both exclusive at the level of basic assumptions and inclusive in the
operational assimilation of other perspectives.
The present thesis is my attempt to contribute to such a foundation for sys-
tems development research and praxis by introducing the dialectical mate-
rialist-based concept of design artefacts as a unifying perspective; by elicit-
ing the relation between design and use in a uniform developmental per-
spective; by proposing a radically pragmatic philosophy of science; and by
pointing to a materialist understanding of innovation and creativity.
A strong theoretical basis may seem to contradict with a radically prag-
matic philosophy of science. However, I feel that it is necessary to reject both
the positions treating scientific method as a universal guarantee and the
relativist positions discarding the whole question of validity beyond imme-
diate suitability. Even though we know the divorce statistics, we proclaim
that we will love Òtill deathÓ; and even though we know that no universal
truth exists, we crave for truth in research. In the same way as it makes no
sense to declare love until next Friday, it makes no sense to do research
without striving for truth. A strong theoretical basis is largely a matter of
taking the responsibility for the research we do, by ensuring that it makes
sense beyond the most isolated context, and by caring for the sociocultural
context of discovery and application.
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Overview of the thesis
The thesis is composed of a collection of published papers and a further
elaboration of the introduced concepts tying the papers together. It consists
of three parts: part one introduces the conceptual basis, elaborates further
on the introduced ideas and sums up the conclusions; part two consists of
the published papers.
Part one introduces and discusses the concept of design artefacts and out-
lines the theoretical and empirical prehistory for the concept. ChapterÊ1,
ÒTwo Empirical CasesÓ, describes the empirical background for the thesis.
The section ÒDebuggerÓ reports on a project that aimed at evaluating parts
of the Mj¿lner BETA programming environment. The section ÒMusic
FestivalÓ reports on a research project that aimed at developing computer
support for the planning of a very large Danish music festival. That case has
been the main background for the development of the notion of design as the
transformation of artefacts. ChapterÊ2, ÒSystems development researchÓ,
discusses software and software design in general; critical systems devel-
opment research (which the present thesis is a part of); and the basic fea-
tures of system development research as opposed to the natural sciences.
ChapterÊ3, ÒA scientific basis?Ó, introduces the notion of dialectical materi-
alism in three steps: paraphrasing the development of the philosophy of sci-
ence in the 20th century, discussing the role of basic assumptions in sys-
tems development research, and finally stating dialectical materialism
through a discussion of MarxÕ theses on Feuerbach. ChapterÊ4, ÒHuman
ActivityÓ, outlines activity theory in very broad terms as a basis for a notion
of design and design artefacts, together with WartofskyÕs analysis of the re-
lation between perception and action, and StarÕs notion of boundary objects.
ChapterÊ5, ÒA notion of design and design artefactsÓ, introduces a notion of
design activity and design artefacts based on the theoretical landscape out-
lined in the previous chapter. Design artefacts is the central concept devel-
oped in the thesis. ChapterÊ6, ÒExploring the notion of design artefactsÓ,
treats design artefacts in more detail; theories are discussed in terms of de-
sign artefacts both to illustrate the embracing power of that concept, and to
get a better understanding of the relation between theory and design; the
tension between principles and praxis is discussed as a basic feature of de-
sign artefacts; and the notions of transformators, transformation, and ab-
ductors are introduced. Part one is concluded with a chapter outlining the
main achievements of the thesis, and possible directions for future work.
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Part two consists of the seven publications included in the thesis. They are
included in their original form, only the layout has been changed to improve
the graphical appearance and readability of the thesis. Publication details
can be found in the beginning of section two.
Paper one: An investigation into the design artefact concept as a
vehicle for systems development research (1994a)
The main achievement of this paper is the tentative formulation of the de-
sign artefact concept. System development is discussed from the design
artefact perspective based on the (at the time of the paper purely pragmatic)
classification of design activities into conception, communication and con-
struction, and the notion of secondary artefacts. It is suggested that the de-
sign artefact concept could be the basis for transcending the detrimental
tendency to naturalism in object-oriented modelling; and the relation be-
tween theory and design is briefly discussed based on the introduced mate-
rialist pragmatism. An addendum to the paper points to the relation be-
tween tertiary artefacts and the experience of modernity.
Paper two: Fitts' Law as a Design Artefact: A Paradigm Case of
Theory in Software Design (1994b)
With FittsÕ law as an example, the paper unfolds the idea that theories can
be understood and assessed as design artefacts. Three different roles (World
view, tool, and metaphor) played by FittsÕ law are identified based on exam-
ples from the literature. In turn, this insight is used in discussing the gen-
eral relation between theory and design. The paper discusses and criticises
the cognitive science based approaches to human-computer interaction re-
search and praxis by questioning the value of additive models and the gen-
eralisability of laboratory data. The paper concludes that a radically prag-
matic science of human-computer interaction taking the context of use, the
context of design, and the relation between science and design into account
can yield design-knowledge and understanding that goes beyond technical
control; and that such a radical pragmatic science is necessarily based on
dialectical, as opposed to mechanical materialism.
Paper three: Supporting the Development of Transparent Interaction
(1995)
The paper, co-authored with Jakob Bardram, is an investigation into the
concept of transparent interaction from the point of view of activity theory,
defining transparency as handling the computer through operations. The fo-
cus of the paper is on how to support the userÕs development of operations
(and thus transparent interaction) by embedding zones of proximal devel-
opment in the artefact. The theoretical basis of the paper is GalÕperinÕs ac-
count on the formation of mental acts through the development of an orient-
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ing basis, and the subsequent automatisation of actions into operations,
emphasising the quality of an action, in terms of its generality, its level of
abbreviation and the extent to which the action is mastered. Three key is-
sues in designing for transparency are identified: supporting development in
use, ensuring a certain degree of initial familiarity and setting conditions for
the formation of new operations. Finally, the paper points to the need for a
thorough reconsideration of the theoretical foundation for human-computer
interaction research and praxis, and points to activity theory as a possible
solution.
Paper four: Contradictions in the Festival Project --Activity systems,
obstacles, and dynamic forces in design (1996a)
In this paper, the Festival project is analysed by identifying contradictions
in the course of the project, and then fitting these contradictions into the ac-
tivity theory based notion of contradiction (Engestrm, 1987). Thus, the pa-
per is an investigation into operational use of activity theory in systems de-
velopment. The primary contradiction between use and exchange value ex-
pressed as a contradiction in the festival of computers as utensils versus
computers as epaulettes, is identified; which makes it possible to under-
stand the main barriers in the project. It is concluded that the perspectives
of contradiction and activity theory are valuable tools for making sense of
design projects, and challenges for the further development of activity theory
related to heterogeneity issues are identified.
Paper five: The Festival Checklist -- design as the transformation of
artefacts (1996b)
The paper describes the Festival project with focus on a ÒchecklistÓ, and
analyses the case in terms of the transformation concept introduced in the
paper. The transformation concept is based on an understanding of crys-
tallisation, secondary artefacts and boundary objects. The idea of transfor-
mation is that the ongoing process of crystallising evolving praxis into arte-
facts can be emulated in the use of representations during the design pro-
cess. Transformation emphasises the materiality of praxis and aims at pre-
serving praxis across the introduction of new technology. The strength and
weakness of the transformation idea are that it limits radical innovation in
ensuring that the new artefact makes sense to the considered praxis.
Paper six: Organisational learning is crystallised into artefacts
(1996c)
Exemplified with the Festival case, the paper discusses the notion of organi-
sational learning as the manifest crystallisation of collective experience into
artefacts; thus, integrating an engineering and an emancipatory perspective
within the framework of activity theory. The paper points to three issues in
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design: crystallisation of procedural memory into new generations of arte-
facts; supporting continual crystallisation of organisational procedures and
knowledge by facilitating tailoring and easy re-design; and disclosing cur-
rent modus operandi through formalisation at the computer artefact, turn-
ing this into a Marxo-Freudian tool for building consciousness to transcend
existing limitations through emancipating praxis.
Paper seven: Understanding objects in use-oriented design (1997a)
The paper is an investigation into the relation between participatory design
and object-oriented methods. The concept of physical modelling is identified
as a key principle in applying object-oriented methods in design with users,
but it is also argued that many methods subscribe to a naive naturalism
making object-orientation contradict with established understandings of
human praxis. Based on WartofskyÕs account on the role of representations
and the general relation between perception and action, the role of physical
modelling in design and in praxis is reformulated in non-naturalist terms.
Based on the Festival case the transformation of artefacts concept is intro-
duced as a possible framework for understanding the use of object-oriented
methods in participatory design.
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The present thesis introduces the concept of design artefacts as a unifying
perspective in systems development research and praxis. Systems develop-
ment, or design, is the activity in which new computer-based systems are
brought about: it involves at least two parties Ð users and designers. The
concept of design artefacts, in contrast to more process-oriented perspec-
tives, emphasises material mediation. Part one gives a conceptual overview
of the thesis based on the results reported in the papers contained in part
two (Bertelsen 1994a, b, 1996a, b, c, 1997a, Bardram and Bertelsen 1995).
The thesis is based on a dialectical materialist approach comprising activ-
ity theory (mainly Engestrm 1987), and the notion of primary, secondary
and tertiary artefacts (Wartofsky 1973), supplemented with the notion of
boundary objects (Star 1989).
The argument is based on the tenet of activity theory that human praxis is
mediated by artefacts and is continually changing in the process of socio cul-
tural development. Development is not seen as an exceptional property of
design, but as a basic feature of praxis in general, which in turn can be
recognised in the artefacts mediating praxis. Thus, praxis is approached
through mediating artefacts and, similarly, design can be comprehended by
looking at design artefacts. Design is the zone where heterogeneous praxes
meet to change a given praxis through the construction and introduction of a
new artefact. This meeting is mediated by design artefacts which are
boundary objects in the sense that they make different sense to the various
praxes involved. Based on WartofskyÕs analysis of the relation between per-
ception and action, design artefacts are identified as being clusters of pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary artefacts, simultaneously mediating different
elements of the design process. Transformators, mediating design as a
transformation process emulating the process of development in use, and
abductors mediating the development of new motives, are introduced as
special instances of design artefacts.
The design artefact concept provides a uniform view on the outcomes of sys-
tems development research, (theories, methods, concepts, tools, etc.) as be-




This chapter describes empirical activities conducted throughout the project.
These activities are directly and indirectly elaborated on in the papers, and
in some cases also point to further writing and research.
During the autumn of 1993 Eval was started, as a joint effort of the Devise
centre aiming at the evaluation, in an industrial setting, of the Devise envi-
ronment for experimental systems development. Eval was motivated by a
desire to see how the products of the Devise project would work in the Òreal
worldÓ context, as well as recommendations of the midway evaluation of the
PIFT grant to Devise. For me, Eval was a promising source for empirical
grounding of the study of design artefacts. Several companies were con-
tacted, and in some cases project establishment activities were initiated.
Promising activities were undertaken together with two departments of a
Danish machine factory with whom we had several meetings where we
planned the project and made initial field studies before the company
backed out. The impossibility of finding an industrial partner for the evalu-
ation may be ascribed both to reluctance in the industry to engage in pro-
jects without an immediately visible result, and to the state of the Devise
tools at that time. The Eval effort ebbed away after approximately one
year1.
The Music Festival project which took place between autumn 1994 and au-
tumn 1995, was in the outset planned to evaluate the Devise environment,
but very early took another direction (see below).
In parallel with the Eval effort I conducted open ended qualitative inter-
views with two system developers in a small in-house development organi-
sation, and with two designers of embedded software at a machine factory.
The purpose was to acquire knowledge about how the creation of new ideas
was mediated by design artefacts. Also in parallel with the Eval effort,
1Later activities in which I did not participate, have more successfully contributed to the
evaluation of the Devise environment. In the autumn of 1995 two student programmers
were hired to implement versions of the Festival prototype and a hospital information
system developed by Jakob Bardram, using  the Devise environment. In 1997 the tools
had reached a state where it was possible to apply them in an actual project. This was
done in a project supported by CIT where people from the Devise centre cooperated with a
big Danish shipping company on a new system.
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Susanne B¿dker and I conducted a project aiming at evaluating and giving
input to redesign of the Mj¿lner debugger Valhalla.
The Valhalla evaluation and the Festival project are described in detail be-
low. The description of the Valhalla evaluation presents the results of the
evaluation, whereas the description of the Festival project is more of a raw
case story.
Debugger
The aim of this project was to evaluate and give input to redesign of parts of
the Mj¿lner BETA programming environment. The focus was on the object-
oriented source level debugger Valhalla. The project consisted of two main
activities, firstly an evaluation of Valhalla 1.3 focusing on observation of
use, secondly contributing to the re-design of Valhalla through a design
workshop with the developer in charge of the debugger and two other
Mj¿lner/Beta designers. This section is based on a draft report written to-
gether with Susanne B¿dker.
What is Valhalla
Valhalla is a source-level debugger for the BETA language and is a part of
the Mj¿lner BETA System. The aim of Valhalla is to help the programmer
locate errors in BETA programs by tracing their execution at the BETA
source level. Thus, the Valhalla user often knows the code looked at and the
purpose of the program rather well. And the debugger is launched because of
an error in the program. There is at least one more reason for using
Valhalla, namely to be able to look at a program execution in order to learn
about the program. Thus, Valhalla is in some cases also of interest to per-
sons who hardly know the code, and who are in a non-error situation.
Valhalla includes the following functionality:
Controlling program execution: The program execution may be controlled
e.g. by setting breakpoints and single stepping at the BETA source level.
Runtime errors are caught by Valhalla which will display the offending ob-
ject and code. From there, program state can be browsed to locate the cause
of error. The debugged program executes in a process of its own, being
watched by Valhalla, but otherwise unaffected.
Static browsing of program text: Static program browsing is supported
through group- and code-viewers making it possible to browse the different
relationships present in a BETA program. These include super-pattern rela-
tionships, links from name applications to the corresponding declarations,
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the binding of slots to fragments, and so on. Finally, search for expressions
denoting objects and patterns may be performed.
Dynamic browsing: Dynamic browsing refers to the possibility of browsing
the dynamic state of the BETA program execution. This includes inspection
of the call chain and object states whenever the program execution is
stopped at a breakpoint or as a result of a runtime error.
The user interface of Valhalla consists of a main window containing a menu
and a number of different windows (viewers) displaying different aspects of
the debugged program.
Version 1.3 in use
The focus of the evaluation was on ValhallaÕs function in use, according to
the general constitution of use quality in use, but also due to the practical
difficulty of generating realistic debugging situations in the laboratory.
The study was done through the following activities: interview with the pro-
grammer in charge of the version of maintaining and developing Valhalla,
as well as designing the next version. Interviews and demonstration with
one frequent user of Valhalla. Our own novice attempts to explore Valhalla
based on the user manuals. Study of a skilled Beta-programmer's introduc-
tion to Valhalla. Observations and video taping of a programmerÕs use of
Valhalla. The last activity turned out to involve methodical problems.
Two interdependent methodical problems arose in relation to studying the
debugger in use. The first problem was related to debugging being an inte-
grated part of programming, happening at unforeseen occasions. Bugs are
not isolated phenomena only related to the piece of code the programmer is
working on when bugs occur. It is next to impossible to generate bug situa-
tions that in a realistic way can be used as a basis for laboratory testing;
thus, we were thrown on hanging around at the programmerÕs office until
bugs occurred. The method we applied was to have a video camera, that the
programmer would switch on when using the debugger, installed at the pro-
grammerÕs workstation. This led to the second problem, related to making
sense of the recorded data. The resolution on the video tapes was so low that
the only thing we could distinguish on the recorded UNIX screen was the
numerous windows popping up. The tapes partly worked for stimulated re-
call interviews, but we were unable to make micro level analysis.
Through the evaluation we were able to detect a number of problems in the
use of Valhalla 1.3, the most important of which are briefly described below.
The number of windows. In Valhalla, any new undertaking is shown in a
window: any object, stack etc. is shown in its own independent window. The
number of windows launched is in itself big. Furthermore, several of the
windows show snapshots, thus e.g. a new request for the stack later in the
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session opens yet another stack window. It is later impossible to see which
windows belong together, somehow representing the ÒstatusÓ of the program
execution, or which version of e.g. the stack is the most recent, and which ac-
tually contains outdated information. The programmers typically do not
want to keep the snapshots/state information between breaks in the pro-
gram execution, but each window has to be closed individually.
Keeping track of history. Knowing which windows are created when and in
which context is, as outlined above, one of the problems of keeping track of
history. Furthermore, the programmers expressed a wish to be able to go
backwards in the program execution, or to restart from a well-defined state.
Staying within oneÕs own code. Though Valhalla delimits which code may
be looked at through the fragment system, there were three major problems
with respect to which code one looks at. Firstly, Valhalla stops on signals
that do not always come from errors in the code being debugged. Secondly,
using Òstep intoÓ takes the programmer through the execution of all the code
including the basic libraries. What happens there is often of little interest to
the programmer, and even worse: it is often exactly the step before getting
outside ones own code that is interesting. This leaves the programmer in a
difficult situation since there is no way of getting back. Thirdly, in various
larger settings it is important to be able to debug only oneÕs own part of a
larger application, e.g. when building something on top of the hypermedia,
one does not want to debug the hypermedia.
Re-design workshop
To clarify the future of Valhalla, Susanne B¿dker and I conducted a work-
shop with S¿ren Brandt (the developer responsible for the debugger), Elmer
Sandvad and J¿rgen Knudsen (designers at Mj¿lner). The workshop was di-
vided into three phases. Firstly, a brief report on the preliminary findings
from the evaluation, as described above. Secondly, a ÒBrain stormÓ centred
around why, who, how, what questions of debugging. Thirdly, presentation of
the new design by means of a paper mock-up constructed during the morn-
ing, and a simulated debugging session with the new version.
Brainstorm
The brainstorm was structured around the questions: Why? Who? How? and
What? in relation to object-oriented source-level debugging. This structure
was pragmatically chosen because of successful experience with the use of
such questions, and was backed up theoretically by the three levels of hu-
man activity corresponding to the questions why? what? and how?
It turned out that the only participant using the debugger regularly was
S¿ren. The two other participants were using more traditional techniques
like inserting printouts of variables in the source code, which made it possi-
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ble to trace critical variables, during the entire execution, particularly the
initial phase, to detect the errors when they are generated. Their own expla-
nation for not using Valhalla was lack of education, but it also pointed to
the fact that Valhalla 1.3 did not support tracing of variables, but only
views on ÒdiscreteÓ states of objects.
Valhalla is intended to be an object-oriented debugger in contrast to tradi-
tional source level debuggers with only one code window and one trace win-
dow and no support for monitoring the relation between different parts of
the program. However, the essential thing to monitor in most debugging sit-
uations is dynamics. This discrepancy can be understood as an instance of
the general tension between principles and praxis. The Mj¿lner BETA sys-
tem is built upon a conceptual framework focusing on static aspects of mod-
elling rather than dynamic aspects of execution. Thus, Valhalla 1.3 was con-
structed to conform to the principles, rather than to support programming
praxis.
During the brainstorm it was questioned whether anything was gained from
the object-oriented debugging approach, and it was agreed that the next ver-
sion should support ÒtraditionalÓ source level debugging in addition to the
object-oriented approach, e.g. by integrating a report generator or scripting
of calculations relative to specified watch points. The advantage of this
strategy was, according to J¿rgen, that programmers could start using the
tracing facilities and then gradually approach the new ÒreligionÓ.
However, in dealing with totally unexpected errors no information can be ob-
tained from traces, because you don't know what to trace. In such situations
the object-oriented approach is more likely to help the programmer.
Furthermore, Valhalla 1.3 had been a useful tool for reporting errors in ba-
sic libraries etc. Thus, the object-oriented approach is useful when dealing
with different layers of a program simultaneously.
The principles versus praxis tension also turned up in the discussion of the
difficulty of navigating between the excessive of windows in Valhalla 1.3. It
was discussed whether programmers have, or should be allowed to have, a
textual understanding of the program they are working on. S¿ren claimed
that Òif you are working on the text then you are working in a procedural
mannerÓ (as opposed to an object-oriented manner), but later on J¿rgen
claimed that Òthe program text is a suitable means of navigationÓ. It was
stressed that Òthe object-oriented programmerÓ is not working on the code-
text but on the structure of the program, that is hierarchies, patterns, ob-
jects. The view on the textual representation as well as the view on specific
executions are only means for viewing the structure. Here, the principles of
object-orientation prevented the Mj¿lner designers from acknowledging the
central role of textual representations in programming praxis, including
their own praxis. However, they agreed that a less fragmented (object-ori-
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ented) and more sequential (textual) way of viewing the program would be
fruitful.
Paper mock-up as a vehicle for discussion of the new design
Based on feedback from users and discussions at Mj¿lner Informatik, S¿ren
had made a design specification for a new version of Valhalla, intending to
solve most of the problems described above. In the new design all of
Valhalla resides inside a single window. The main reason for this is that it
makes it possible to draw connections between sub-window displaying ob-
jects, data or source code. The display of source code in the new Valhalla is
done with a subset of the Mj¿lner hyper-structure editor Sif.
After the brainstorming the new design was presented by means of a paper
mock-up, produced during the morning before the workshop. The mock-up
was based on the specification for the new version and the standard exam-
ple Beta program from the present Valhalla manual. Although S¿ren had a
very clear vision of the new design, the process of building the mock-up pro-
voked discussions and decisions about non-trivial details.
The presentation and enactment of the new debugger served as the vehicle
for a long discussion about the new design and about how the different parts
of the Mj¿lner Beta environment should be integrated in the future. Several
times the discussion became very technical, but frequently the focus turned
back to usability issues. No specific conclusions were drawn from these dis-
cussions; but they yielded new unstructured insights among the Mj¿lner de-
signers into the environment they were building and the activity this envi-
ronment was aimed at supporting.
Findings and further research
The most obvious problem with the studied version of Valhalla was the
number of windows and the resulting risk of getting lost. This problem was
easy to discover through isolated studies of the use of the debugger. What
turned out during the workshop was that Valhalla mainly supports one as-
pect of debugging (the object-oriented view on runtime instantiations), and
that this aspect wasnÕt enough debugging support in real programming. The
textual aspects turned out to be equally important; both support for tracing
and support for viewing the code.
In relation to my thesis, the study of the Mj¿lner BETA debugger elicited the
contradiction between the object-oriented principles of working with struc-
ture and the actual text oriented programming praxis of both users and de-
signers of the Mj¿lner BETA system. Thus, the study has contributed to un-
derstanding the tension between prescription and praxis, which is one of the
important themes of the thesis.
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A topic for further research is on methods for collecting data on program-
ming, both at the technical level of being able to see what is going on, and at
the level of finding a meaningful basic unit to study (debugging is obviously
a too small unit). Further empirical studies of the object-oriented principle
of structure and its role in practical programming, is another topic for fur-
ther research. This will involve analysis on what is the object of program-
ming work (text, structure, application, use praxis).
Music Festival
The Festival project took place during the first half of 1995, and involved
Morten Kyng, Kim Halskov Madsen, Preben Mogensen, Henrik B¾rbak
Christensen, and Olav W. Bertelsen from the Devise Centre at Aarhus
University, and people from the Festival organisation. During the fall of
1994 the Festival had decided that they needed an IT-strategy, and an in-
ternal IT group was formed. The project was initiated by the Festival who
contacted the Devise Centre to initiate a project eliciting the possible ad-
vantages of introducing IT in the planning and production of the festival.
Unfortunately, the scope of the project was cut down by festival manage-
ment half way through, and the engagement terminated before the planned
activities were completed. Nearly a year should go before any of us were able
to write about it. Apart from the writings about the Festival case included
in this thesis, Kim Halskov Madsen (1996) has used the case in a discus-
sion of initiative in participatory design.
The Festival
The Festival is a non-profit organisation with the production of DenmarkÕs
largest annual music festival as its main objective. In 1995 the festival took
place during 4 days, with concerts on 8 different stages, presenting a total of
more than 140 different acts. Making a music festival involves many differ-
ent tasks: engaging the artists, establishing camping areas for the audience,
selling tickets, selling foods, controlling access to the festival site, informing
the press, building the festival site, etc. The volunteers working in the
Festival are organised in 35 operation groups, 150 are working throughout
the year and in the time around the festival 2500 volunteers are enrolled.
9000 members of external organisations (e.g. boy scouts and sports clubs)
are working during the festival. 10 people have a regular, paid job at the
Festival.
The focus of the project was on technical production and pre-production, in-
volving people from the Booking group, Sound and Light group, Transit
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group, Catering group, and the eight stage groups (Green, Red, etc.). The
Booking group is responsible for deciding which artists are going to play at
the festival, and for negotiating the conditions and prices with the agents.
The Sound and Light group is responsible for the technical side of the
artistsÕ performances. They are responsible for making arrangements with
sub-contractors running the basic sound and light equipment on the individ-
ual stages, and for making sure that all the artists will have the conditions
needed for their performances, equipment-wise, including instrument ampli-
fiers, piano tuners, and help with special effects. In addition, the Sound and
Light group has a co-ordinating role in the pre-production. The Transit group
is responsible for the transportation of the artists from airport to hotels to
and festival, etc., and for the booking of hotel rooms. The Catering group is
responsible for dressing rooms, meals, and other backstage facilities for the
artists. The festival takes place on eight different stages. The stage groups
are responsible for the production at the stages including establishing the
facilities in the backstage area, e.g. stage and production offices, stage
hands, etc.
The project
The project took place during the first half of 1995. We had the first meeting
with the Festival in the middle of January, and in the beginning of February
we decided to engage in the project, and an agreement for the project was
formed.
The first project meeting at the Festival office in Roskilde took place at the
end of February. The Sound and Light group told us about the Festival from
their perspective, and about their work. We in return demonstrated the
Devise Hyper Media System as inspiration for the Sound and Light ac-
tivists. The Sound and Light group had prepared for the meeting, by making
two descriptions on paper, one describing the Òflow of informationÓ to and
from the Sound and Light group during pre-production, the other a sketch of
a database for pre-production represented as a screen layout.
During March a series of interviews with two of the stage groups, the
Catering group, the group responsible for access to the festival area, the
Transit group, the Booking group, festival management, and a secretary,
were conducted. On April 1, a workshop with Sound and Light, Transit,
Catering, and the Yellow stage groups took place. After the workshop we de-
cided to use a database management system in order to have a prototype
ready before the big rush of the pre-production activities. During April we
designed and implemented a first prototype of a system for Pre-production.
At the middle of April, the Festival management became nervous about the
project, fearing that too much information would flow too freely around in
the organisation, therefore they dictated that the project could only continue
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with the Sound and Light group. As a consequence the second and third
planned workshops with the operation groups had to be cancelled. This
breach of the original agreement made it difficult for us to continue the work
in a decent manner, especially it became impossible to confront their under-
standing of the festival with the actual reality. Seen in retrospect we should
have left the project at this time.
During May, the first version of the prototype was installed at the Sound
and Light office, and we helped them entering some of the existing data into
the system. This version was never used by the Sound and Light group. At
the end of May a simplified version of the prototype more suited for the sit-
uation with Sound and Light as the only users, was installed. At this time,
Sound and Light had not made the checklists as they did during the previ-
ous yearÕs pre-production, some of the data were entered into the database,
but most data were only available on faxes, and ad hoc notes. The final re-
sult was low quality checklists delivered to the stage groups.
In the last week of June, Festival 95 took place. During the festival we con-
ducted field studies at the Festival site. After the festival we wrote a report
on potential advantages of introducing IT in the Festival organisation. The
first version of this report was sent to the festival on August, 25.
Due to time pressure we were not able to have the people we had observed or
interviewed, approve the report. To remedy this violation of our own princi-
ples we both sent the report to all the involved groups as well as to the spe-
cific people whoÕs addresses we knew, so they could correct possible mis-
takes. The reaction from festival management was quite surprising. In a let-
ter dated September 5, they told us that we had violated the conditions for
the project by sending the draft report to the volunteers. Management had
the opinion that we had continued work without respecting the FestivalÕs re-
ality and the general reality, which according to management was that.
Òa strategy must be ready before possible affected parties are involved.
[if this had been respected] then the researchers would have avoided
unrealistic expectations [among the volunteers] and subsequent frus-
tration and disappointmentÓ (Letter from the Festival management
September 5, 1995, my translation).
Despite this letter and the general conditions for the project, we felt that
several interesting topics were left to study in relation to the use of IT in the
Festival, furthermore the FestivalÕs internal IT group wanted to continue to
cooperate with us. This lead us to engage in negotiations about a continued
project. However, it was not possible to get sufficient explicit commitment
from the Festival management, so we withdrew from further activities.
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Pre-Production Work
During the spring, the head of the Sound and Light group is employed at the
festival to take care of the technical pre-production, and to distribute rele-
vant information to other operation groups. The most important means of
communication throughout this process is telefax, and to some extent tele-
phone. Pre-production work is a kind of detective work; when an artist is
booked for the Festival the normal situation is that the only information the
Festival gets is the name of an agency somewhere. Thus the first difficult
task in pre-production is to find somebody who actually knows something
about the artist, and then to convince this person that the festival needs up-
to-date information as soon as possible. Pre-production work is complicated
by several factors. People in the music business are always late with every-
thing; it can be hard to make people understand that the festival needs in-
formation in advance. Also, it is very important for especially the bigger
artists to show off by demanding specific resources for their appearance at
the Festival, these demands then have to be negotiated in some way.
Finally, information about the Festival program, and information about ar-
rival times and hotels of the artists has to be treated confidentially.
Program information has to be kept secret until it is given to the public to
maintain the advertising value; information about hotels and arrival, to
protect the artists during the booking negotiations and during the Festival
(e.g. big stars do not like to have their hotels invaded by their fans and the
press). The general understanding in the Sound and Light group is that the
festival could be produced without pre-production, but that it then would be
more chaotic. Thus the purpose of pre-production is to facilitate a smooth
production with a relaxed and friendly atmosphere.
During pre-production Sound and Light builds a band file, a plastic folder
enclosing documents, for each performance. These files are kept in a matrix
of cardboard boxes, with one column per stage and one row per day. The first
document in the file would normally be the checklist. One sheet of paper
with the total plan of performances, the play plan, organised in the same
way is used both as a tool for locating the files in the cardboard boxes, and
for recording central information about the specific performances, e.g. the
state of the information gathering, and the need for special equipment. The
play plan is always situated on the desk in the Sound and Light office; when
someone calls on the phone the Sound and Light person will look at the play
plan, locate the artist in question, and examine the state of the pre-produc-
tion for this performance; then the pre-production person will take the file in
the cardboard box while continuing the discussion on the phone.
The checklist is a sheet of paper with pre-printed fields for information re-
lated to a specific artistÕs performance at the festival. The checklist was
originally invented in the Green stage group. This list contained fields for all
the information that should be available or collected when an artist arrived
at the backstage area at the Festival site. The checklist was filled in when
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the Sound and Light group handed information from the pre-production over
to the stage groups, and it was later used when the artist arrived.
Subsequently it was adopted by the Sound and Light group, and used during
the pre-production process as the central overview of the individual artists.
From 1993 the Sound and Light group produced a common checklist for all
the stages, and filled in the available information about the artists before
carrying the complete files over to the stage groups. Thus the checklist had
three functions: as a tool for the collection of information during pre-produc-
tion, secondly as a medium for forwarding information from the Sound and
Light group to the stage groups, and finally as a tool at the stages when re-
ceiving the artists and carrying out the performances.
Designing for pre-production work
The checklist became the central point in the design process. Despite all the
technological visions we had introduced to the users in the beginning of the
project. The most important reason for that was that the Sound and light
group already had a very strong vision about a relational database. One
member of the Sound and Light group had earlier experiences with computer
support for festival pre-production. This support was implemented in a rela-
tional database management system, and looked very much like a Òsmart
checklistÓ. The Sound and Light group had discussed this concept and
drafted a sketch of a relational database screen layout as they would like it.
This database sketch was basically a slightly expanded transformation of
the checklist.
According to the original plan, design together with the users should take
place as a series of workshops; only one of these was realised. This workshop
took place in the Festival buildings and was scheduled to 5 hours. The
planned participants were members of four Festival operation groups:
Sound and Light (3 persons), Yellow stage (one person), Catering (one per-
son), and Transit (one person); the three seniors researchers and two ap-
prentice participatory design researchers.
The plan for the workshop was to enact or simulate a series of work situa-
tions, both routine and problematic, from the planning (pre-production) and
production of the festival. The participants were encouraged to bring real or
made up situations that they found interesting, Òfocusing on the exchange of
informationÓ and how IT could be used, to the workshop. The idea was fur-
thermore that we would introduce various kinds of technologies into the
game to elicit how, e.g. computerised telefax, central and local databases, e-
mail, or hypermedia would change work at the festival.
The workshop took place around a table, on the walls were mounted large
pieces of paper. One piece of paper was laid out with columns for various
kinds of technologies; local databases, centralised databases, hypermedia,
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computer integrated telefax, etc. Cardboard lids were available to be used
as database mock-ups, and yarn for simulating hyper-links between docu-
ments. Other pieces of wall paper were used to record situations and prob-
lems during the workshop. Material from the previous yearÕs Festival was
photocopied in advance together with some made-up ideal typical material
produced by the Sound and Light group.
The first problem which we encountered at the workshop was that the par-
ticipant from the Yellow stage never came, after an hour of waiting and sev-
eral phone calls his seat was filled with one of the Sound and Light guys,
who had previously worked in the Orange stage group. This resulted in a
strong Sound and Light, and planning bias of the workshop; thus, and it be-
came much harder to generate situations where the stage claimed not to
have the information they needed. These situations would probably have
arisen if the activist from Yellow stage had participated, because that group
emphasised the lack of information during the preceding interviews.
The simulation games ended up focusing on how things were done the previ-
ous year; the workshop basically became a discussion repeating the infor-
mation the researcher already got from the interviews. The cardboard lids
and the yarn were never used, and the technology wall paper did not make
its way into the situation. The design or construction related part of the
workshop was limited to the last half hour, when the original database
sketch, produced by the Sound and Light group, was examined with respect
to suppliers and users of the information. This part of the workshop was
important for building a prototype, but it did not break the meetingness of
the workshop.
The design of the prototype took place right after the workshop. The first
step was to make an object-oriented description of pre-production and pro-
duction. The main functions of this description became to generate discus-
sions between us about data formats, and to serve as a vehicle for the estab-
lishment of a shared understanding of the Festival among us in the Devise
group. In this process the understanding of the Festival we got from the in-
terviews was an important resource.
The transformation of the object-oriented description was done by mapping
objects to tables in a straightforward manner. The issue of data-ownership
distribution of the database over several non-networked PCÕs was already
dealt with in the object-oriented model by reflecting the ownership of data in
the division of objects. The construction of the user interface of the prototype
started out on paper but we soon agreed that it was easier to program the
interface right away without making a specification first. The task was un-
complicated because most of the prototype was specified in the Sound and
Light database sketch, and on the pre-printed checklist made by Sound and
Light the previous year.
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Findings and further research
In relation to my thesis, the Festival project served as the main background
in forming the notion of design as the transformation of artefacts (Bertelsen
1996b, 1997a). Furthermore, the project has been used as a testbed for
EngestrmÕs notion of contradiction as an analytical tool (Bertelsen 1996a),
and the checklist transformation story has been used to illustrate the idea
that organisational learning is crystallised into artefacts (Bertelsen 1996c).
The festival project gives rise to several topics for further research. A lin-
guistic investigation into the object-oriented analysis and the database de-
sign could contribute to both understanding our work in the project and de-
sign work in general. The lacking ability of our methods to deal with use
praxises going through long cycles of separated phases, calls for the devel-
opment of new methods. Finally the issue of democracy in organisations
with many volunteers, and how to understand such organisations, can yield




This chapter briefly sets the stage for the contribution of the thesis by dis-
cussing the basic constitution of software, and of software construction as a
design discipline. It goes on to outline the previous development of critical
systems development research in Scandinavia; based on this outline, it fi-
nally discusses the basic features of system development research.
In his ÒNo silver bulletÓ article, Brooks (1986) analyses computer systems
development and software, by identifying the accidental and the essential
properties of the field. Accidental difficulties can be solved by means of new
tools and methods, but without dramatic gain, whereas the essential diffi-
culties cannot be subjected to technical or methodical solutions. According to
Brooks, the complexity of software is an essential property that is different
from the (accidental) complexity of other fields of engineering and science.
The essential complexity of software has two important aspects: the accel-
erating development of information technology, and the sociocultural consti-
tution of software. Although the impacts of the maelstrom-like development
of information technology seem to be overestimated these years, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the development of, e.g. the price/performance ra-
tio of computer hardware radically exceeds what has been seen in other
fields. This contributes to the complexity of software because basic software
elements have no time to stabilise before the next innovations and new ar-
eas of application come into play; the bit tends to be the only stable unit in
software. The accelerating development prohibits the development of com-
puter systems development as a craft, because the needed software knowl-
edge is constantly changing, and thus cannot crystallise into the kind of tra-
ditions that are the backbone of the development of the traditional crafts.
Software is basically a socioculturally constituted phenomenon, not a tech-
nically constituted one. Basic features of software are constituted in the con-
text of use; in most cases, software has no meaning as isolated technical
constructs (Andersen 1990, B¿dker 1991). Thus, systems development re-
search and praxis cannot be based solely on the systematic application of
quantitative software measures or other methods derived from ideal natu-
ral science, but has to include a strong basis for understanding psychologi-
cal, social and cultural phenomena. Furthermore, it has to comprehend de-
velopment as a basic feature rather than as an exception. In addition,
Brooks (1986) points to the methodical difficulties in finding comparable
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cases for collecting statistically significant empirical data on systems de-
velopment; systems development research has to rely on qualitative meth-
ods in the study of particular projects, organisations, events, etc. Such a dis-
cipline is by nature a pragmatic one directed to establishing relevant design
knowledge, rather than establishing the universal, disinterested, but also
irrelevant ÒtruthÓ.
Thus, systems development research and praxis are not purely technical
fields that can be based on algoritmics and quantitative measurements;
systems development is rather, as suggested by Kapor (1991), a design dis-
cipline, which means that it is Òconcerned with making artifacts for human
useÓ (ibid. p. 4). Due to the accelerating development of information technol-
ogy, computer systems development cannot be expected to stabilise as a
craft based on traditions, instead the field has to become an intertwined
field of praxis, research, and theory, i.e. not separated into a design praxis
and a basic science. Since the basic problems of computer systems develop-
ment today are the accelerating development of basic technology and the so-
ciocultural constitution of software, such an integrated field must be based
on a theoretical framework that understands these features as basic condi-
tions of the world rather than unusual exceptions. Such a theoretical frame-
work has to be exclusive to avoid the multi-paradigmatic babel of conflicting
world views, but at the same time it has to assimilate other perspectives
and disciplines in an operational manner. Activity theory could be a possi-
ble, although not unproblematic, candidate for such an overarching frame-
work (see also Bertelsen 1997b).
The approach to software development implicitly criticised by Kapor (1991)
and Brooks (1986), perceives software as a pure technical matter to be op-
timised along objective criteria in order to achieve efficiency and to max-
imise revenue, thus completely neglecting issues like quality of working life.
Bansler labels this approach Òthe system theoretical schoolÓ (Bansler 1987,
1989), Hirschheim and Klein (1989) refers to it as functionalism. This ap-
proach to systems development has been widely criticised for being both in-
efficient and inhuman, and alternatives have been formed including socio-
technical as well as more critical approaches. In Scandinavia, critical ap-
proaches to system development research have been through three phases.
The first phase, NJMF, DEMOS, DUE (see Ehn & Kyng, 1987, Bansler
1987) was the phase of politically engaged worker-academics cooperation;
politically engaged computer scientists used their technical knowledge for
the benefit of the workers and for general democratisation and improvement
of the quality of working life. In these early projects the focus was on
changed motives for engaging in the design of computer artefacts; from op-
timising productivity to serving the working class. In the next wave, it was
realised that the new motives for engaging in system development created a
need for new ways of doing design. Thus, e.g. the UTOPIA project (B¿dker et
al. 1987), developed new methods and techniques for specifying new com-
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puter support for work and for involving users in the design process. In this
second wave, the external political critique of the first wave was trans-
formed into an internal and theoretical critique. This wave still dominates
participatory design. In the third, wave it becomes clear that the new ways
of doing design induce a need for new artefacts mediating the making of the
actual computer systems. This can be seen in the Devise project (Gr¿nb¾k &
Knudsen 1992, Kyng 1991)2 where a focus on the development on tools and
environments is taken. The new design life requires a new house. The third
wave can be seen as the crystallisation of the new ways of making and doing
design into deliberately formed new design artefacts. The APLEX (B¿dker et
al. 1988) expresses this new direction. In this line of development it becomes
natural to use the artefacts mediating design as the vantage point for re-
search on design as done in the design artefacts approach introduced in this
thesis.
Systems development research is a field, based on a multiplicity of research
methods and strategies, including intervention, theorising, field studies, and
controlled experiments. Systems development research cannot, as it is pos-
sible with the natural sciences, be arranged according to the basic versus
applied, and the theoretical versus experimental distinctions. It is impossi-
ble to make experiments detached from theoretical considerations which in
turn only make sense when related to concrete reality. Research that is not
contributing to the development of theory is not research, but mere consult-
ing. However, consulting is in many cases a fruitful method, because the re-
searcher has a chance to get close enough to the object of research (change
processes) to see what is going on.
Systems development research is complicated by various features, setting a
demand for the application of a broad spectrum of modes of enquiry.
• The domain of systems development research includes human beings,
which are very hard to study in the controlled manner, applicable for
purely technical phenomena. The objects of the ideal natural sciences are
phenomena with causality, whereas phenomena involving human beings
are intentional. In systems development research the researcher has to
ask ÒwhyÓ, and results are always subject to interpretation. Quantitative
methods are less applicable, instead research is often concrete, particu-
lar, and qualitative.
2 The Devise project, or Devise Centre for Experimental Systems Development, is an
ongoing cooperation between the Petri nets group, the programming languages and
environments group, and the systems development group within the Department of
Computer Science at the University of Aarhus. Further information can currently be found
on http://www.daimi.aau.dk/DEVISE.
18
• Important qualities of computer artefacts are constituted in the context
of use. This means that we never know what we are building before the
implementation is done.
• Systems development research has change processes as its objects,
which researchwise is a methodical difficulty.
• Intervention is both part of the object and a necessary method for learn-
ing about the object.
• In systems development research we are actively engaged in change pro-
cesses and doing research at the same time. We need to engage ourselves
in change to establish the object and to get close enough to it to have




By introducing the notion of dialectical materialism in three steps, this
chapter aims at elucidating the forms of knowledge established by systems
development research. Firstly, by paraphrasing the development of the phi-
losophy of science in the 20th century, represented by three central posi-
tions, the recurring dilemma between relativism and cosmological objec-
tivism in western thinking is illustrated. Secondly, the role of basic assump-
tions in systems development research is discussed based on Burrell and
MorganÕs (1979) scheme for classification of organisational paradigms, elic-
iting the danger in confusing descriptive taxonomies with norms for re-
search. Thirdly, a solution to the described problems is outlined through the
introduction of MarxÕ theses on Feuerbach, which form basis for dialectical
materialism.
Truth and method in the philosophy of science
The problem of finding true knowledge has been a main concern in western
thinking from the old Greeks and onwards. In the 20th century, the truth
problem has been the theme of the philosophy of science, attempting to es-
tablish a principle of demarcation between science and non-science, sense
and nonsense. Logical positivism, founded in the 1920ies in the Vienna cir-
cle, approached the problem by analysing the logical structure of the state-
ments made by science, rejecting the meaning of question about reality and
relevance (Carnap 1935). Critical rationalism (Popper 1973) was concerned
with the scientific process, particularly the process of justification of scien-
tific findings, thus prescribing the ideal process of scientific inquiry.
Common for the philosophy of science is that it has attributed true science
to the application of specific methods; e.g. the inductive method in logical
positivism, or the hypothetical deductive method in critical rationalism.
Method has been seen as ensuring that no matter who does research and
what their interests are, a result will be good and clean as long as Òscientific
methodÓ has been applied. The history of science has been perceived as a ra-
tional and cumulative development towards greater knowledge.
In the sixties, philosophers like Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1975) ap-
proached the problem of understanding science by actually looking at the
history of scientific inquiry, and found that the ideals produced by philoso-
phy of science did not have much to do with actual history. This led Kuhn to
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the concepts of normal science, paradigm and scientific revolution, rejecting
also the belief in a cumulative history of science. Feyerabend, being more
normative, argues for methodical pluralism.
ÒThere is no special method that guarantees success or makes it proba-
ble. Scientists do not solve problems because they possess a magic
wand Ð methodology, or a theory of rationality Ð but because they have
studied a problem for a long time, because they know the situation
fairly well, because they are not too dumb [É] and because the excesses
of one scientific school are almost always balanced by the excesses of
some other school [É] Basically there is hardly any difference between
the process that leads to the announcement of a new scientific law and
the process preceding passage of a new law in societyÓ. (Feyerabend
1975, p. 302).
The above statement may be too radical. Truth is not universal and accessi-
ble, method is not a universal guaranty (or infallible nanny), but we may say
that honesty, and the search for universal truth as a self-educating norm,
characterises good science in general.
Further, as claimed by Kuhn, different scientific schools and traditions have
different, often incommensurable ways of establishing valid scientific argu-
ments, or proofs. To be scientifically valid is to conform to the established
norms within the tradition. KuhnÕs argument can be radicalised by claiming
that scientific validity depends on scientific community, which is part of a
broader societal praxis. Thus the production of scientific fact must be sub-
sumed under the criticism of societal praxis.
Feyerabend is a rebellion within the field of analytical philosophy and tradi-
tional (Vienna and after) philosophy of science. In that context, it makes
sense to point out that no universal principles exist and that Òthe mature
citizenÓ must make up his3 own mind and make his own decisions. What
Feyerabend ignores is that science, and any other human endeavour, is his-
torically situated in a societal context. Feyerabend realises that the purpose
of science is not to acquire divine insight, that science serves profane pur-
poses, but he does not analyse how science itself is part of the economy. He
destroys all cultural intolerance by stating: ÒAt all times man approached
his surroundings with wide open senses and fertile intelligence, at all times
he made incredible discoveries, at all times we can learn from his ideas.Ó
(Feyerabend 1975 p. 307). However, he does not ask what ÒsensesÓ and
ÒintelligenceÓ are, or how these human faculties are constituted.
3 Cowboys are usually men.
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On basic assumptions
Research is based on sets of basic assumptions not questioned on a day to
day basis. The validity of the laboratory experiment, at least as it is tradi-
tionally perceived, can be seen as an example of that (Chapanis 1967).
The classification and analysis of different approaches to the study of a
given subject matter can be based on an investigation into the basic as-
sumptions of the different approaches. This is the strategy chosen by Burrell
and Morgan (1979) in an attempt to classify different schools in organisa-
tional theories. This is done by locating them in a two-dimensional classifi-
cation scheme, with assumptions about the nature of social science on one




Figure 1: The Burrell and Morgan scheme.
 The Burrell and Morgan scheme has a concrete historical scope and purpose
as an instrument for making sense of sociological theories of organisation.
ÒIn this analysis we polarise a number of issues and make much use of
rough dichotomisations as a means of presenting our case. We do so not
merely for the purpose of classification, but to forge a working tool. We
advocate our scheme as a heuristic device rather than a rigid defini-
tion.Ó (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. xii).
The Burrell and Morgan scheme has also been applied outside the narrow
context of organisational theory, e.g. by Hirschheim and Klein (1989) to the
field of systems development research. This makes sense because systems
development is also organisational change. A more problematic aspect of
Hirschheim and KleinÕs (op cit.) use of the Burrell and Morgan scheme is
that they tend to use it as a normative rather than a descriptive tool. They
understand the scheme as a systematic analysis starting with Òa prioriÓ,
universal categories of scientific inquiry and the finite set of possible world
views. Thus, they use the scheme as a finite and unchangeable space that
any suggestion for a new theoretical framework needs to define itself in. By
taking the dimensions to the extreme they end up degenerating the scheme






Figure 2: Hirschheim and KleinÕs degeneration of the Burrell and Morgan
scheme.4
For the normative purpose a more viable strategy is to dissolve the di-
chotomies of the scheme and thereby to overcome the shortcomings of the
paradigms laid out by the scheme. Then, the outcome of such an exercise
may afterwards be analysed by placing it in the Burrell and Morgan scheme.
As a normative instrument the order-conflict axis may still be valid; the
litmus test is to ask whether hard emancipation is on the agenda.
Dissolving the subjectivism-objectivism dichotomy, together with the inter-
pretation vs. change dichotomy, is one of the central achievements of dialec-
tical materialism, which is the basis for this thesis.
Dialectical materialism
As illustrated above, the Burrell and Morgan scheme may be a suitable tool
for organising the analysis of concrete directions in organisational sociology,
but as a general framework it suffers from the unfruitful ontological and
epistemological dichotomisation between objectivism and subjectivism. The
dialectical resolving of this dichotomy is one of the basic features of dialecti-
cal materialism, which is the basis for activity theory. MarxÕ notion of di-
alectical materialism, as expressed in the Feuerbach theses, is based on
conceptions of history and dialectics developed by Hegel.
Hegel understands reality, including human reason and rationality, as being
historically constituted. He perceives history as a spiritual development
where human consciousness and knowledge are gradually enhanced in the
attempt to appropriate reality and thereby consciousness by itself creates
new cultural, technical and social institutions. By their consciousness, hu-
mans change the world, and spiritualise it according to their ideas. Through
this transformation of the world things, the consciousness acts back on itself
and is itself changed. The process and energy in the historical dynamics
come from human consciousness. When consciousness appropriates the
world through human work, the forms of consciousness are themselves ob-
4 This observation was originally made by Randy Trigg when Klein visited rhus in 1989.
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jectified in the things in the world. This self-representation of consciousness
in the world of things, is the basic figure in HegelÕs philosophy of history. In
this process, consciousness is alienated because it is split into something
different from itself. Thus, for consciousness the purpose of history is to ap-
propriate and spiritualise this different world, in which it has been alien-
ated; when this world has been passed spirit can at last exist as itself.
However, history does not in general coincide with the motives of the indi-
vidual human beings. Thus, individuals become ÒtoolsÓ for the engrossing
historical process. In this respect Hegel is in line with the enlightenment
philosophical notion of the necessity of history. Humans are always part of,
and contributing to, history, no matter what they do. Everything, even nature
is subsumed under history. (Carlsen et al. 1984).
HegelÕs philosophy is idealist, taking spirit as the first source of the world.
In contrast to this, Marx emphasises the primacy of concrete material
praxis.
ÒMy dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its
directly opposite. Under the name of idea, Hegel turns the thought-pro-
cess into an independent subject, which for him is the real demiurgos,
whereas reality for him only is the outer, phenomenal form of the idea.
With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing but the material which
has been transformed and translated in the human head. [É] The mys-
tification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, does not prevent him
from being the first to present its general form of working in a compre-
hensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. You
must turn it right side up again, to discover the rational kernel within
the mystical shell.Ó (Marx 1962, p. 27, my translation).
Without entering into a philosophical treatment of dialectics and dialectical
materialism, MarxÕ theses on Feuerbach (Marx 1845), are used here as an
illustration of the basic ideas of dialectical materialism as basis for activity
theory. On the surface, the theses deal with the sociology of religion, the
question being: what are the origin and material status of religious ideas.
They illustrate and condense important points where idealist philosophy,
and cognitivism can be criticised. On a very compact form, they express the
dialectical materialistic basis for activity theory (see below).
Ò1: The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of
Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is con-
ceived only in the form of an object or of something contemplated about,
but not as sensuous, human activity, praxis, not subjectively. Hence, in
contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed ab-
stractly by idealism -- which, of course, does not know real, sensuous ac-
tivity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objectsÑreally distinct from
the thought objects; but he does not conceive human activity itself as
objective [gegenstndlich] activity. Hence, in ÒDas Wesen des
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ChristenthumsÓ, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only gen-
uinely human attitude, while praxis is conceived and fixed only in its
dirty-Judaic manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of
ÒrevolutionaryÓ, of "practical-critical", activity.Ó (Marx, 1845).
In this first thesis, Marx attacks the classical dichotomisation between, on
one side a materialism (or objectivism) that deals exclusively with passive,
or causal determination, in a mechanical way; and on the other side ideal-
ism (or subjectivism) that deals with human beingsÕ active, or intentional,
relation to the world. The problem is that idealism is only abstract or spiri-
tual whereas the former materialism is only mechanically concrete. Marx
resolves this tension with a dialectical materialist concept of human activ-
ity, which is both objective and active. According to this concept human ac-
tivity is practical-critical, or revolutionary in the sense that it changes or
recreates its own objective conditions through practical actions.
The anti-Semitically sounding expression Òdirty-Judaic manifestation of
praxisÓ, makes sense if the anti-Semitism is filtered out. According to
Wartofsky (1977, p. 319) it was commonplace in Germany at the time of
Marx and Feuerbach, to identify egoism, practicalism, and utilitarism with
Jews. Thus, Feuerbach, according to Marx understands praxis as being
short-sightedly this-sided, and he fails to acknowledge that the world can be
changed only through the praxis of conscious human agency.
Ò2: The question whether objective [gegenstndliche] truth can be at-
tributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical
question. In praxis, man must prove the truth of his thinking, i.e. the
reality and power, the this-sidedness. The dispute over the reality or
non-reality of thinking that is isolated from praxis is a purely scholastic
question.Ó (Marx, 1845).
Mental activity (thinking) is material in the sense that it is impossible to
talk about it as an entity isolated from practical activity. In particular, this
thesis states that studies of cognitive processes isolated from concrete activ-
ity, as laboratory psychology (e.g. Card, Moran and Newell (1983) see below)
tries to establish it, are absurd.
Ò3: The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances
and education forgets that circumstances must be changed by men, and
that the educator must himself be educated. This doctrine must, there-
fore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
The synchronous changing of circumstances and of human activity or
self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolu-
tionary praxis.Ó (Marx, 1845).
Conditions for human activity can and should be changed by people them-
selves. While these conditions are changed, traditions and norms become
obsolete; no universal standards exist above concrete practical activity.
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Conditions and activity develop together; this coordinated process is the
process of progress, emancipation, and revolutionary praxis.
The absence of universal standards above societal praxis, indicates that
history and progress should not necessarily be understood as elevation
through fixed levels of developmental advancement.
Ò8: Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to
mysticism find their rational solution in human praxis and in the com-
prehension of this praxis.Ó (Marx, 1845).
By understanding human praxis, it is possible to understand social life in
general. Ideas, theories, beliefs, etc. are parts of practical life and should be
understood in that context. E.g. the capability of human beings to receive
without giving back Ð receiving GodÕs grace like a child (Luke 18:17) Ð can be
understood as prerequisite for the existence of an economy with considerable
division of labour.
The human mind is societally constituted, rooted in the process of concrete
societal history. Human beings are tied together by societal relations Ð by
history not by the fact that they belong to the same species. Thus, human
beings cannot be understood as universal abstractions, but must always be
analysed in a concrete historical, and societal context. In the Feuerbach the-
ses, Marx resolves the dichotomy between materialism that understands
mental phenomena as mechanically determined by the material conditions,
and idealism rejecting that the material world can have any influence on
thinking; he shows that humanity is societally constituted as Òthe ensemble
of the societal relationsÓ situated in the course of concrete history; he re-
solves the separation between the subjective and the objective; and he
shows that thinking cannot be separated from praxis.
In contrast to Hegel who advocated an idealist armchair philosophy in the
shape of MinervaÕs owl, Marx advocates a practical and concrete philosophy.
Ò11: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways;




This chapter outlines the theory of human activity, StarÕs notion of boundary
objects and heterogeneity, and WartofskyÕs concepts of primary , secondary
and tertiary artefacts related to perception and action. These contributions
are the basis for the understanding of design and design artefacts intro-
duced later in this thesis.
From a simpleminded reductionist point of view, we can regard computer
systems development as involving an assembly of human beings and techni-
cal artefacts being changed or re-constructed to satisfy some motivation. We
may thus want to understand the individual components involved in order to
understand the whole process; we need to understand computers and we
need to understand the individual human beings involved. Understanding
human beings as a basic unit is what psychology is about, thus we may want
to start with a psychological perspective.
At the outset, activity theory is a dialectical materialist psychology aimed
at understanding the mental capacities of a single human being. The impor-
tant thing about activity theory is, however, that it rejects the isolated hu-
man being as an adequate unit of analysis, thus insisting on culturally and
technically mediatedness. We then end at a unit of analysis which includes
technical artefacts and cultural organisation. The main references for this
chapter are EngestrmÕs Learning By Expanding (1987), Engelsted (1989),
and Mammen (1989).
According to Vygotsky (1978), Human activity has three fundamental char-
acteristics; firstly, it is directed towards a material or ideal object; secondly,
it is mediated by artefacts; and thirdly, it is socially constituted within a cul-
ture. Historically, activity theory is an answer to the problem of studying iso-
lated individuals in the laboratory setting, e.g. pure memory. Instead of
dealing with the isolated relation between the subject (S) and an object (O),
from which the subject is perfectly separated, Vygotsky introduced a medi-
ating X, which is culturally constituted. This mediating X is also referred to
as instruments, which can be either technical instruments (tools) or psycho-
logical instruments (signs). Psychological instruments like language and
concepts are internalised during child development, which is the reason why
it is not possible to experiment with (or even to talk about) the basic, uni-
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versal, unmediated, cognitive apparatus. Vygotsky distinguishes between
meaning and sense in language5. Meaning is stable, and is what the sign
points at or denotes, whereas sense is the fluctuating contents of the sign
determined by the use of the sign in praxis. This doubleness does not cause
many problems in the use of language.
Leontjev applied a slightly different approach in analysing cognition. In
VygotskyÕs group, Leontjev was assigned to the task of describing the devel-
opment of natural history, from one-celled organisms to human beings. In
describing this development the hunt becomes an important laboratory for
thought. In natural history, the first important quantum leap in the devel-
opment from cell to man is when animals start to work together in fulfilling
their needs. Thus for Leontjev the basic triangle is not S-X-O, but the pre-






Figure 3: Triangles of activity, on the left human activity mediated by arte-
facts (Vygotsky), on the right socially mediated activity (Leontjev).
At the level of animals it is possible to identify embryonic forms of media-
tion of S-O relations in form of ad hoc tools, mediation of the S-C relation as
emerging rules and rituals, and mediation of the C-O as emerging division of
labour.
The quantum leap from animal to man takes place when these embryonic
mediations become a solid part of the triangle of activity. According to
Leontjev (1978), human activity can be analysed into a three-level hierarchy
of activity, action, and operation, each of which reflect the objective world.
Activity is directed to satisfy a need through a material or ideal object. The
subjectÕs reflection of (including expectation to) this object is the motive of
the activity. Human activity is carried out through actions, realising objec-
tive results. These actions are governed by the conscious goals of the subject.
Goals reflect the objective results of action. Actions are realised through se-
ries of operations; each ÒtriggeredÓ by the conditions and structure of the ac-
tion. They are performed without conscious thinking but are oriented in the
world by a non-conscious orienting basis. Goals that are different from the
5 I am indebted to Holger Hybshmann HansenÕs review of the development of the concepts
meaning and sense in VygotskyÕs work at Ò8. Danske seminar om Virksomhedsteori:
Virksomhed - betydning - meningÓ [The eighth Danish seminar on Activity Theory: Activity
- Meaning - SenseÓ].
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motive, but still realising it are only possible in human activity; in animals
goal and motive are always the same.
Activity Motive (need) Why?
Action Goal What?
Operation Condition (structure of
activity)
How?
Figure 4: The table adopted from B¾rentsen (1989) shows the relation be-
tween the three levels of activity.
The three levels of activity are not fixed (figure 5); an action can become an
operation through automatisation/internalisation, and an operation can be-
come an action through conceptualisation in breakdown situations (B¿dker
1991). A separately motivated activity in one context can be an operation in
an other activity. The focus in activity theory on how human acts transfer
between the different levels of activity is a very important feature that dis-
tinguishes this framework from the mainstream of cognitive theories, e.g.
Card et al.Õs (1983) engineering psychology, where acts are classified as be-
longing to static categories, e.g. time bands (Bannon & Kuutti 1993). In





Figure 5: The dynamic relation between levels of human activity.
LeontjevÕs notion of human activity can be depicted as embedded triangles
(figure 6), which is the Subject-Object-Community triangle of pre-human ac-
tivity expanded with societally constituted forms of mediation: instruments,
rules and division of labour (Engestrm 1987). The specific form of the tri-
angular figure is not very important. The important thing is that activity is
an intertwined system; if one corner changes the system becomes unstable





Rules Division of 
labour
Figure 6: LeontjevÕs theory of human activity as depicted by Engestrm
(1987)6.
Activity is constantly developing as a result of instability (see below) and
due to the construction of new needs. Activity is historically crystallised into
artefacts; in this sense the historical development of activity can be read
from the development of artefacts mediating the praxis (B¾rentsen 1989,
Bannon and B¿dker 1991).
ÒArtifacts can be characterised as crystallized knowledge, which means
that operations that are developed in the use of one generation of tech-
nology are later incorporated into the artefact itself in the nextÓ
(Bannon & B¿dker 1991, p. 243).
Activity is crystallised into artefacts in two ways. Firstly, as externalisation
of operations with earlier artefacts, and secondly, as secondary artefacts
representing modes of acting in the given activity (see below section on per-
ception and action.). Artefacts mediating human activity are not just more
or less suitable attachments to human praxis, but they are constituting ac-
tivity. Thus mediating artefacts can be regarded more stable than the object
of activity. This points to the argument (given below) that modelling in de-
sign (e.g. object-oriented modelling) should be understood as the transfor-
mation of artefacts mediating the domain of use. Crystallisation can be il-
lustrated with an example from Mathiassen (1981), who approaches the
problem with a different terminology. The basic concepts are work process,
technique, and tool.
ÒTake for instance the relation between programming techniques and
programming languages: In the beginning when programming (the work
6  In the age of 3D graphics it could be tempting to draw the figure more like a
tetrahedron.
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process) was done directly in absolute machine language (the tool), it
was necessary to develop a conscious relation (techniques) to the use of
individual memory cells; otherwise it would come to grief. Later sym-
bolic machine language was developed (new tool), which made it possi-
ble to use the computer as a help for administering the use of physical
memory, and which at the same time formed a basis for new program-
ming experience. The development of techniques and tools goes hand in
handÓ. (Mathiassen 1981 p. 100, my translation).
In terms of activity theory, administering memory usage in programming
pure machine language was crystallised into the next generation of pro-
gramming artefacts, symbolic machine language.
Engestrm (1987) develops the analytical framework of activity theory to in-
clude neighbouring activity systems. The basic idea is that the components
of a given activity system are produced in other activity systems, and that
the object of activity is consumed in other activity systems. Instruments are
produced in the instrument producing activity, subjects are shaped in the
subject producing activity through education, etc. The relation to the neigh-
bouring activity systems in the model is introduced through the classifica-
tion of contradictions in activity. In general, contradiction is the source of de-
velopment, empirically contradictions appear as disturbance.
According to Engestrm (1987) there are four types of contradictions: pri-
mary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary.
The primary contradiction is the contradiction of commodity between use
and exchange value. This double nature is a basic feature of the economic
structure in capitalist culture, and it penetrates every single corner of the
triangle and is the basic source of instability and development (see also
Marx 1962, pp. 49-55).
The secondary contradictions of an activity system are contradictions be-
tween the corners of the triangle, e.g. between the skills of the subject and
the instrument, or between rigid rules and new flexible instruments.
Tertiary contradictions are contradictions between the central activity
and new motives of forms of activity. In ÒLearning by ExpandingÓ, this con-
tradiction is generated by a culturally more advanced activity, by represen-
tatives from this other culture introducing culturally more advanced objects
or motives into the central activity.
The obvious problem is to know what is more advanced without subscribing
to a very deterministic idea of history. However, the concept of a culturally
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more advanced activity does not necessarily imply historical determinism7;
it can also be interpreted as potential ways of conducting the central activity
differently. Thus, the conflict between the historical determinism, still pre-
sent somewhere in the basis of activity theory, and notions of heterogeneity
(e.g. Star 1989) is not necessarily insoluble (see below).
Quaternary contradictions are contradictions between the central activity
and the neighbouring activities; i.e.: 1) object activities where the immediate
objects of the central activity are embedded, 2) instrument producing activi-
ties where key instruments of the central activity are produced, 3) subject
producing activities educating the subject of the central activity, and finally
4) rule producing activities like administration and legislation. An example
of a quaternary contradiction is the contradiction between education of com-
puter scientists at universities, focusing on mathematical formalisation,
and the central activity of computer scientists working as system developers
in the industry. The quaternary contradictions show that activity systems






























Figure 7: The relation between activity systems in terms of classes of con-
tradictions.
7 The idea that history will proceed through an unavoidable sequence of phases and end
in a determined stage, communism.
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In applying an activity theory based analysis to a systems development pro-
ject, it is not always obvious how to select the central activity. E.g. in the
Music Festival project, it was not at all clear whether the work of the half-
time employed sound and light person, the work of the entire sound and
light group or maybe somebody elseÕs work, should be considered the central
activity. In most situations, several possible central activities will be visi-
ble.
Naturally the Ôneighbour activitiesÕ also include central activities which
are in some other way, for a longer or shorter period, connected or re-
lated to the given central activity, potentially hybridizing each other
through their exchanges (Engestrm 1987, p. 88).
Rather than dealing with one fixed central activity, we are often confronted
with a number of intertwined activities each in different ways are potential
central activities. In the end identifying the central activity is a matter of
choice, a matter of how we are going to act in changing the world, a matter of
the purpose of the analysis. Analysing praxis in terms of interrelated activ-
ity systems provides a dynamic analysis, making it possible to understand
specific acts differently according to viewpoint, but maintain a materialist
view on the situation. According to B¿dker & Mogensen (1993), this is an
important advantage of activity theory over static notions of mechanisms
based on the concept of articulation work.
A technique in identifying central activities in chaotic empirical data, is to
work Òupside downÓ, by botanising for contradictions and then classify them
into primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary, and subsequently identify
of one or more interesting central activities. This was done in the analysis of
the festival project (Bertelsen 1996a).
Contradictions as a perspective in systems development research
The concept of contradiction or tension alone can be a fruitful vehicle for un-
derstanding system development and praxis. In (Bertelsen 1996a),
EngestrmÕs classification of contradiction is used to analyse the Music
Festival case; this gave rise to a series of interesting observations which had
not been considered earlier in the project. In general, the existence of antag-
onistic contradiction has been a key premise in the Scandinavian collective
resource approach, which has made strong practical focus on the conflict be-
tween capital and wage labour, and how this conflict can become a resource
(Borum & Enderud, 1981).
The Norwegian left-wing seems to have a persistent Maoist orientation,
which is reflected in Norwegian critical systems development research by
contributions (Bjerkness 1992, Bratteteig & ¯grim 1994) based on MaoÕs
notion of contradiction (Mao, 1937). In this notion everything tends to be
contradictions, but there will in any situation be a principal contradiction,
e.g. the contradiction between social classes. In a contradiction there will be
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one side dominating the situation. This Maoist concept of dialectics is basi-
cally a vulgarised version of HegelÕs dialectics. The weakness of the Maoist
approach is that:
ÒMao does not give any frame for discussing and understanding the con-
tradictions. In this way the notion may become very subjectiveÓ.
(Bjerkness, 1992).
To put actual flesh and blood into the analysis, the Norwegian approaches
have combined the Maoist notion of dialectics with elements of Soft
Systems Methodology (Checkland 1981) in an approach referred to as ÒSoft
DialecticsÓ (Bratteteig & ¯grim 1994). The problem in doing so is that the
basic assumptions of SSM may take over the role as a main perspective, be-
cause the Maoist concepts are not transferred into an operational orienting
basis for the praxis of ÒSoft DialecticsÓ. In the treatment of theories as de-
sign artefacts below, it is argued that in the absence of an explicit world
view, the world views embedded in the applied design artefacts will take
over the situation. The example of Òsoft dialecticsÓ shows that the world
view not only should be explicit but also has to be coherent and to some de-
gree operational. Thus, the advantage of basing design and research on ac-
tivity theory is that this approach builds on a complete and coherent set of
assumptions about the world, in particular that activity theory, in contrast
to SSM, understands the creation of new motives as a basic feature. Activity
theory, however, does not make the use of techniques like rich pictures from
SSM impossible.
human-computer interaction and computer mediated activity
Human activity mediated by computers (i.e. the object of our design activity)
has been dealt with within the field of human-computer interaction. The ba-
sic understanding put forward inhere shapes the process of design and the
possible design solutions (see discussion on theories as design artefacts be-
low and in (Bertelsen 1994b)).
The traditional perspective on human-computer interaction in the early
eighties (e.g. Card et al. 1983) was based on the mechanical reductionism of
cognitive science, i.e. human-computer interaction was understood as a
symmetrical relation between two machines and the aim of the discipline
was to tune the computer side, or more specifically the human interface, to
reach an optimal fit between the two entities.
The lack of practical success for the orthodox cognitivist approaches gave
rise to contributions taking the userÕs daily work more directly into account
(Norman and Draper 1986, Carroll et al. 1991). However, these approaches
did not reject the mechanist assumptions systematically; this created a sort
of mismatch between the intentions of research and design recommenda-
tions, and the basic theory underlying the endeavour.
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With the introduction of activity theory as a basis for human-computer in-
teraction research and praxis (B¿dker 1991), the field has acquired a theo-
retical grounding matching the relevant practical research problems. With
activity theory it is possible to maintain both the original focus on interac-
tion between human and computer, and notions of context etc. Ñ the inter-
face explodes while it continues to be the pivotal point of research.
The otherwise vague concept of Òuser interface transparencyÓ can become a
well-defined concept in terms of activity theory by observing that the inter-
face (or rather the entire computer artefact) is transparent when, and only
when, the user is handling the computer artefact at the level of operations
(Bardram & Bertelsen 1995). In computer mediated activity, the situation
is slightly more complicated than in the case of a carpenter using a hammer
to drive a nail; in that case Òtransparent hammer-carpenter interactionÓ oc-
curs when the carpenter is able to focus on the nail. The complication in the
case of computer mediated activity is that the object of activity in most
cases is inside the computer: E.g. the text which is the object of writing with
a word-processor is represented as bits in the same RAM chip that holds
the word-processor program. B¿dker (1991) analyses this problem in detail
by distinguishing between physical aspects, handling aspects, and sub-
ject/object-directed aspects of the interface. In the situation of total break-
down (Winograd & Flores 1986) the user directs actions to the physical as-
pects of the computer, by e.g. trying to pull out a diskette stuck in the drive
or searching for the power switch to turn the not working machine on. The
handling aspects are parts of the computer artefact through which the user
interacts in the normal situation of use; these become the object of action,
e.g. when the user learns to use a new program. The subject/object-directed
aspects in the computer artefact, can be representations of subjects or ob-
jects outside the computer, or objects that exist only inside the computer.
These aspects are equivalent to the nail in the hammering case.
Development
VygotskyÕs theory of human activity is a psychology with a strong focus on
developmental psychology and pedagogy. The concept of the zone of proximal
development is aimed at changing the focus of developmental psychology
(which is in practice a foundation for teaching strategies) from already ac-
quired skills to potential skills ÒwaitingÓ to mature in the individual. The
concept is defined by Vygotsky as:
Òthe distance between the actual developmental level as determined by
independent problem solving and the level of potential development as
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collabo-
ration with more capable peersÓ (Vygotsky 1978 p. 86).
Learning, in this framework, is a voyage through the zone of proximal devel-
opment. The concept of the zone of proximal development has been widely
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applied outside the areas of pedagogy and developmental psychology, and
has a central role in EngestrmÕs framework of expansive learning. In gen-
eral the concept of the zone of proximal development is interesting because
it indicates that theory of human activity treats potentiality and develop-
ment as basic aspects of human activity. People are not understood in terms
of what they are but in terms of what they are becoming. Furthermore, it is
important to notice that the zone of proximal development is a concept of so-
cial mediation of activity and of development of mental capacities.
In (Bardram & Bertelsen 1995), we used the concept of the zone of proximal
development in the context of development of transparency in the one user
one machine situation, which at first sight appears to be in contradiction
with the concept since there does not seem to be any social mediation of the
development of this situation. However, computer artefacts are not only
tools mediating usersÕ relations to their object of work, they are, at the same
time, media mediating the relation between designers or culture and users.
Computer artefacts are social mediation in the same sense as books. By
careful planning the designer can place clues in the interface affecting users
at specific stages of the development, and in this way build a curriculum
into the artefact.
In the original form, the concept of the zone of proximal development is deal-
ing with skill acquisition, thus it contains a vertical notion of development
in that the learner is moving from one state of activity to a more advanced
state. Engestrm partly criticises this aspect of VygotskyÕs concept of the
zone of proximal development by stating that:
ÒVygotskyÕs concept of the zone of proximal development is itself in
need of development. The cultural-historical school founded by
Vygotsky has up to the present time concentrated on the acquisition,
assimilation and internalization of the tools and sign systems of the
culture. How these tools and sign systems are created has mainly been
treated as a problem for the futureÓ (Engestrm 1987 p. 172).
Engestrm concludes that the chief defect of all hitherto existing concepts of
zones of proximal development is that they do not take into consideration
the development of the total activity systems and their motivations.
ÒWhat is not discussed is whether and how the activities themselves as
social systemic formations develop and change constantlyÓ (Engestrm
1987 p. 173).
This is setting the program for his own development of activity theory and
results in a reformulation of the zone of proximal development.
ÒA provisional reformulation of the zone of proximal development is
now possible. It is the distance between the present everyday actions of
the individuals and the historically new form of the societal activity
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that can be collectively generated as a solution to the double bind po-
tentially embedded in the everyday actionsÓ (Engestrm 1987, p. 174).
The voyage through the zone of proximal development can be described as an
expansive cycle of five stages (figure 8). According to Engestrm (1987) the
starting point of the voyage is a state of need in the central activity, which in
general originates from the primary contradiction between use and exchange
value. In the second phaseÐthe double bind phaseÐthe central activity is
faced with insoluble dilemmas caused by secondary contradictions between
corners of the activity caused by the introduction of new corner elements. In
the third phase, motive/object construction begins with finding instruments
that can function as ÒspringboardsÓ for initially breaking the double bind
and for initiating the constructing of a general model of the reformed activ-
ity. New instruments and actions for the reformed activity are constructed
through modelling. In the fourth phaseÐthe application and generalisation
phaseÐthe new instruments are confronted with the old activity; precursors
of the new activity, the expected new and the old activity are conflicting and
disturbing each other, and the societally new is born in forms not antici-
pated in the earlier phases. In the last phase, the new activity is consoli-
dated which may happen through three sub-phases. Firstly, the instruments
are systematically applied in a repetitive and explicit way; secondly, the use
of the new instruments is varied, and the new activity is integrated into the
entire activity system. In the third phase the new activity takes effect in the
relation to the neighbouring activities. The last phase is characterised by
quaternary contradictions, Òthe new central activity has to compete with and
adjust to the dynamics of the neighbour activitiesÓ (Engestrm 1987, p.
191). Thus, activity 2 is not a stable finite state and development will con-

























Figure 8: The phase structure of the zone of proximal development depicted
as the general cycle of expansion (adopted from Engestrm 1987, figure 3.3).
Based on the cycle of expansive transition Engestrm (1987) outlines a me-
thodical cycle of expansive developmental research. The steps in this cycle
are: 1) Phenomenology and delineation of the activity system. 2) Analysis of
activity: object historical, theory historical and actual empirical. 3)
Formation of new instruments: finding a springboard, formulating general
instrumental model and its derivative models, formulating a microcosm for
turning the instrumental models into new forms of praxis. 4) Practical ap-
plication of new instruments to change the activity through strategic tasks.
5) Reporting and evaluation.
The isomorphism between the cycle of expansive developmental research,
the cycle of expansive learning, and VygotskyÕs methodological scheme
points to basic similarities between development in children, development
in collectives, and developmental research, but it also hides important dif-
ferences; e.g. between reporting after the process has ended and the uncer-
tainty of the consolidation phase. Developmental research is more related to
praxis than to, e.g. the hypothetical deductive method (Popper 1973) of ide-
alised natural science.8
8 EngestrmÕs methodological cycle of developmental research is isomorphic with the
expansive cycle, in the same way as FittsÕ law (FittsÕ 1954, see also Bertelsen 1994b)
states that human motor performance is isomorphic with ShannonÕs (1949) mathematical
model of communication. EngestrmÕs cycles are based on folk tales and stories about
subjects in  a need state going on a voyage to find a solution and then returning to (a
renewed) home, and the resulting model is so simple that the pure morphology (partially
derived from ScribnerÕs illustration of VygotskyÕs four steps) alone doesnÕt reveal anything.
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EngestrmÕs (1987) reformulation of the zone of proximal development and
the methodology for expansive learning transcends the limiting focus on in-
dividual assimilation into established activity forms of VygotskyÕs original
concept. But it does still conform to the uni-directionality of vertical devel-
opment, as it is expressed in the concept of Òthe culturally more advanced
activityÓ. This reflects the inherent tendency of dialectical materialism to
subscribe to historical determinism, and a general uni-directionality of
western thinking in the enlightenment tradition. Such an uni-directionality
is a problematic foundation for systems development and for systems devel-
opment research, because it deforms the mutuality of the development pro-
cess; it will cause us to understand the computer professionals as Òthe more
capable peerÓ in the heteropraxiality (see below) of design, setting narrow
limits for the outcome of the development effort. In a later paper, Engestrm
(1996) formulates three challenges to developmental theories (Vygotsky and
Piaget), which programmatically outlines the next (ongoing) leap forward of
activity theory, away from the uni-directionality of historical determinism.
These challenges are:
Ò (1) instead of just benign achievement of mastery, development may
be viewed as partially destructive rejection of the old; (2) instead of just
individual transformation, development may be viewed as collective
transformation; (3) instead of just vertical movement across levels, de-
velopment may be viewed as horizontal movements across borders.Ó
(Engestrm 1996, p. 126).
The second, and to some extend the first, challenge are reflected in
(Engestrm 1987); thus it is the formulation of a horizontal concept of devel-
opment that forms an important agenda for further development of activity
theory. The three leading concepts in formulating a new developmental the-
ory are contradiction, zone, and mediation. Engestrm points to contradic-
tions as a fundamental feature of Òthe worldÓ, not merely a result of cogni-
tive mismatch (as suggested by Piaget). Zone is different from VygotskyÕs
conception of the zone of proximal development in that it is not necessarily a
room for elevation across levels through meeting the more advanced, but
rather a room for meeting the different, the incomprehensible mediating
horizontal development. The role of mediation is that the mediating arte-
facts through re-mediation lead to new goals and actions.
ÒThe process described by H¿eg [Engestrm uses a novel by Peter H¿eg
as a vehicle for the argument /ob.] calls for a conceptualization of medi-
ation as more than technical amplification. It calls for studies of arti-
A challenge for further research would therefore be to analyse the developmental stories
used by Engestrm with structuralist oriented models of folk tales and literature, e.g.
Propp or Greimas; and then in turn use the outcome of such an analysis as a  basis for a
methodological model of developmental/action research.
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facts mediating in the construction of new tasks, in the formation of
motives, and in related developmental shiftsÓ (Engestrm 1996, p. 131).
Engestrm (1996) concludes that a developmental theory that is able to ex-
plain something about significant transformations in human life, will not be
a combination of the two main perspectives outlined, but the two perspec-
tives maintained in isolation but also transcended.
Activity theory yields a framework for understanding human praxis as his-
torically constituted and mediated by artefacts, setting the agenda precisely
at central issues in systems development research. With the ongoing devel-
opment of the framework, activity theory is about to get rid of its detrimen-
tal historical determinism, although it is unclear if the new orientation to-
ward heterogeneity, as expressed in the concept of horizontal development,
will turn the framework into inconsistent theoretical babel. Only the future
will reveal how deep the revision needs to be. Also induced by the ongoing
development of AT is the relativism problem caused by the absence of a uni-
directional notion of development and progress. We have to ask whether any
change, caused by meeting what is different, is a desirable development; and
how we distinguish. To avoid falling into relativism, activity theory needs to
develop a new concept of progress.
Activity theory and systems development research
Currently, activity theory is catching a lot of attention in the fields dealing
with the design and use of information technology. Despite this fact, very lit-
tle work substantially based on activity theory have been presented. Based
on experience from the UTOPIA project (B¿dker et al. 1987) B¿dkerÕs thesis
from 1987 (published in B¿dker 1991) focuses on how quality of use devel-
ops in use. Christiansen (1988) focus on the development of knowledge in
systems development, and on the role of different conceptions of people and
technology in relation to the development process. Based on Engestrm
(1987), Bisgaard et al. (1989), present a framework for the utilisation of con-
flicts as a resource in systems development; they furthermore apply this
framework in the post hoc analysis of two systems development case stories.
Kuutti (e.g. 1991) has bases his work on a very thorough application of
EngestrmÕs framework in the fields of information systems, computer sup-
ported cooperative work, and human-computer interaction (Bannon &
Kuutti 1993). Not directly related to systems development research,
Raeithel (1991) outlines activity theory as an alternative to Winograd &
FloresÕ (1986) critique of artificial intelligence, which according to Raeithel
reduces man to Òa speaking animal that loves to bargainÓ (p. 392). The book
ÒContext and ConsciousnessÓ (Nardi (ed.) 1995) was intended to remedy the
absence of practically applicable methods based on activity theory; unfortu-
nately the book contains only a few operational contributions.
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Heterogeneity and artefacts
Activity theory takes activity systems as the basic unit of analysis, primar-
ily understanding the situation in terms of uniform motives. When several
activity system are involved, they are understood as having the same kind of
rationality and the same direction of development, although some more ad-
vanced. This does conflict with the lessons learned about the necessity of do-
ing prototyping with users. In such situations, both parts (users and design-
ers) will learn, but they are radically different to a degree that they will
never understand each other. Thus, we are in need of a concept that can unify
the design situation without subsuming everything under the same rational-
ity and the same line of development.
Recent development of activity theory has been influenced by north
American notions of heterogeneity, e.g. from symbolic interactionism. The
concept Òboundary objectÓ (Star 1989) is particularly useful in understand-
ing the design of computer artefacts and in particular the artefacts mediat-
ing design. The concept boundary objects is based on the study of scientific
work, and is aimed at understanding how the multiple and highly diverse
viewpoints of actors participating in the scientific process are coordinated.
The cases analysed by Star (1989) are a group of neurologists in England at
the end of the last century, and the people working on a zoological museum
in California during the first three decades of this century9.
Systems development is similar to the scientific processes described by
Leigh Star in that they involved a heterogeneous group of people who work
together in relation to a material object that matters in varying degree for
the participants, and which is perceived in different ways.
According to Star (1989), boundary objects are objects used by different par-
ties in different localities. They are at the same time robust enough to
maintain their identity across use by different parties, but also plastic so
that they can adapt to the constraints and needs of the different parties
working with them. Across sites, boundary objects are weakly structured,
but in a specific context their use become highly structured. Thus, boundary
objects mediate the relation between actors with divergent viewpoints. The
concept of boundary objects focuses on information and representation of in-
formation. Star explains that it is important that there are different kinds
of boundary objects, depending on the characteristics of the heterogeneous
information joined. ÒThe combination of different time horizons produces
one kind of boundary objects; joining concrete and abstract representations
of the same data produces anotherÓ (Star, 1989, p. 47).
9 Obviously these studies have been based on archivals.
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Based on the studies of neurologists and the zoological museum, Star iden-
tifies four types of boundary objects. ÒRepositoriesÓ are ordered piles of ob-
jects indexed in a standardised and modular way, e.g. a library or a mu-
seum. Repositories are dealing with heterogeneity caused by differences in
the unit of analysis, e.g. when the amateur zoologists collect individually in-
teresting beetles whereas the biologists are interested in what the same
beetles represent. ÒIdeal types or platonic objectsÓ do not describe the detail
of the concrete, but are adaptable abstractions like maps and atlases.
ÒPlatonic objects arise with differences in degree of abstraction such as
those that obtain in the clinical/basic distinction. They result in the deletion
of local contingencies from the common object, and have the advantage of
adaptability.Ó (Star 1989, p. 49). ÒTerrain with coincident boundariesÓ are
common objects with shared boundaries but different internal contents.
StarÕs example is the outline of the state of California which is filled out in
different ways by amateur zoologists and professional biologists working to-
gether. Terrain with coincident boundaries allow different groups to au-
tonomously work with different means of aggregating data. ÒForms and la-
belsÓ are aimed at mediating common communication across distributed
work groups. They ensure that information is collected in a uniform and
standardised manner no matter who does it, local uncertainties are deleted.
Forms and labels are, according to Star (1989), what Latour calls
Òimmutable mobilesÓ, i.e. objects that maintain unchanged information
when transported over distance. These four types of boundary objects are
highly dependent on the specific empirical material Star refers to. A more
generalised framework would merge some of these types and add others.
However, in the context of this thesis these types serve as examples of
boundary objects, and they illustrate that different kinds of heterogeneity
are handled through the use of different kinds of boundary objects.
Boundary objects are relevant in a design context because the artefact me-
diating the design process in many cases are used by different groups with
different roles, motivations, and professional backgrounds. A context dia-
gram (Yourdon, 1982) can be understood as a Òplatonic objectÓ; the domain
of use can be seen as a Òterrain with coincident boundariesÓ; a library of
reusable software components is a ÒrepositoryÓ; some design methods, e.g.
SPU (Biering-S¿rensen, et al., 1988) focusing on the production of specific
documents during the design process, present themselves as Òforms and la-
belsÓ, but are not so in concrete praxis (see interview with designer of em-
bedded software below).
Boundary objects can be compared to the Wittgensteinian notion of lan-
guage games used heavily by, e.g. Ehn (1988). Language games are used by
Ehn to explain the process of creating mutual understanding through co-cre-
ation of language. Meaning is not universal but attributed concrete praxis.
What is accomplished during the language game of a design workshop is
manifested through the creation of design artefacts which makes sense to
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the heterogeneous group of participants because they are boundary objects.
Language itself is a boundary object. The two concepts complement each
other. Language game is a process oriented concept, whereas boundary ob-
ject is emphasising the artefacts structuring the process.
Perception and action Ñclasses of artefacts
As described in the section above, the basis of activity theory is that human
beingsÕ relations to their surroundings are mediated by artefacts. VygotskyÕs
concept of psychological instruments emphasises that this mediating is a
basic feature Ð the bare human being without instruments does not exist.
Action10 and perception are mediated by artefacts in a dialectical way; ac-
tion is perception and perception is action. A hammer mediates changing
the surroundings by driving a nail in a board, but at the same time it medi-
ates the carpenterÕs perception of that particular piece of wood. All artefacts
possess this double character of mediating both perception and action, al-
though in many situations it is possible to identify a main direction of the
relation. Driving a nail with a hammer is mostly action; examining a blood
test with a microscope mostly perception. The separation of perception from
action is prominent in many disciplines related to the design of computer
support for work. It has been the core of the traditional work sciences as
founded by Gilbreth (1911) and Taylor (1916) Ñ the stopwatch man evalu-
ates operations and the worker performs operations. Card et al. (1983),
along with the mainstream of mechanist cognitive science, hardwire the
separation into the cognitive apparatus by ÒconstructingÓ separated percep-
tual, cognitive and motor processors. Newer revisionist accounts like
NormanÕs (1991) concept of cognitive artifacts maintain the separation, thus
failing to explain how tools mediate our understanding of the world.
In constructing a notion of design artefacts, a more differentiated under-
standing of artefacts is needed, especially the representational aspects of
artefacts. Marx Wartofsky (1973) introduces a distinction between primary,
secondary and tertiary artefacts which seems to meet this need. According
to Wartofsky (ibid.), classical theories of perception suffer from three impor-
tant defects. Firstly, rationalist as well as empiricist theories understand
perception as an ahistorical, universal characteristics of the species.
Secondly, most accounts are based on seventeenth-century psychological
models of perception which only deal with anomalous situations related to
10 The word action in this section is not used in the strict activity theory meaning, but as
outward human behaviour.
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geometrical science; they do not see the historical limitations of their own
theories. Thirdly, they understand perception only as an inner process.
Wartofsky, in contrast to this, advocates a historical epistemology, under-
standing perception as an integral part of praxis (not a prelude to action);
perception changes historically together with that praxis, and it is deter-
mined by and help determine changes of praxis11. Thus, the theory of percep-
tion suggested by Wartofsky is characterised by having the following three
features: 1) Perception is understood as being historically variable; 2)
Rejection of the seventeenth-century psychological model of perception; and
3) Perception is taken to be a mode of outward action. In agreement with the
theory of human activity described above, Wartofsky understands the per-
ceptual ÒapparatusÓ as involving historically developed artefacts. The dis-
tinctive human form of acting is constituted by the creation and use of arte-
facts, in reproducing the species as well as in producing the means of exis-
tence. Immediately Wartofsky identifies two types of artefacts, primary and
secondary. Primary artefacts are used directly in production. Secondary arte-
facts are used in preserving and transmitting the skills and modes of acting
that the productive praxis is carried out by. Thus, secondary artefacts are
representations of the modes of acting in production; they are not merely
pictures of objects or environments relevant to production, but ÒpicturesÓ of
modes of acting on and with these objects (Wartofsky 1973, p. 202).
To simplify things, we can say that primary artefacts are mediating produc-
tion whereas secondary artefacts mediate communication and reproduction.
Wartofsky constructs a graphical model explaining how perception is part of
praxis. It locates perception in the feedback loop of human praxis where it is
mediated, or conditioned by production and communication, the fundamen-
tal modes of praxis, and by the artefacts mediating praxis. In the division of
praxis into production and communication, he refers to AristotleÕs distinc-
tion between making and doing, separating the making of things from the
relation between people.
In addition to the inseparable Òon-lineÓ loop of praxis mediated by primary
and secondary artefacts, Wartofsky suggests an Òoff-lineÓ loop of imagina-
tive construction. This loop is mediated by tertiary artefacts, which are ab-
stracted from their direct representational function. Tertiary artefacts are
in a genetic sense rooted in the productive praxis but do not depend on it in
any direct manner. They constitute an autonomous zone of free creation of
visions transcending the existing way of production, and they influence and
change productive praxis by changing the established modes of perception.
11  In making a similar point, Mogensen (1994) uses a notion of time adopted from
Heidegger, stating that human endeavour is directed to the future based on the past, and
that the present is the meeting between future and past. WartofskyÕs account is preferred
in this thesis because it is far less cryptic and because it is based in dialectical
materialism.
44
(Techno music changes our way of hearing so that we are able to discover the
music of offset printing machines and truck horns).
Any artefact is, or is part of, a complex of primary, secondary, and tertiary
artefacts. The hammer is a primary artefact for driving nails existing in a
complex with (mostly informal) secondary artefacts representing praxis with
hammers. The quality of the concrete hammer, particularly beautiful or
lousy, the feeling of driving nails, the hammer as general metaphor for tool
is, or induces, images with an amount of tertiary artefactness.
To sum up:
¥ Primary artefacts directly mediate productive praxis.
¥ Secondary artefacts are representations.
¥ Tertiary artefacts mediate imagination or conception of new mo-
tives/needs Ñ radical alternatives to the well-known.
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Chapter 5
A notion of design and design
artefacts
The previous chapter outlined the theoretical preconditions for the construc-
tion of the notion of design and design artefacts introduced in this chapter.
Activity theory is the backdrop on which everything is staged. The most im-
portant inputs from activity theory are the structure of activity and the dou-
ble triangle figure, the concepts of mediation, contradiction, and develop-
ment, as well as the notion of crystallisation. WartofskyÕs analysis of per-
ception and representation as outward action, as well as the concepts of
primary, secondary, and tertiary artefacts are central for the notions intro-
duced below. Finally, the sensitivity to heterogeneity as well as the concept
of boundary objects supplied by Star are also central elements.
Design activity
Design is deliberate development of activity through the creation of new
artefacts and their introduction into a given activity system Ñ it is the (re-)
creation of conditions for life. Design of computer artefacts is the develop-
ment of the entire work setting, thus general notions of development and
progress are important elements in understanding design of computer arte-
facts.
Analytically, design activity is when a designing subject shapes the design
object by means of some design artefacts. The design object is the artefacts
changed or created in designÑthe outcome which design activity is directed
to. The design object is a part of the deliberately shaped environment, or
conditions for human life: houses, cars, word-processors, and furniture. The
designing subject is almost always a collective subject. Some of the members
of this subject can be professional designers who design the conditions for
the lives of somebody else, and others can be members of the praxis that the
design object is intended to mediate. Design artefacts are artefacts that me-
diate the design activity; they are utilised but not consumed during the pro-
cess. They serve as conditions or environment for the design process. Design
artefacts can thus be opposed to materials. Examples of design artefacts are
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programming languages, CASE-tools, specification standards, and systems
development methods. A prototype can both be understood as a design arte-
fact and as object of design. Design artefacts are mediating three main de-
sign functions: getting knowledge and understanding about what is de-
signed, i.e. conception; communicating and co-operating during this process;
and constructing the new artefacts forming the considered world. Often a de-
sign artefact is intended to support just one of these elements: an editor is
used for writing code, a future workshop is used in order to understand the







Figure 9: The relation between design subject, design object, and design
artefact in naive activity theory terms.
Software is basically a moving target. From the point of view of activity the-
ory, it is an obvious problem for any design discipline that the object of de-
sign will not take its final form before it becomes part of the object activity;
furthermore the object activity is changed through the introduction of the
new artefact. In the design of computer artefacts, the situation is compli-
cated even more because computer artefacts are composed of symbols, or
signs, which have meaning and makes sense in ways constituted in the situ-
ation of use. This unpredictability is a basic feature of design of computer
artefacts and can only be remedied through iterative design processes in-
volving representatives from the use domain.
The prototyping session (e.g. B¿dker & Gr¿nb¾k 1996) can serve as a gen-
eral metaphor for design. In idealised terms, prototyping is a process where
one or more designers work together with one or more prospective users on
developing new computer support for the users. Based on some sort of vision
or an analysis of the usersÕ needs the system developers build the first pro-
totype. The prototype is tried out in work (like) situations with the users
and gradually adjusted to fit the (renewed) praxis. Users and designers are
fundamentally unable to understand each other, but during the prototyping
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session they build a common understanding which, however, is only present
as the final prototype.12
Thus, design is basically heteropraxial, i.e., involving heterogeneous groups
of people with different backgrounds and different motivation for participat-
ing in the process.
In the framework of activity theory outlined above, design can be understood
as the instrument producing activity in relation to the considered use activ-
ity, and the use activity can be understood as object activity for the design
activity. This analysis, however, does not capture the intertwined character
of the prototyping session proposed as a general metaphor for design. What
tie the involved activities together in design are the involved artefacts; the
design artefacts and the artefacts which are object of the design process. In
the design situation these artefacts become boundary objects, constituting a
boundary zone of design, where users and designers meet to change the



















Figure 10: Heteropraxiality of design: by applying the notion of boundary ob-
ject we get this picture. The figure is the composition of two triangles of
(design) activity, the boundary objects and boundary artefacts of design con-
stitute a boundary zone.
This analysis of design as being heteropraxial is primarily a descriptive one
outlining general features of design. However, it also states the normative
ideal of active involvement and codetermination by all involved parties as
the basic form of unrestrained design; cooperative, or participatory, design
becomes the ideal. Basically, participatory design occurs when users are ac-
12 Actual prototyping always includes initial analysis of the considered activity system as
a basis for the construction of the first prototype. The purpose in the present context is to
point to fundamental characteristics of design in general, not to discuss rapid prototyping.
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tive subjects in the design activity, which is opposed to the mere involve-
ment of users as test objects. Thus, much of the so-called participatory de-
sign reported in the literature should rather be labelled extended user test-
ing.
Three dimensions of design
Design activity can be analysed and decomposed in an infinite number of
ways, according to perspective and desire to make yet another contribution.
The identification of five systems development functions introduced by
Mathiassen is just one example:
Ò[W]e postulate that change, decision, investigation, construction and
communication are the necessary sub-functions which in some way or
another have to be carried out throughout the systems development
process and its sub-processesÓ (Mathiassen, 1981 p. 81, my transla-
tion).
In the specific context of MathiassenÕs work these sub-functions were useful,
but in general they are logically inconsistent; e.g. change is a function at an-
other level than the other sub-functions. However, the important achieve-
ment of Mathiassen in the present context is the notion of systems devel-
opment functions being orthogonal to process. Loosely based on the notion of
primary, secondary, and tertiary artefacts, the, it is possible to identify (or
postulate) a more consistent set of three functional dimensions of design:
construction, communication, and conception.
Construction
Construction is the productive relation between the designing subject and
the object of design. System development is a process aiming at the con-
struction of software and the environment for its use. In this way we are
talking about system development as a programming process. The artefacts
mediating the relation between designers and the design object seen as
technical construction, are programming environments, CASE tools etc. The
artefacts mediating the constructive aspects of design also mediate coopera-
tion and conception. The use of a CASE tool makes the designers conceive
the design object with the concepts supported by the tool, and will thus
guide the process in certain directions. When looking at design as construc-
tion, the advantages of object-oriented programming languages are the pos-
sibilities of code reuse, the high degree of maintainability, and the stability
of Òcode structureÓ.
Communication (or cooperation)
Communication is the representational relation between subjects cooperat-
ing in design. Design is a co-operative enterprise where different people with
different professional backgrounds and different motives are engaged in cre-
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ating something new. This is the reason why cooperation is essential in sys-
tem development. The design artefacts mediate system development as co-
operation, both as explicit means of cooperation (e.g. status reports and
specifications) and as means for the sharing of experiences, insights, and vi-
sions about the design object. A prototype mediates cooperation when users
through their exploration of the prototype yield knowledge about the use
context to designers, and when designers express their new insights by way
of continuously changing the prototype. When looking at design as communi-
cation, one advantage of object-oriented programming languages is that
Òphysical modellingÓ is possible to understand for non-computer profession-
als. The communication dimension is related to the concept of articulation
work referring to Òthe specific details of putting together tasks, task se-
quences, task clusters, and even the work done in aligning larger units such
as sub projects, in order to accomplish the workÓ (Strauss et al. 1985, p.
175). We may say that articulation work is mediated by secondary artefacts.
Conception
Conception is the dialectical relation between the designing subjects and
the historically developing activity. Design is conception of the considered
praxis and of the new to come. Users and designers achieve new understand-
ing of the existing world and rooted in this they conceive a new world that
transcends the old. Design artefacts mediate learning and conception. A
functional programming language for example facilitates the understanding
of the design object as transformation of data streams. A prototype induces
new visions and knowledge when it confronts the possible and the existing.
Conception is about changing the existing modus operandi, both by identify-
ing more suitable ways of realising the established activity and by develop-
ing entirely new motives. In the terms introduced later in the thesis, concep-
tion is both transformation and generation; it covers all degrees of radical-
ity. Conception is both understanding (of the given) and imagination (of the
better). When looking at design as conception, an advantage of object-ori-
ented programming languages could be the ease of building explorative pro-
totypes from existing objects.
A definition of design artefacts
The artefacts mediating design activity are called design artefacts and can
be divided into two categories: global and local design artefacts. Global, or
general, design artefacts are created independently of the actual project and
exist before and after the project. Local design artefacts are specific sub-
products of a project, and only applicable in that context, they are often rep-
resentations - descriptions or models - mediating the transformation of
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artefacts in the domain. Ehn and SjgreenÕs (1991) notion of design artefacts
is to some degree related to this concept of local design artefacts; however,
their notion is limited to material representations produced during the de-
sign process as vehicles for the generation of visions. As a productive act, de-
sign is directly mediated by tools like compilers, editors, debuggers, and
case tools. However, methods and theories are equally important as design
artefacts.
Previously, the notion of human activity has been sketched, and the basic
features of design has been laid out. Design has been described as a hetero-
praxial activity aiming at the creation of new conditions for (day to day) ac-
tivity. On this background it is possible to outline the main features of de-
sign artefacts.
Definition of design artefacts:
1: Design artefacts mediate the three functional dimensions of design
(construction, communications, and conception).
a) design artefacts are, or belong to clusters of, primary, secondary, and
tertiary artefacts.
2: Design artefacts have the double characters of mediating technical
construction and representation; being tools and signs, having meaning
and sense.
3: Design artefacts are boundary objects;
a) tying the activity systems involved in a project together,
b) tying different rooms of design and use together.
Mediating the three design dimensions
By definition design artefacts mediate design, thus they also mediate the
three design functions. However, more interesting, any design artefact, no
matter what its intended use is, to some extend mediate all three functional
dimensions of design. E.g. a debugger mediates construction by providing ef-
ficient feedback when the programmer is coding; it mediates communication
and cooperation by representing programs and bugs in a standardised way,
thus facilitating programmers cooperative work on the program; it mediates
conception by yielding alternative views on the actual program and serving
as a way to learn about other programmers code, e.g. in standard libraries.
In the same way a system description mediates construction by being a kind
of very high level programming tool; it mediates communication and cooper-
ation by fixating ideas to be shared and by being a vehicle for the division of
labour; it mediates conception by inducing alternative, structured views into
the problem in question. Mogensen (1992, 1994) has in detail explained how
computer artefacts, both existing systems and prototypes, mediate concep-
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tion by provoking praxis to become explicit. Basically, his idea is that by in-
troducing new artefacts into a given praxis, limitations and possibilities be-
come explicit. Design artefacts in general mediate communication and coop-
eration due to the secondary artefactness of the actual artefact or because it
is clustered with secondary artefacts. Even gadgets which do not make sense
will mediate communication because they can be pointed to and blamed for
not making sense. Design artefacts in general mediate construction in the
abstract sense that the outcome of design is the construction of a new com-
puter application. More concretely any specification in design can be re-
garded as a very high level programming. In the sections about transforma-
tors and abductors (see below) it is discussed in detail how design artefacts
are secondary artefacts and tertiary artefacts respectively.
The double character of design artefacts
The double character of design artefacts appears in relation to several as-
pects of design. Design artefacts have a double character of both mediating
the technical construction of computer systems, which is an extremely for-
malised aspect, and mediating representational activity, which depends on
a large degree of openness. This double character is a problem because the
plasticity of secondary artefacts are obstructing or obstructed by the natu-
ralism and formalisation of primary artefactness. The example below illus-
trates this feature of design artefacts.
Structured design (Yourdon 1982) is, from a technical perspective, a kind of
very high level program construction tool, at the same time this tool serves
as mediator of communication and conception. The applicability of elements
from structured design in communication and conception with users depends
on the designersÕ success in establishing common representations based on
the tool. In 1990 we conducted a project based on a series of open ended,
qualitative interviews with systems developers in a small in-house devel-
opment organisation (Laursen et al. 1990). Focusing the interviews on com-
munication and documentation in a particular project, we saw how output
from a CASE-tool both facilitated and obstructed user-designer cooperation
according to various circumstances. In one particular situation, a context di-
agram (poetically referred to as the Òthe sunflowerÓ) was successfully ap-
plied as a common frame of reference shared by the whole project group dur-
ing the project. In an other situation the designers had no luck trying to ap-
ply diagrams from the same CASE-tool in communication with users in the
project group. In both situations the CASE tool and its output had a double
role, both mediating production of machine executable code and mediating
communication and conception. In the first situation (the sunflower) the
formalised features were weak enough to allow the formalised description to
acquire other meanings, whereas in the other situation the model was so
complicated that it was impossible to transcend just making sense of the
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formal contents of the figure. The ÒsunflowerÓ offered openings into a poetic
world, whereas other diagrams only yielded frustration.
In a Vygotskyan terminology, design artefacts are both tools (technical in-
struments) and signs (psychological instruments). This directs us to a wider
use of the distinction between meaning and sense, not only in language but in
relation to artefacts in general. Technical instruments have both meaning
and sense. The meaning of a hammer is the assemblage of shaped iron and
wood. The sense of the hammer is that it is used by carpenters for driving
nails. The sense of the hammer is ÒcrystallisedÓ in secondary artefacts, me-
diating hammering praxis; e.g. anecdotes and sayings. The meaning of the
ÒSunflowerÓ described above was that it was a (formalised) SA/SD context
diagram. The sense of the ÒSunflowerÓ in the cooperation between designers
and users was the context of the prospective computer system, and the way
it would mediate parts of the relations between activities in the organisa-
tion. This has some degree of tertiary artefactness to it, because the poetic
connotations of summer and nature may have mediated the emergence of
entirely new ways of understanding the workplace.
Programming shares the same kind of doubleness. This is pointed out by
Peter Naur (1985) who rejects the idea that programming can be seen as the
mere production of machine executable code Ñ isolated construction without
elements of conception and cooperation. He explains that a theory about
what the program does, and how it does it, is built simultaneously with the
construction of the executable code. Thus, in the terminology introduced
above, programming work has the double character of being both construc-
tion and conception. This theory cannot be written down or otherwise for-
malised, and is only accessible to the programmers working on the particu-
lar project. In WartofskyÕs terminology NaurÕs Òprogram theoryÓ is a sec-
ondary artefact conserving the acquired knowledge and skills in working
with the program. However, Naur bases his analysis on the individualist
philosophy of Ryle, thus neglecting the societal/cultural aspect of represen-
tation. The point in the concept of secondary artefacts is that the way hu-
mans understand their surroundings (including programs) is culturally me-
diated, secondary artefacts not only conserve knowledge and skill among the
individuals whose experience they are based on, but secondary artefacts also
transfer these across a given culture, e.g. the programming profession.
Furthermore, the empirical cases Naur uses in making the point about the
impossibility of transferring Òprogram theoryÓ are ambiguous, and may be
interpreted as pointing to the lacking ability of established design artefacts
in transferring Òprogram theoryÓ. Thus, WartofskyÕs (1973) general state-
ment that it is a basic feature of human praxis that experiences can be
shared and transferred, cannot be rejected based on NaurÕs programming as
theory building idea.
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Design artefacts are boundary objects
Design artefacts, global/general as well as local, are boundary objects; tying
involved activity systems together, and tying different rooms of design and
use together.
The heterogeneous activity systems contributing to design are tied together
through their joint use of artefacts, and through their joint focus on the same
object. Users and designers are driven by different motives and the object of
design does not make sense in the same way for them. Design artefacts are
boundary objects in the sense that they tie different praxes together, main-
taining meaning across groups but making sense in different ways. When
designers and users work together on a system specification, designers may
perceive the specification as a model of the data flowing in the prospective
system, whereas users may understand the same specification in terms of
new ways of working in the organisation. In the same way, the double char-
acter of design artefacts described above also makes them boundary objects
within one praxis.
Design artefacts do not only take different shapes or serve different pur-
poses in different groups, they also take different functions within one group
across time, during use and design, and in the different rooms of a specific
groupÕs praxis. Thus a system development method is a boundary object in
the sense that it has one function in the project organisationÕs internal edu-
cation prior to a project, and another function during the project. Working in
accordance with the method means two different things in the two project
rooms (see the example in the section on prescription versus praxis).
In the same way as design artefacts are boundary objects, the object of de-
sign, according to the prototyping as a general metaphor for design example,
is a boundary object. Realising that design artefacts and the object of design
are boundary objects, makes it possible to revise common ideas of shared
understanding and interpretation in design. The crucial point is not for the
designers to be able to understand and interpret the users correctly, but to
supply design artefacts that can serve as boundary objects in mediating the
design process.
The ÒsunflowerÓ (described above) was a boundary object in the sense that
designers perceived it as a computer system description whereas users per-
ceived it as an image of the organisation, but it maintained stability across
these different perceptions. In the Festival case the checklist was a bound-




Exploring the notion of design
artefacts
In this chapter, the notion of design artefacts introduced in the previous
chapter will be further explored. Firstly, to demonstrate the scope of the de-
sign artefact concept, the relation between theory and design is discussed by
viewing theory as design artefacts. Secondly, the tension between principles
and praxis in systems development is discussed as a special case of the gen-
eral doubleness in design artefacts of meaning and sense. Thirdly, trans-
formators are introduced as a norm for the secondary artefactness of design
artefacts, i.e. the use of representations in design. Finally, the notion of ab-
ductors is introduced as a vehicle for the discussion of the tertiary artefact-
ness of design artefacts and artefacts in use.
Theories as design artefacts
Scientific theories form an important class of representations, which are
formalised and pretend to be independent of concrete praxis. Because of the
very formalised quality of some theories it is possible to use them directly
as mediators of productive praxis. Thus, it makes sense to explore theories
as design artefacts.
Orthodox cognitive science based human-computer interaction research be-
lieved that design tools could be built by making approximate versions of
the general theories (Card et al. 1983). Although the rigid hard science vi-
sion of Newell and Card (1985) is not shared by everybody in the human-
computer interaction community, the ideals of the natural sciences are
widely accepted. Universal disinterested knowledge is seen as the only al-
ternative to unsystematic design by rules of thumb and ad hoc procedures.
This general lack of theories that are pragmatically rooted in praxis has
been destructive for the entire field of human-computer interaction
(Bertelsen 1993).
Theories can play different roles in design of computer artefacts; from world
views, guiding the designer and helping him asses the situations and keep
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the goals in mind, to tools mediating the achievement of specific results. In
(Bertelsen, 1994b) the notion of theories as design artefacts is introduced
through the example of Fitts' law.
FittsÕ law is one of the most cited results of experimental psychology in the
field of human-computer interaction. Every year papers based on this law
are presented. Thus, it is an obvious case to examine in trying to understand
the role of theory. Based on mathematical communication theory (Shannon
& Weaver 1949) FittsÕ law (Fitts 1954) states that there is a certain rela-
tion between how fast the human hand can be moved and the length and
precision of the movement, and further that this relation is congruent with
an ideal mathematical communication channel. In the classical human-
computer interaction ÒFittsÕ law studyÓ Card, English, and Burr (1978) com-
pared the performance of various pointing devices in a text selection task.
These results were the basis for incorporating law into Òthe model human
processorÓ by Card, Moran and Newell (1983).
Three distinct Òdesign artefact rolesÓ played by FittsÕ law can be identified
based on the literature (Bertelsen op cit.). These are: basic world view, tool
for calculation, and source of inspiration. In the human-computer interaction
psychology by Card et al. (1983) FittsÕ law was part of the world view.
Basically, FittsÕ law assumes that human behaviour can be understood
through additive models, i.e. by dividing it into behavioural atoms which can
be analysed in isolation and then sum up the findings. Thus the world view
promoted by the use of FittsÕ law is that human beings are computing ma-
chinery. Landauer (1991) reports on the use of FittsÕ law as a tool for specific
optimisation of a screen layout, which does not necessarily imply cognitive
science as a main perspective on human-computer interaction. Gillan et al.
(1990) have used FittsÕ law as a metaphor for research on specific aspects of
human behaviour with a mouse. In design this is equal to the use of the
FittsÕ effect as a thinking tool (Gediga and Wolff 1989).
The borders between these three roles are not clear-cut. By thinking about
interface problems in FittsÕ law terms (the metaphor role), other views are
excluded and FittsÕ law draws the main perspective on the interface towards
time performance concerns. As a tool for calculation FittsÕ law is a primary
artefact, just as a microscope. Of course, the things we are able to see by us-
ing FittsÕ law are irrelevant for design unless the calculations can be related
to the use situation. As a metaphor, FittsÕ law is a secondary design arte-
fact. As part of the basic world view, FittsÕ law promotes the idea that hu-
man-computer interaction can be decomposed and subjected to universally
valid laboratory experiments. In the later role, FittsÕ law and the entire cog-
nitive science framework is a secondary artefact.
These three roles of FittsÕ law as a design artefact cannot be generalised,
but they span a spectrum of ways in which theories mediate design. The two
extremes in this continuum of roles are:
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¥ tool: goal directed, ÒneutralÓ, and
¥ world view: value based, motive oriented.
Activity theory takes the tool role when analysing empirical data of interac-
tion with a specific computer artefact in terms of focus shifts (B¿dker 1991).
If designers adopt the framework of activity theory as their way of under-
standing technology, i.e. mediating human activity which is culturally medi-
ated etc., then activity theory takes the world view role. In between these
roles the double triangle figure can serve as a vehicle for communication,
and in the human-computer interaction community in general activity has
become a metaphor for seeing that there is more to designing computer arte-
facts than time and motion optimising (see Blumenthal 1995, for an exam-
ple of this use of activity theory).
In a logical positivist perspective there is no difference between the two roles
of theory. Theories are universal and can be applied independently of context
and purpose; they are always true and therefore need no direction related to
motive and values. If, however, we reject the idea of a universal and value-
free science also the most specific tool-like applications of theory, are carry-
ing a certain world view. This is no surprise; it is a corollary of the relation
between perception and action as analysed by Wartofsky.
The world view role is not only played by explicit theories. In any design sit-
uation, a set of basic assumptions are always playing an active role in guid-
ing the process and determining the outcome no matter if they are explicit or
not.
More than thirty years ago Meister and Farr (1967) showed that engineers
were disinclined to use human factors information that was not presented
as graphs or tables. In general, engineers and other designers can be ex-
pected to be pragmatic people, interested in getting the job done rather than
engaging in metaphysical questions about the fundamental arrangement of
Òthe worldÓ. Thus, an explicit world view is likely to be absent in many de-
sign situations leaving the arena for either mechanical materialism or
whatever world view embedded in the applied ÒtoolsÓ to govern the design
process. This can cause problems in using reductionist based approaches
like GOMS (Card et al. 1983). In general, GOMS is not a harmful approach
if it is utilised as one tool among others, and if it is subsumed under a basic
understanding of Òthe worldÓ that acknowledges human beings as human
beings. However, in a situation without a strong ruling world view GOMS
will act as a Trojan horse for the basic assumptions of the very mechanistic
cognitive science of Card et al. (1983).
Theories as design artefacts, as exemplified by FittsÕ law, conform to the
general notion of design artefacts developed in the previous chapter.
Theories mediate the three functional dimensions of design by playing the
roles in the continuum from tools to world views, being primary, secondary
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and tertiary artefacts. Theories explicate the doubleness of design artefacts
of mediating construction and representation; as in the case with FittsÕ law
both mediating technical optimisation of user interface layout, and repre-
senting specific understandings of the interface design problem. Theories,
like other design artefacts, are boundary objects, most prominently by tying
the production of Òuniversal factsÓ in research together with design. The no-
tion of theories as design artefacts contributes to a pragmatic philosophy of
science by providing a criterion for the assessment of theory. Thus, ideally,
the theoretical framework introduced in this thesis should be assessed as a
design artefact.
Principles versus praxis
The recurring conflict between principles and praxis in systems development
is an instance of the general tension between meaning and sense in design
artefacts. The two examples below are related to methods; in the first case a
method book, in the other the object-oriented ÒmethodÓ embracing the
Mj¿lner BETA system together with a specific tool.
In most cases a specific design artefact is intended to be used in a specific
way, and just as often the actual way the design artefact mediates design is
very different from this intention. In most cases, the relation between the
principles of intended use and the actual praxis with the artefact is far from
trivial. The mismatch is most obvious in the case of design methods, which
is illustrated by the below excerpt (reconstructed from interview notes) from
one of the interviews with designers of embedded software at a Danish ma-
chine factory.
Olav: How do you do when you specify the software for the pumps?
Designer: well, according to the SPU method [lengthy summary of
method book].
Olav: OK. The pump we looked at in the front room, the one you de-
signed the software for, how did you make the specification for that?
Designer: With that particular pump the situation was a little un-
usual, so we did not go through the steps of the SPU method.
Olav: Then, if we take the project you are currently involved with. How
is specification done there?
Designer: The current project is not a regular design project, because
we are also developing a general framework.
The embedded software department at the machine factory had used some
effort in implementing the SPU method, but the interviewed designer had
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never gone through the steps, defined in the method book, in a project. This
is in accordance with findings of Button & Sharrock (1994) who studied the
use of design methods in a development project and found a tension between
methologistsÕ ambition (clarity, coherence and closure) and the indetermi-
nate character of actual design work. This mismatch between the prescrip-
tions of the method and the actual design work can be understood in terms
of the doubleness of meaning and sense of the method. The meaning of the
method being the literal prescription of how to proceed through specified
steps, filling in certain forms etc.; the sense of the method being the actual
use of it, the sparse use of selected techniques combined with common
sense, etc. However, when the distance between this ÒmeaningÓ and ÒsenseÓ
becomes too long, the meaning-sense relation degenerates to a contradiction
between principles and praxis. Argyris & Schn (1978) write about the ten-
sion between espoused theory and theory in use in a somewhat similar
manner.
In our study of the object-oriented source level debugger, Valhalla, we saw
similar problems (see the chapter ÒTwo Empirical CasesÓ). The tool was
based on strict object-oriented principles, whereas the users to a great ex-
tent worked with programs as text. The tension between principles of object-
orientation and actual programming praxis was most clearly expressed dur-
ing the re-design workshop.
Valhalla was intended to be an object-oriented debugger in contrast to tradi-
tional source level debuggers. It is a part of the Mj¿lner BETA system, which
is built upon a conceptual framework emphasising that programming is
modelling, but also focusing on static aspects rather than the dynamic of ex-
ecution. However, in debugging it is important to be able to monitor the dy-
namics of execution Ñ the debugger was conforming to principles rather
than supporting praxis.
In discussing the navigational problems in the use of Valhalla, the princi-
ples versus praxis tension turned up again. The designers discussed whether
programmers had, or should be allowed to have, a textual understanding of
programs. The claim from one of the designers that Òif you are working on
the text then you are working in a procedural [non object-oriented /ob.] man-
nerÓ was later moderated by another designer acknowledging that Òthe pro-
gram text is a suitable means of navigationÓ. But, it was emphasised that
Òthe true object-oriented programmerÓ is not working on code-text but on the
structure of the program, i.e. hierarchies, patterns, objects. The view on the
textual representation as well as the view on specific executions are only
means for viewing the structure.
The principles of object-orientation prevented the designers, from acknowl-
edging the central role of textual representations in programming praxis, in-
cluding their own praxis. Valhalla was primarily intended as a part of the
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hidden curriculum for the re-education of programmers to do true object-ori-
ented programming.
The designers were unsure if anything was gained from the object-oriented
debugging approach. The discussion of their own use of Valhalla, had forced
them into explicating their own debugging praxis. To meet the demands of
their own praxis their debugger had to include support for more ÒtraditionalÓ
debugging, e.g. tracing of variables, this was agreed to be featured in the
next version along with object-oriented features. This was not considered a
setback for the vision of object-oriented programming activity, rather, ac-
cording to one of the designers, programmers could start using the tracing
facilities and then gradually approach the new ÒreligionÓ. In terms of the ex-
pansive cycle, the new instrument was not consolidated in a new object-ori-
ented activity. The praxis of old time programmers to hand wire print
statements was surviving the vision of the new object-oriented programming
activity. This is not an instance of too little power in introducing the new,
but rather due to a too limited scope of the vision. However, the introduction
and consequent use of an object-oriented programming language into a pro-
gramming praxis is no guarantee for the successful transition of the pro-
gramming activity to be object-oriented. This is realised in the Mj¿lner
community (Knudsen (ed.) 1994) and is the reason for the semi religious
talk about structure over text, during the workshop.
The examples above point to a general contradiction between prescription
and praxis. The general discrepancy in design artefacts between what they
prescribe and the praxis they induce can in some situations be understood
as a contradiction between the design artefact producing activity and design
praxis. This is the situation in the case of the Mj¿lner programming envi-
ronment (here Valhalla and Sif). The tool designers think that programmers
need to understand their own work as constructing object-oriented structure,
whereas the programmers, even when they are intimately familiar with the
structure not text idea, continue to write program text. In this case, the in-
strument producing activity is also representing the more advanced activity.
The funny twist in the case of the Mj¿lner environment is that the same
persons are subjects in the instrument producing activity introducing new
principles, and in the programming praxis rejecting to adopt these princi-
ples. In other situations, the discrepancy between principles and praxis can
be understood as a result of the relation between meaning and sense in de-
sign artefacts. In the case of the designer of embedded software, the mean-
ing of the SPU method was the prescriptions for design printed in the
method book, whereas the sense of the method was the way it actually influ-
enced work in concrete design projects. The interviews did, however, not shed
sufficient light on how the method influenced praxis, but only that the de-
signer had a bad conscience about not obeying the prescriptions in full de-
tail. Methods, or method books, are secondary artefacts to the extent to
which their prescriptions are rooted in praxis. But, according to Wartofsky,
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secondary artefacts are not depending on naturalism. Some method books
are based on fiction, war stories from other fields and the like, which in rela-
tion to the purpose of a method book has a character of tertiary artefactness.
We cannot expect methods to prescribe praxis in a direct manner. Instead,
the prescriptions embedded or expressed in design artefacts are resources;
they do not determine process and product; they are seeds that can develop
in concrete praxis in varying ways depending on specific circumstances.
Transformators the secondary artefactness
The secondary artefactness of design artefacts can be understood in terms of
transformators13 and transformation. Transformators being the design
artefacts mediating the creation of representations which can be regarded
transformed versions of other artefacts. Despite that this thesis generally
focuses on artefacts these concepts are introduced focusing on process.
Transformation is a process oriented concept focusing on the connection be-
tween development in use and development by design. The concept is evolu-
tionary, emphasising tradition over transcendence. While this focus on min-
imising the damage caused by a too abrupt introduction of too much new
technology is shared by many systems development methods, it must be
stressed that transcending the limitations of established praxis should be
an equally important purpose of such methods.
Transformation connects use and design by turning artefacts mediating use
praxis into local design artefacts, and back again. The idea is an outcome of
the Music Festival project (see example below). The computer support for
pre-production work, built in the Festival project can be understood as a new
version of the paper based pre-production checklist. Furthermore post hoc
analysis of the project (Bertelsen 1996b) showed that the lack of success of
this new computer artefact can be attributed to lacking possibility of
grounding the new artefact in praxis during the development process. The
concept of transformation is consistent with the experience and techniques
developed in the UTOPIA project and onwards (B¿dker et al. 1987,
Greenbaum & Kyng 1991).
In general, activity with one generation of an artefact is crystallised into the
next generation (see above), thus the history of a praxis can be discovered by
studying the history of the mediating artefacts. The idea of transformation
is to base design on the historical development of the praxis by deliberately
13 The back-formation of the word transformator from transformation is used over
transformer to emphasise the specific meaning of concept in the present context.
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continuing the crystallisation of activity into artefacts. In the methodologi-
cal cycle of developmental work research (Engestrm 1987), this crystallisa-
tion of activity into artefacts is analysed in the object historical analysis of
the second phase. The difference is that the object historical analysis is a
technique for establishing background knowledge for the development pro-
cess whereas design as transformation of artefacts concretely brings Òthe ob-
ject historyÓ into design.
In design by transformation, central artefacts from the considered praxis are
taken into the zone of design. This depends on the boundary object capabil-
ity of these artefacts, maintaining their identity across use and design.
When the central artefacts have been brought (successfully) into design, they
are gradually changed while they are mediating simulated praxis. By con-
fronting the artefacts with praxis throughout the process it is ensured that
the subsequent transformed versions make sense in praxis. When the trans-
formation of the central artefacts is completed and they have taken their
new form they are brought back into use.
The process of bringing central artefacts from praxis into design is a repre-
sentation process; for this to be useful these artefacts must be boundary ob-
jects, which maintain stability across representation. When artefacts are
transformed by design they exist both in their original form within the do-
main of use, and within the domain of design likely as representations. Thus
artefacts being transformed are boundary objects in the sense that they ex-
ist in different activity systems, and tie these together across groups, across
phases of praxis, and across the transition between use and design. The cru-
cial aspect of design by transformation is that the transformed artefacts
need to be robust enough to maintain their identity and still make sense in
all the involved rooms of design and use. The main practical achievement of
the transformation idea may be that it contributes to an increased sensitiv-
ity among designers to this boundary objectness.
The general concept of transformation is illustrated in figure 11. The big ar-
row is the central artefacts transformed over time, the big ovals are the
main rooms in which transformation take place. The small ovals show that
the transformed artefact is confronted with actual or simulated praxis
throughout the process. The horizontal arrows at the right side indicate im-
portant general design artefacts. The partly overlapping circles in the last
ÒstageÓ indicate that the transformed artefact is spread to a wider range of
related activities.
In terms of EngestrmÕs (1987) cycle of expansion, the big ovals on the design
side of the transformation model may correspond to the Òmodelling of in-
strumentsÓ phase, and the small ovals may correspond to application and
generalisation. Thus, transformation involves several cycles, which are




















Figure 11: Design as transformation.
The transformation approach is in some sense a conservative one emphasis-
ing continuity over the development of radically new needs. In this sense, it
is in line with the traditional approaches to office automation; and even
bares morphological resemblance with structured analysis (Yourdon 1982),
see figure 12. However, the differences between the transformation idea and
traditional office automation are more prominent than the similarities.
Traditional office automation is system-oriented, i.e. it understands design
as optimisation of the input-output relation of a system with an external
owner. While the purpose of office automation is to replace people by tech-
nology the transformation approach is praxis-oriented, focusing on the en-
hancement of mediated activity. The purpose of the transformation ap-











Figure 12: The morphological similarity between transformation and struc-
tured analysis.
Object-oriented modelling and transformation
The forefront of current system development methods are based on the ob-
ject-oriented paradigm, here referred to as physical modelling. The physical
modelling paradigm and its relation to the transformation approach is de-
scribed in some detail in (Bertelsen 1996a).
Traditionally, the advantage of physical modelling has been ascribed to the
naturalism of such descriptions (e.g. Holb¾k-Hansen et al., 1975, Madsen
et al. 1993, Coad and Yourdon 1990). Physical modelling is convenient in
modelling very complex, technical systems, including the computer itself,
but it is unclear how physical modelling facilitates or prohibits active in-
volvement of users in design14. However, by way of the concept of transfor-
mation it is possible to justify this idea.
According to WartofskyÕs notion of secondary artefacts, representations are
not one to one naturalist pictures of interesting parts of the world, but
rather containers for knowledge and skill related to outward action.
Representations are important components embedded in any praxis, medi-
ating the ongoing production and reproduction. Thus, system development
description and modelling artefacts should not be evaluated with
ÒnaturalistÓ criteria, but rather by looking at the actual design praxis made
possible by the formalism.
Madsen et al. (1993) refer to the paper-based Norwegian train reservation
system (S¿rgaard 1988), and medical records to point out that physical
models are not only parts of computerised systems, but also important
parts of human praxis in general. Physical models are secondary artefacts.
14 Colleagues outside the DEVISE project have asked why I am interested in the relation
between object oriented systems development and active user involvement in design. The
answer is that I wasnÕt in the first place, but it was a basic assumption of the DEVISE
project that object oriented programming was good for user involvement (see B¿dker et al.
1988).
64
Thus, the advantage of physical modelling in designing computer artefacts
together with non-computer professional users is that physical models are
integral parts of most praxes, and that physical and formalised objects can
be modelled and transformed as physical models in a way that makes sense
for the involved parties.
By understanding physical modelling based design as transformation of
artefacts it is possible to transcend the naive naturalism expressed in some
object-oriented approaches, (e.g. Coad & Yourdon 1990). Thus, the reformu-
lation of examples, like the Norwegian train (S¿rgaard 1988), of object-ori-
ented design in terms of crystallisation and transformation processes, vali-
dates the use of physical modelling in design together with users.
Transformation of the festival checklist Ñ an example
To exemplify the transformation idea the design process in the Music
Festival project can be analysed as transformation of the checklist. The
transformation of the checklist is illustrated in figure 13.
The original checklist as it was made by the Green stage group was a crys-
tallisation of festival work. They were doing the same things every year
when they received information from pre-production, and when the artists
arrived at the festival. They made notes on sheets of paper and these notes
gradually became more standardised and, in the end, the pre-printed check-
list was made. Thus knowledge about how to receive the artists and what to
look out for was crystallised into a new artefact the pre-printed checklist.
When the Sound and Light group took over the checklist, it was transferred
from the local context of Green stage group, to the rest of the organisation. In
this form the checklist served a broader range of functions; it became a
planning tool and a media for information exchange. The checklist became a
boundary object.
In the design process, the checklist was initially transformed into a
database sketch by the Sound and Light group; the checklist became a local
design artefact. For Sound and Light it was an incarnation of a technological
vision, and it was a representation of pre-production work, and of how this
work supports production on stages. For the researchers the database
sketch was first a too narrow technical vision, but later, during the last part
of the workshop, it became the specification for the prototype. The object-
oriented descriptions made by the researchers were transformations of the
checklist in the sense that they were a step in the definition of the relational
tables in the prototype. For the researchers the prototype was the new
checklist, with which the Sound and Light group could do everything they
previously did with the paper checklist. However, an important aspect of the
paper-based checklist was that it was handed over to, and used by the stage
groups. The way this was done with the prototype was that the information
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in the database was printed out on paper and attached to the band files;
thus, the reincarnated checklist returned to the stage groups. Unfortunately,
these printouts did not make sense as a checklist for the stage groups, they
contained all the information collected during pre-production but lacked all
the empty fields that were the original feature that mediated stage work.
The grey cross on the checklist transformation figure (figure 13) indicates
that it was not possible, for political reasons, to confront the design propos-
als with actual, or simulated, festival work.
The checklist existed both in the domain and in the design process
(database sketch). It was a boundary object in the sense that it existed in
different activity systems, and tied these together; across different activity
groups; across the different, incommensurable stages of the individual
groups cycle of the year; and across the transition from use to design.
However, the checklist was not robust enough to be carried from the
Festival, to the researchers and back into the Festival. In the transforma-
tion of the checklist from paper-based checklist into computer-based pre-
production support it lost its Òchecklist-nessÓ. The researchers saw the
checklist as a medium for the transfer of the information gathered together
during pre-production, for them it was an incomplete, non-computer version
of the future computer system; but for the people working at the stages, the



































Figure 13: The checklist history, an example of an unsuccessful transforma-
tion process.
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Abductors the tertiary artefactness
In this section, the tertiary artefactness of design artefacts, as well as the
tertiary artefactness of artefacts in use, is loosely unfolded by way of the no-
tion of abductors15.
Whereas the notion of transformation introduced in the previous section is
directed to the secondary artefact aspect of design artefacts, focusing on
maintaining praxis across the introduction of new technology, the notion of
abductors is directed to the tertiary artefactness of design artefacts empha-
sising the creation of unexpected new motives and new modes of action. In
contrast to transformation, dragging use into design, abductors in some
sense infuse design into use. Abductors are the tertiary artefact aspect of
the artefact clusters mediating design as well as use. In the most radical
sense the notion of tertiary artefacts imply that they cannot be planned for
as part of any purposeful act. However, it makes sense to put instruments
mediating the creation of unexpected solutions to recognised problems into
this category also. Thus, two sub-categories of abductors can be defined ac-
cording to the presence or absence of a recognised need state, and the subse-
quent entry into deliberate development. Abductors in the radical sense, are
e.g. abstract paintings, reshaping our ways of perceiving the world, whereas
abductors in a plain sense could be future workshops (Jungk & Mllert
1987) mediating the unexpected solution to a need state.
Whereas Engestrm (1987 and 1996) describes creation of the new as being
part of progressive projects, the tertiary artefacts as introduced by
Wartofsky reside in an off-line loop de-emphasising the project aspect. The
separation of goals from motives (Leontjev 1981) caused a separation of
tools as purpose by themselves, whereby secondary artefacts emerged. As
this separation is intensified in modernity, a stationary state of constant
innovation arises (Marx & Engels 1848); the dynamics of innovation and
imagination become separated autonomous motive, thus giving rise to ter-
tiary artefacts. In the form of aesthetic expressions tertiary artefacts are
created by individuals as a result of individual genius (explainable as the
result of the experience of contingency in modernity, e.g. Baudelaire), but if
such forms of creating are going to play a role in design they have to be
ÒsocialisedÓ and objectified.
15 In some of the papers of this thesis, abductors are called generators, but to avoid
confusion with the Ògenerators of secondary artefactsÓ referred to in other papers, I have
chosen another term. I do not intend to indicate any relation to PierceÕs use of the concept
abduction. Other terms could have had their own drawbacks; expanders would have
suggested mediation of expansive learning in a need state, transcenders, would have
implied too much dialectics and an unintended relation to Pelle EhnÕs tension between
tradition and transcendence.
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In meeting a recognised need situation, the instruments described by
Engestrm (1987), together with established techniques in cooperative de-
sign (see, e.g. Greenbaum & Kyng 1991), form a broad collection of plain ab-
ductors. Engestrm (1987) emphasises the role of theoretical models in ex-
pansive learning; similarly, models in systems development play a strong
role, not only as very high level programming, and as transformations of
artefacts from use praxis, but also as abductors, generating conceptions into
the unexpected new. The modularity and recombineability of object-oriented
models may make them particularly important as plain abductors.
However, the use of object-oriented design artefacts as abductors may as
well restrict the process by enforcing a too narrow focus on information and
computer technology per se.
With respect to radical abductors, the situation is more open. The horizontal
forms of development described by Engestrm (1996) rely less on a recog-
nised need state, thus, implicitly announcing an agenda for future develop-
ment of activity theory addressing the issue of radical abductors.
In use, radical abductors are rooted in tertiary artefactness in the general
sense of changing established modes of perception, it is a matter of aesthet-
ics, and it is related to the suitability of the specific computer artefacts as
re-mediators (see above). An important point here could be to make less
Òwell-plannedÓ user interfaces, allowing for poetic openings into contingency
and imagination. Being distracted at a lecture, you might look through the
windows, observing the forest of TV-antennas on the roof tops; in your imag-
ination the TV-antennas become a jazz orchestra; when focusing back on the
lecture you may understand organisational games, the topic of the lecture, in
a new way as a jazz band. In a computer interface there is no functional
point in seeing the ÒTV-antennasÓ, so they are not visible. The obvious diffi-
culty is that the designer (in principle) has full control of the 1100 x 800 pix-
els on the screen to exclude anything that does not contribute to Ògetting the
job doneÓ, and error messages from the basic system software coming
through to the user is generally considered a very bad idea with good reason.
Furthermore, abductors in use points to aspects of the artefacts explicating
current modus operandi, by functioning as Marxo-Freudian tools for creating
consciousness of existing limitations in order to transcend these. This also
points to the issue of enabling re-mediation by avoiding over specialisation
(Jones 1988). Clearly, facilitating development in use in this way is very dif-
ferent from embedding a curriculum for the development of transparent in-
teraction, into the interface (Bardram & Bertelsen 1995).
The notion of radical abductors in design is close to being a contradiction in
terms, because design is a purposeful endeavour. In contrast, radical abduc-
tors would be mediating purposeless systems development activities. When
John Whiteside, back in the eighties, sent an entire department at DEC on
leave to read HeideggerÕs ÒSein und ZeitÓ, that book may have served as an
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abductor when the department came back. Suggestions for possible abduc-
tors could include Òwild picturesÓ unrelated to any possible problem, or
techniques based on Fluxus or Dada. However, when such elements are
drawn into the design process they may end up as plain abductors, nicely
addressing Òthe problemÓ in question. Thus, in general, radical abductors
are likely to reside, and stay, outside the development process, belonging to,
e.g. general education, hobby, or art.
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 connected and transcended.Ó
ÐEngestrm
A materialist and dialectical framework for understanding and influencing
the field of use and design of computer artefacts has been introduced.
Materialist because it insists on the reality of the material world and the
material character of mental phenomena; dialectical because it rejects the
idea that human life is a mechanical product of its material basis (including
the physiological structure of the brain); the mental and the material de-
termining each other in a dialectical relation. Activity theory has been
pointed to as a possible, although not unproblematic, basic framework for
systems development research; integrating the relevant and necessary as-
pects involved in designing computer artefacts (human-computer interac-
tion, design, organisation, programming, cooperation, etc.), not necessarily
operational at a detailed technical level, but as a general Òworld viewÓ under
which the sub-fields can be integrated.
The concept of design artefacts has been introduced as a unifying perspec-
tive on systems development, emphasising material mediation in design,.
The concept is based on a dialectical materialist approach comprising activ-
ity theory as a general perspective (mainly Engestrm), and specifically the
notion of primary, secondary and tertiary artefacts (Wartofsky). The dialec-
tical materialist background has been supplemented with the notion of
boundary objects (Star), as mediators in boundary zones. The argument has
been based on the tenet of activity theory that human praxis is mediated by
artefacts and is continually changing in the process of socio cultural devel-
opment; and further that the history of praxis is crystallised into artefacts.
Design has been pictured as a zone where heterogeneous praxes meet to
change a given praxis though the construction and introduction of new arte-
facts, mediated by design artefacts making different sense to the various
praxes (boundary objects). As special instances of design artefacts, trans-
formators, mediating design as a transformation process emulating the pro-
cess of development in use, and abductors, mediating the development of
new motives, have been introduced.
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Design artefacts
The idea in activity theory that human endeavour is mediated by culturally
developing artefacts permeates the entire contribution. In understanding
design and in understanding the relation between research and design, this
tenet is expressed in the notion of design artefacts, which is the central con-
cept introduced in the thesis. With reference to WartofskyÕs terminology, it
has been argued that design artefacts are clusters of primary secondary and
tertiary artefacts (or they are part of such), implying that they mediate the
direct production of the new computer artefact, that they are representing
the considered work praxis as well as design work and, finally, that they
take part in a non-productive off-line loop of free imagination. With refer-
ence to the concept of boundary objects and the concept of zone discussed by
Engestrm (1996) and others, it has been argued that design artefacts me-
diate design in a boundary zone, where heterogeneous praxes meet to create
the new. With reference to the distinction between primary and secondary
artefacts and the general tension in language between meaning and sense
(Vygotsky), it has been argued that design artefacts have a precarious dou-
ble character often emerging as a conflict between principles and praxis. The
concept of design artefacts and mediation is a unifying concept in the sense
that it is possible to understand all outcomes of systems development re-
search, and computer science16 in general, as design artefacts, and to appre-
ciate the value of these outcomes according to how they mediate design.
Development in use and use in design
Connecting use and design is an old idea, exemplified by the involvement of
users in design, and by the concept of tailorable systems. To maintain the
focus on use quality as a product of the development of use itself, the impor-
tant concept of tailorability (Trigg et al. 1987, Henderson & Kyng 1991,
M¿rch 1997) has been left out of the discussion. As indicated in the discus-
sion of support for the development of transparent interaction (Bardram &
Bertelsen 1995), computer artefacts are changing during use without being
altered technically (e.g. by tailoring). With reference to the notion of crys-
tallisation of activity into successive generations of artefacts, it has been
argued that the notion of design as the transformation of artefacts from the
domain of use, is connecting design and use, ensuring that the new computer
artefact makes sense in the considered praxis. Transformation of artefacts
establishes a boundary zone of use and design, the transformed artefacts
being boundary objects in the double sense of both mediating across hetero-
geneous communities and across the use-design border. It has been argued
that artefacts maintain identity across transformation, abstractly as they
16Computer science, not only meaning the sub-disciplines  which Naur calls Datalogy, but
the whole spectrum of fields of research dealing with use and design of computer artefacts.
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continue to make sense in the same way for the involved praxes, and be-
cause representations in design in this situation are the secondary artefacts
maintaining praxis, made explicit. As a particular result, it has been argued
that understanding representations in design in terms of transformation
yields a solution to the recurring referent system problem in object-oriented
methods.
Radically pragmatic philosophy of science
Based on the notion of design artefacts, a radically pragmatic philosophy of
science has been suggested. Pragmatic, because the validity of a theory is
appreciated based on its mediation of design activity (or other praxis).
Radically pragmatic, because validity is not appraised based on the random
preferences of detached individuals, but based on the reality of concrete so-
cietal praxis at a specific point on the trajectory of cultural development;
thus, neither relativism nor utilitarism. This normative approach to the
study of theory and history of disciplines dealing with use and design of
computer artefacts has yielded a solution to the difficulties experienced ear-
lier (Bertelsen 1993) in trying to reject the orthodox cognitivist engineering
psychology of human-computer interaction (Card et al. 1983). However, it
has also induced enhanced sensitivity to the motives and achievements of
these early contributions. The radical pragmatic philosophy of science
makes it possible to both maintain earlier contributions and to destroy
these in the creation of a dialectical materialist basis for design, thus for-
matting the basis of systems development research so that it has both an
exclusive world view and is inclusive in the adaptation of earlier achieve-
ments.
ÒThe newÓ
Proponents of activity theory have fanatically claimed that development and
innovation are strictly collective achievements. Thus, Kuutti (1989) con-
cludes that there is no need for the individualist concept of creativity, be-
cause all relevant aspects of development can be systematically understood
in terms of expansive learning. By understanding development as being the
collective answer to a need state, such positions miss that innovation in late
modernity is becoming separated from production. It is essential to be able
to comprehend, at least partially, the exceptional creativity of individuals,
not in idealist terms but as a materialist theory of genius. WartofskyÕs con-
cept of tertiary artefacts provides such an understanding of individualist
creativity as a material phenomenon in the off-line loop. Thus, tertiary arte-
facts is a basic concept in understanding creativity and innovation as a ma-
terial phenomenon, in a way that transcends the limitations of the histori-
cally deterministic activity theory. Furthermore, by bridging the gab be-
tween individual inspiration and collective achievement, the notion of ter-
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tiary artefacts will play an important role in maturing a dialectical materi-
alist notion of horizontal development that is evading relativism.
Discussion of the contribution
The strength of the concept of design artefacts is that it provides a uniform
perspective on the object and praxis of systems development research, the
downside is that such perspectives in general tend to bring about tunnel vi-
sion, ignoring important aspects of (in this case) systems development, and
systems development research.
The two important issues of project management and power struggle, seem
to be absent from the framework introduced in the thesis. These two issues
have, however, been the main focus of several earlier contributions to critical
systems development research; power struggle was the main focus of the
early Scandinavian projects, NJMF, DEMOS, DUE (see Ehn & Kyng, 1987,
Bansler 1987), and project management was thoroughly dealt with in the
MARS project (Andersen, et al. 1990). These issues are indispensable as-
pects of systems development research, but can as separate themes be re-
garded external to a conceptual framework for design. However, project
management and power struggle are not excluded from the framework in-
troduced in the thesis; power struggle is a basic dynamic force in the activity
theory framework, understood as part of the primary contradiction ex-
pressed in terms of the contradiction between capital and labour; and pro-
ject management is part of the communicational dimension of the intro-
duced notion of design.
Obviously, process-oriented approaches yield important insights; however,
the design artefact concept, introduced in this thesis, promotes a focus on
the mediation of design praxis, rather than on principles and intentions.
Tools are crystallised activity, secondary artefacts represent process, world
views are carriers of conflict between interested parties. Thus, power, pro-
cess and politics are profoundly embedded in the basis of the introduced
concept of design artefacts.
Future work
The focus of the thesis has been on the development of a set of basic con-
cepts for systems development research and praxis, based on a sparse
amount of empirical material. Thus, an obvious direction for future research
is to systematically use the introduced concepts in studies of development
project, and in the identification and analysis of concrete classes of design
artefacts. Such a direction could be taken within Centre for Object
Technology.
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New insights into the history and philosophy of systems development re-
search and praxis can be obtained from the systematic application of the
radical pragmatic philosophy of science proposed in this thesis. Similarly, it
would be worthwhile to revisit the history of human-computer interaction
research and praxis from the orthodox cognitivist and onwards. Also, it
seems promising to follow the ambition of Card et al. (1983) to build an en-
gineering psychology, not based on their mechanical materialism, but based
on the dialectical materialism of activity theory; contributing to real appli-
cability of activity theory in the field of human-computer interaction.
Generally WartofskyÕs dialectical materialism provides a basis for a stream
of new insights. E.g. further application of the notion of secondary artefacts
in relation to current theories in the field of computer supported cooperative
work based on the notion of articulation work seems promising.
The level of basic theory presents intriguing issues for future work. The pri-
mary problem in applying activity theory in systems development research
has been the dependency on historical determinism, through the linear and
vertical concept of the zone of proximal development; but as indicated by
Engestrm (1996), activity theory is moving away from this dependency.
However, it is not clear whether the installation of a horizontal concept of
development, etc., will turn activity theory into a relativistic mess of theo-
retically inconsistent babel, or it will be possible to maintain activity theory
as an engaged and value-based foundation. The question is if the rejection of
the uni-directional concept of development implies the general rejection of
any notion of progress. The answer is no. A long tradition for non-utopian
Marxisms exist, e.g. the Frankfurter school (see Adorno (1985) for an ac-
count on the notion of progress). Such positions will be of great importance
for activity theory in the years to come. Related to the issue of the direction-
ality of development is the role of the individual. WartofskyÕs concept of off-
line loop indicates a way to go in understanding innovation and creativity in
materialist terms without insisting on collectivity as the only valid kind of
dynamic force (e.g. Kuutti 1989).
Aesthetics is cultural reflection freed from purpose, the societal experience;
aesthetics is the spring of innovation and emancipation. Thus, studies of the
creation of art, will be a possible source of insights into the very basics of
creativity, innovation and emancipation. The obvious difficulty in such an
endeavour is to ÒseeÓ what goes on in the genius mind of the artist, therefore
groups of artists, e.g. theatres using a wide spectrum of technologies and an
experimental mode working could be a fruitful laboratory. In the same way,
multimedia projects together with artist who are non-computer experts
could yield insights into this issue. Within the Danish National Centre for
IT-research (CIT), we are moving in this direction in current pilot projects.
In this thesis, design has been described as a zone where heterogeneous
praxes meet for a while to do something meaningful together, and the arte-
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facts mediating this meeting have been analysed. The vocabulary applied
seems promising in the further study of such boundary zones; not only in de-
sign, but also in relation to collaboration and experience in virtual rooms
and common information spaces.
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An investigation into the design
artefact concept as a vehicle for
systems development research
Abstract: System development is studied from the viewpoint of artefacts
utilised during the design process. Different aspects of design artefacts are
discussed based on a pragmatic classification of design activities and a
philosophical notion of perception and representational artefacts.
Statements about the relation between theory and design are made based
on materialist pragmatism.
Introduction
In the last years the development of tools and environments for experimen-
tal system development has been the main issue for the system develop-
ment research group at Aarhus University. This can be seen as a natural
progression of the critical Scandinavian tradition: In the early projects
(NJMF, DEMOS, DUE) the focus was on changed motives for intervention in
system design. The later projects (UTOPIA, MARS) realised that the new
motives induced a demand for new ways of acting (methods, techniques) in
design. Now we (the Devise project) understand that the design life we want
to live requires a new house Ñ new tools and environments.
In this paper I look at system development through the artefacts utilised in
the design process. I will call such artefacts design artefacts, Admittedly this
concept is somewhat outlandish and very wide in definition. The reason for
talking about design artefacts instead of just design tools or system devel-
opment environments, is twofold. Firstly it emphasises that system devel-
opment is a human activity like many other activities, and thus mediated
by certain artefacts. Secondly the concept indicates that design is different
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from use, and that the activity of deliberate transformation of the environ-
ment for our daily life contains elements which are not to the same extend
present in our day to day praxis. In this paper design is opposed to use, and
should not be confused with Òdesign phaseÓ (as opposed to analysis, and im-
plementation) defined in many system development methods.
Design
Design is an activity where a designing subject shapes the design object by
means of some design artefacts. Artefact does not only denote Òman made
thingsÓ as the dictionary suggests, but further points at things as mediators
of human activity. The artefact concept thus emphasises that things are
what they are due to their use rather than their physical features. In general
artefacts are mediating either a relation between a subject and an object, or
a relation between subjects. An artefact mediates an activity when the focus
of the acting subject is on the object/subject for the activity rather than on
the artefact. If focus is on the artefact, this become the object of the activity,
and other artefacts come to mediate the activity. (For further explanation
see e.g. Leontjev 1979).
The design object is the artefacts that the design process changes or creates.
The design object is parts of the deliberately shaped environment, or condi-
tions for human life: houses, cars, word-processors, and furniture, but not
food, movies, news papers and toilet paper. The designing subject is almost
always a collective subject. Some of the members of this subject can be pro-
fessional designers who designs the conditions for the lives of somebody
else, and others can be members of the praxis that the design object is in-
tended to mediates. Design artefacts are artefacts that mediate the design
activity, they are utilised but not consumed during the process. They serve
as conditions or environment for the design process. Design artefacts can
thus be opposed to materials.
In the perspective of design artefacts, system development consists of three
elements, or main design functions mediated by the design artefacts. The
three elements are: (1) getting knowledge and understanding about what is
designed, (2) communicating during this process, and (3) shaping the consid-
ered world. Examples of design artefacts are programming languages,
CASE-tools, specification standards, and systems development methods.
Often we think of design artefacts as supporting just one of the design ele-
ments: an editor is used for writing code, a future workshop is used in order
to understand the problem domain, memos are used for communication, and
so on.
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The computer is a symbol manipulating device, and thus design of computer
artefacts can be seen as construction of signs. Most human-computer inter-
action research has tried to find the mechanics of these signs, in order to op-
timise the collaboration between man and machine. Computer semiotics
(Andersen 1990) has, however, pointed out that software and hardware are
not signs but only potential carriers of signs, or generators of signs, and that
the signs are constituted by the use praxis. This implies that as designers
we donÕt know what we are constructing, and thus the fundamental lack of
experience that is a basic condition for system development (Kyng 1994) be-
comes twofold: we donÕt know the problem domain, and it is impossible to
know what we are building before the design process has ended.
Three elements of design
As stated above system development consists of the three elements: concep-
tion, communication and construction.
System development is a process aiming at the construction of software and
the environment for its use. In this way we are talking about system devel-
opment as a programming process. The artefacts mediating the relation be-
tween designers and the design object seen as  technical construction, are
programming environments, CASE tools etc. The artefacts mediating the
constructive aspects of design also mediate communication and perception.
The use of a CASE tool makes the designers conceive the design object with
the concepts supported by the tool, and will thus guide the process in certain
directions. When looking at design as construction, the benefits of object-ori-
ented programming languages become the possibilities of code reuse, the
high degree of maintainability, and the stability of Òcode structureÓ.
Design is a co-operative enterprise, where different people with different
professional backgrounds and different motives are engaged in creating
something new. This is the reason why communication is essential in sys-
tem development. The design artefacts mediate system development as
communication, both as explicit means of communication (e.g. status reports
and specifications) and as means for the sharing of experiences, insights,
and visions about the design object. A prototype mediates communication
when users through their exploration of the prototype, yield knowledge about
the use context to designers, and when designers express their new insights
by way of continuously changing the prototype.
Design is conception of the present and of the new. Users and designers
achieve new understanding of the existing world and rooted in this they con-
ceive a new world that transcend the old. Design artefacts mediate learning
and conception. A functional programming language for example facilitates
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the understanding of the design object as transformation of data streams. A
prototype induces new visions and knowledge when it confronts the possible
and the existing. In a positivist epistemology, the conceptional elements of
design will be the passive operations of mere inspection and evaluation. In
such a view the above analysis of the three design elements would not say
anything about design, and we could say with Card et al. (1980) that
ÒScientific models don't eliminate the design problem, but only help the de-
signer control the different aspects. Ó. In contrast to this pessimism I claim
that it is possible to base design on scientific studies (although not ideal
natural scientific) of the design object and of design.
It is the conceptional and communicative elements that separate system
development from programming, but as Naur (1985) has pointed out there
is more to programming than writing machine executable code. NaurÕs the-
sis is that a theory about what the program does, and how it does it, is built
simultaneously with the production of the executable code. The theory can't
be written down or otherwise formalised, it is only accessible to the pro-
grammers. In this notion, theory becomes a mysterious, immaterial con-
struct. NaurÕs conclusions offer no understanding of how knowledge can be
transferred between different groups of people, or what (historical) human
praxis is. Naur fails to see that everything man does is rooted in his societal
context, and that the technical process of constructing a program is sub-
sumed under its evolving social praxis. S¿rgaard (1988) adopts the same
mistake in his discussion of the relation between programming environ-
ments and system development environments, by claiming that all co-oper-
ative work including systems development, is an aggregate of individual
work (op sit p.14). This is the idea that human life can be understood by
first considering human biology, then the mind of the individual, and last
the society. But the human mind can't be understood as a biological phe-
nomenon, and sociality is not an aggregate of individuals. I will not argue for
historical determinism or against the existence of some kind of free will. But
I will claim that those aspects of human behaviour which are related to sys-
tem development can only be understood by looking at man as a product of a
socio-historical process.
If the classification of system development into the three elements concep-
tion, communication and construction is compared to the MARS-framework
(Andersen et al. 1990), the first thing to be noticed is that my scheme does
not explicitly deal with the so-called Òprocess orientedÓ components i.e.
planning, evaluation, and regulation. Although these Òprocess orientedÓ
components are located in the communication category, it is obvious that
project management is one of the major bottlenecks in practical system de-
velopment, and that it should be paid careful attention to by practitioners.
But in trying to understand the basic features of design I think it is unnec-
essary to deal with these aspects explicitly.
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Representational artefacts
While it is fairly simple to see how the communicational and constructional
elements of design are mediated by various artefacts, it is far more compli-
cated to see and appraise how the conceptional element is mediated by
these artefacts. In order to clarify that question the notion of secondary arte-
facts is adopted from an essay on perception by Marx Wartofsky (1973,
p.202):
...what constitutes a distinctively human form of action is the creation
and use of artifacts, as tools, in the production of the means of existence
and in the reproduction of the species. Primary artifacts are those di-
rectly used in this production; secondary artifacts are those used in the
preservation and transmission of the acquired skills or modes of action
or praxis by which this production is carried out. Secondary artifacts are
therefore representations of such modes of action, and in this sense are
mimetic, not simply of the objects of an environment which are of inter-
est or use in this production, but of those objects as they are acted upon,
or of the modes of operation or action involving such objects.
Design artefacts are primary artefacts as well as secondary artefacts. As
primary artefacts they mediate construction and communication, and they
also mediate the creation of various artefacts like charts and diagrams
which belong to the conceptional element. When seen as primary artefacts,
design artefacts can be analysed with the same concepts that we use in the
analysis of artefacts in general. From this point of view CASE-tools and de-
buggers are very similar to cars and frying-pans. B¿dkerÕs (1991) activity
theory based analysis of the human-computer interface, is an analysis of
computer artefacts as primary artefacts i.e. how the computer artefacts me-
diate either relations to objects (instrumental) or relations to other subjects
(communicational).
It is as secondary artefacts, or rather as generators of secondary artefacts
the design artefacts are constituted. Ehn and SjgreenÕs (1991) notion of de-
sign artefacts is in some sense related to the concept of secondary artefacts.
They use the concept to denote material representations produced during
the design process, not as part of the final product, but as vehicles for the
generation of (visions of) the new. Such artefacts, belonging to a specific pro-
ject, could be classified as local secondary artefacts, in order to separate
them from ÒglobalÓ secondary artefacts like theories, methods, and the like,
and to separate them from general design artefacts.
If we adopt the notion of secondary artefacts, the models and descriptions
made in system development appear to be conventional reminders rather
than one-to-one reflections of the world. Thus modelling artefacts should not
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be evaluated with ÒnaturalistÓ criteria, but rather by looking at the actual
design praxis made possible by the formalism.
NaurÕs idea of programming as theory building can be reformulated with the
notion of secondary artefacts. In this perspective the program is an exter-
nally embodied representation of the modes of action upon the world that
the programmers have discovered during the programming process. Naur is
right in stating that there is more to programming than the production of an
ÒobjectiveÓ specification, but this extra thing is not impossible to transfer. In
contrast such external embodiments are basically vehicles for the process of
making modes of action, generally available for other members of the hu-
man species. Naur describes a case where a team of programmers success-
fully transferred the ÒtheoryÓ of a program to another team, which they
made a revision of the program together with. Naur explains this by claim-
ing that the new team experienced the creation of the program, but that was
not the case since the program was not totally re-constructed. If the ÒtheoryÓ
is understood as a secondary artefact we can avoid this mystification, and
instead see the theory as a ÒmaterialÓ shareable part of social praxis.
Primary artefacts as generators of secondary
artefacts
Though there is more to system development than mere programming, sys-
tem development may be seen as a process aiming at the production of pro-
grams that can be run on a computer. Thus the primary artefacts in system
development are those things normally referred to as programming envi-
ronments. The tool par excellence, the hammer, is primarily an instrument
for construction e.g. driving nails and splitting bricks. But at the same time
the hammer is used as an instrument for our perception of the world. When
the carpenter drives the nail he also learns something about the specific
piece of wood. NormanÕs (1991) concept of cognitive artifacts does not offer a
suitable explanation of this aspect of the use of tools. Norman builds his no-
tion of cognitive artefacts on a division between evaluation and execution.
First we test on the world, then we operate, then we test to see if we can exit
the loop. This division has likewise been the core of the work science tradi-
tion founded by Gilbreth (1911) and Taylor (1916) Ñ the stopwatch man
evaluates operations and the worker performs operations. Understanding
and changing the world can only be seen as separate in degenerated contexts
like the psychological laboratories or the factory assembly lines. The real
world is moving and unpredictable and we have to dig the holes for the foun-
dation pillars in the mud before we can know where to build our house.
91
Programming tools serve as mediators for the creation of the running sys-
tem. But at the same time the tools mediate the perception and under-
standing of the existing and the future worlds. In this way simple tools like
hammers can be seen as generators of secondary artefacts. These secondary
artefacts are not pictures of the hammer or the wood, but representations of
modes of acting with/upon hammer and wood.
The applicability of elements from structured analysis (Yourdon 1982) in
communication and conception, together with users depends highly on the
designers abilities to transform e.g. a context diagram produced with a
CASE-tool, into a secondary artefact. Laursen et al. (1990) report on two dif-
ferent situations in the same organisation. The two situations comprised
almost the same persons but in different development projects. In the first
situation a context diagram (called the Òthe sunflowerÓ by the project group)
was successfully applied as a common point of reference shared by all mem-
bers of the project group. In the second situation the designers tried to apply
ER-diagram output from a CASE-tool in discussing aspects of the applica-
tion area with the users. In this situation the diagrams failed as generators
of shared secondary artefacts. This suggests that different types of dia-
gramming techniques (as primary artefacts) are differently suited as gener-
ators of secondary artefacts. But what are these differences based on? What
makes a primary artefact a good generator of secondary artefacts?
The schools of ÒontologicalÓ object-orienting (e.g. Coad and Yourdon 1990)
suggest that the advantage of the object-oriented methods is that the world
is object-oriented. This idea is based on a world view that fails for the parts
of the world that contain human beings, because laws of mechanics and
common sense logic only are applied by human beings when they are en-
gaged in detached reflection (Ehn 1988, Suchman 1986). But how can we
then defend the widely accepted, although never empirically supported, idea
that object-oriented methods are much better than other known methods for
programming and software specification?
Object-oriented methods have much in common with LEGO bricks. The good
thing about LEGO bricks is not that the world is LEGO-oriented or that hu-
man beings think about the world, and have visions in LEGO brick-like con-
cepts. The good thing about LEGO-bricks is that they are easy to construct
with and that it is possible to re-combine existing constructions. Using
LEGO bricks it is possible to develop the vision of a new space vehicle
shaped in a way that totally transcends the limitations of LEGO. The suit-
ability of LEGO bricks for the construction of space vehicles is not due to the
LEGO-like form of the world of space vehicles, but a result of LEGO-bricksÕ
potentials as generator of secondary artefacts. I think that the virtues of ob-
ject-oriented methods in system development are comparable to those of
LEGO in the field of flying saucer design. Thus I will agree with Morten Kyng
(1994) in saying: ÒBy means of object-orientation it is possible to design
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computer artefacts such that it is easier for users to create relations be-
tween these artefacts and that which the artefacts is aboutÓ. And I will fur-
thermore suggest that this, and not some kind of naturalism, may be the
background for the virtues of object-oriented design artefacts.
Science in design
Scientific theories can be understood as secondary artefacts pretending to
transcend the limitations of their historical context. Cognitive science
based, orthodox human-computer interaction research, believes that design
tools can be built by making approximate versions of the general theories of
human cognition (Card et al. 1983). Although the rigid hard science vision of
Newell and Card (1985) is not shared by everybody in the human-computer
interaction community, the ideals of the natural sciences are widely ac-
cepted. Universal disinterested knowledge is seen as the only alternative to
unsystematic design by rules of thumb and ad hoc procedures. This general
lack of theories that are pragmatically rooted in praxis has been destructive
for the entire field of human-computer interaction (Bertelsen 1993).
In general scientific theories are secondary artefacts, but when specific tools
for calculation are extracted from a theory, this extract becomes a primary
artefact. FittsÕ law is probably the most cited result from experimental psy-
chology in the field of human-computer interaction, and is in addition very
suitable as a paradigm case for the study of the relation between theory and
design (Bertelsen in press). FittsÕ law (Fitts 1954) states that there is a cer-
tain relation between how fast the human hand can be moved and the length
and precision of the movement, and further that this relation is congruent
with an ideal mathematical communication channel (Shannon 1994). The
classical ÒFittsÕ law studyÓ in the field of human-computer interaction was
performed by Card, English, and Burr (1978) who compared the performance
of various pointing devices in a text selection task. Later on the law was
canonised as part of Òthe model human processorÓ by Card, Moran and
Newell (1983).
As a design artefact FittsÕ law has played at least three different roles. As
ontology, as tool for calculation, and as source of inspiration. In the human-
computer interaction psychology by Card et al. (1983) FittsÕ law was a part
of the world view. To play this role, FittsÕ law must be placed in a context
where human beings are seen as mechanical devices, that is cognitive sci-
ence. Landauer (1991) reports on the use of FittsÕ law as a tool for specific
optimisations in the design process, which not necessarily implies cognitive
science as a main perspective on HCI. Gillan et al. (1990) have used FittsÕ
law as a metaphor for research on specific aspects of acting with a mouse. In
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design this is equal to the use of the FittsÕ effect as a thinking tool (Gediga
and Wolff 1989). The borders between these three roles are not clear-cut. By
thinking about interface problems in FittsÕ law terms (the metaphor role),
other views are excluded and FittsÕ law draws the main perspective towards
mechanistic reductionism. The use of a specific performance calculation
serves as a thinking tool too. As a tool for calculation FittsÕ law is a primary
artefact, just as a microscope. Of course, the things we are able to see by us-
ing FittsÕ law are irrelevant for design unless the calculations can be related
to the use situation. As a metaphor, FittsÕ law is a ÒglobalÓ secondary design
artefact. As ontology, FittsÕ law must be tied to the idea that the world is
out there no matter what we do about it, and that it is possible to get uni-
versal knowledge about this world. In the later role FittsÕ law and the entire
cognitive science framework is a secondary artefact. To appreciate its valid-
ity, we have to ask if it helps us to shape the world in a desirable way.
Studies of applications of FittsÕ law in human-computer interaction show
that universal knowledge abstracted beyond a specific context, can't be re-
garded as confident (Bertelsen 1994b).
What has surprised me is that similar conditions can be identified in the
field of algorithm construction. In recent lectures at the department of com-
puter science in rhus, Neil Jones and Jens Clausen (Department of
Computer Science at the University of Copenhagen) have pointed out that
theories of asymptotic complexity are insufficient as instruments for the
identification and refinement of effective algorithms in practical situations.
Clausen pointed out that evaluation of the different algorithms in a specific
context is necessary. He further suggested a checklist for qualified choice of
algorithms. The importance of these observations for this paper is that even
in the very ÒexactÓ world of algorithm construction, theories can't be treated
as Òone-to-oneÓ reflections of the problem domain e.g. the performance of a
specific algorithm. General theories should rather be seen as artefacts facil-
itating deliberate intervention based on specific conceptions. Theories will
be better understood if we think of them as secondary rather than primary
artefacts.
Conclusion
In this paper I have introduced three analytical categories which can be ap-
plied in order to understand what is going on in system development, and I
have further more discussed how the notion of secondary artefacts can yield
an understanding of design artefacts. The discussion of the benefits of object
oriented methods showed how this notion can provide us with new insights
that transcended the naturalist tendency in object oriented modelling.
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On the level of design theory the notion of secondary artefacts gives rise to a
pragmatic materialism that can prevent the design sciences from driving
into the ditches of relentless logical positivism, indifferent relativism, or
foggy idealism. A practical approach to the construction of design artefacts
based on the theoretical constructs presented above has not been discussed
so far. One of the things that such a discussion may reveal is the need for a
more explicit treatment of the Òprocess orientedÓ component from the
MARS-framework, in order to deal with issues like version control and re-
source allocation.
The focus on representations and modelling in contemporary system devel-
opment literature, enforces a discussion of how human beings relate to their
surroundings. We have to understand how this relation is different from the
ways animals and machines relate to their surroundings. This paper hope-
fully contributes to that discussion.
Postscriptum
In the above mentioned essay by Wartofsky a third category of tertiary arte-
facts  is also suggested. These artefacts relate to the ordinary worldly pro-
ductive praxis in the same obscure way as dreams relate to the awake life.
Tertiary artefacts have not been discussed in this paper, because it is diffi-
cult to relate this concept to design. Nevertheless, I am sure that aesthetics
should be brought into this field. Not as rules about screen colouring or as
application of Aristotelian poetics (Laurel 1986), but as a field of emancipa-
tory, authentic praxis where unexpected things can happen. The basic aes-
thetic problem in design of computer artefacts, is that everything in an in-
terface is planned, or should be. If something unexpected shows up on your
screen then it is the result of bad design and it will cause immediate frus-
tration. While the aesthetics of the modern world is constituted by a contin-
gent stream of experiences (truck horns, TV-antennas, paint peeling of a
wall), the world of computers only supplies us with over planned images.
What is needed in this functional concrete dessert is more TV-antennas.
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Second paper
Fitts' Law as a Design Artefact: A
Paradigm Case of Theory in
Software Design
Abstract: FittsÕ law is described and discussed as an example of use of
theory in human-computer interaction design. The dichotomy between
academic theory and applied theory is rejected and replaced by a radical
pragmatic notion of theories as design artefacts. Different roles of theory in
design are discussed.
Introduction
In the early years of interactive computing, designers relied solely on their
intuition, some rules of thumb and a few guidelines. As the users of interac-
tive systems turned from programmers to non-computer professionals, this
situation became a problem Ñthe systems were too difficult to use. Some
saw in this an urgent need for a scientific foundation for HCI-design. The
classical contribution to this vision is formed by the works by Card, Moran
and Newell [3, 4], who believed that the future science of HCI should be
based on cognitive psychology. They saw their task as one of making the
bulk of academic experimental results applicable for designers. The vision
was that this science had to be guided by the requirements set by the inter-
face engineers, i.e. the theory should be operational rather than true in a
more academic sense. The basic components in this applied science of the
human-computer interface were task analysis, calculation and approxima-
tion. The idea was that the performance of a future human-computer system
could be calculated from an analysis of the job which the system was in-
tended to do. The special need for approximation in this field, compared to
e.g. electrical engineering, was that the human system component was too
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complex. The implicit epistemology underlying Card, Moran and NewellÕs
vision is formulated with great clarity in NewellÕs last book:
Theories are approximate. Of course, we all know that technically they
are approximate; the world canÕt be known with absolute certainty. But
I mean more than that. Theories are also deliberately approximate.
Usefulness is often traded against truth. Theories that are known to be
wrong continue to be used, because they are the best available. FittsÕ
law is like that. How a theory is wrong is carried along as part of the
theory itself. Grossly approximate theories are continuous launching
pads for better attempts. FittsÕ law is like that too. The scientist does
the best he can with what heÕs got - and the engineer, who has to have
answers, even more so. [13, p.14]
Newell doesnÕt reject the existence of a universal truth about human cogni-
tion, neither does he claim in principle that it is impossible to know this
truth. The world is out there, but we construct approximate theories because
it is too cumbersome to build an exhaustive theory, and because in many
practical situations we are better off with operational rather than true theo-
ries. We canÕt reach the truth so we have to live with the useful. NewellÕs
pragmatism is based on a dichotomy between applied theory (that is wrong
but useful) and the truth. This position could be called methodological
pragmatism.
In the field of HCI, the most prominent result from cognitive psychology is
FittsÕ law [6]. In this paper, I will use Fitts' law as a vehicle for a discussion
of the role of theory in human-computer interaction, viewing it as a design
artefact. Design artefacts  are employed in the design process in order to
support (or mediate) one or more of three design functions: gaining knowl-
edge and understanding about what is to be designed, communicating dur-
ing the process, and affecting the world. Examples of design artefacts are
programming languages, CASE-tools, specification standards, systems de-
velopment methods, and the like. Theories are thus constructed to help us
master the world we are living in. Here I look at  FittsÕ law because it plays
various interesting roles in the game of science and design.
FittsÕ Law.
The goal of FittsÕ work [6] was to make sense of experimental results about
human motor performance that seemed to be mutually contradictory.
The need for a unifying concept of motor capacity is indicated by the ap-
parent difficulty of reconciling many of the facts reported in the litera-
ture on motor skill. [6, p.382]
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Thus Fitts' motivation was the purely academic one of making sense of some
phenomena. Fitts' idea was that this could be obtained by realising that the
capacity of the motor system (the relation between the movement-time, dis-
tance, and required precision) could be compared to the capacity of a com-
munication channel [15], that is, a model where a sender codes signals onto
a channel with a given bandwidth possibly perturbed by noise, after which a
receiver gets the signal from the channel and decodes it. Fitts did not claim
that mechanisms for coding etc. could be found in the motor system, but only
that the limitations on performance had the same mathematical structure.
Fitts conceived the motor system as consisting of bones, muscles and nerves
in the arm, as well as control mechanisms such as visual feedback. That is,
the motor system consists of everything from Òthe signal in the brainÓ that
initiates the movement to the resulting movement outside the subject. Fitts
points out that one can only observe the total system of: receptor Õ neural
channel (cognitive system) Õ effect, from the eye via the brain to the finger;
you stimulates the eye and observes the resulting response in the hand. He
works around this problem by applying a trick. By assuming that the neural
channel consists of specific sub-channels in a chain, he sets up an experi-
ment where everything except the motor system is eliminated. By using
repetitive over-learned movements at the highest possible speed, he elimi-
nates perception and cognitive processing from the chain, leaving the iso-
lated capacity of the motor system (including the subjectsÕ monitoring of the
movement) to be measured. This was done in the so-called reciprocal tap-
ping set-up.
Fitts defines the capacity of the human motor system as the ability to per-
form certain classes of movements in a uniform way. The time required to do
a specific movement is inversely proportional to the capacity of the Òmotor
channelÓ. This capacity can be described by an analogy to ShannonÕs:
Theorem 17: The capacity of a channel of band[width] W perturbed by
white thermal noise of power N when the average transmitter power is
limited to P is given by
C = W log P + N
N
[15, p.100]
The obvious problem of this analogy is that it is impossible to get any in-
formation about the information capacity of the motor channel. Fitts does
not see the information capacity of the motor system as a property of the
motor system per se, but as a property of motor performance under given
conditions. Thus the basis for FittsÕ analysis is the amount of information
required to accomplish a given movement. This quantity he denotes as the
index of difficulty Id, described by:
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where Ws is the variability of the movement, and A is the amplitude
(distance). Division by the time t it takes to do the movement yields a quan-
tity that is constant for specific classes of movements. This is called the in-








where Ip corresponds to ShannonÕs C, 1/t to the bandwidth of the motor sys-
tem, and Ws/2A to the signal to noise ratio,  (P+N)/N in ShannonÕs formula.
The interesting point is that this equation is able to describe the empirical
data. From this expression of Ip, it is simple to deduce an expression for the
required time t, but Fitts did not do that. He only wanted to describe the
empirical data in a consistent way.
The appearance of Fitts' law is historically situated in a time when aca-
demic psychology (in the US) was on its way back from the behaviourist
dark ages. The appearance of the computer had made it possible to build
testable models of human cognition. The channel idea has been central in
the sciences of human cognition and performance. In the behaviourist ver-
sion, the channel degenerates to a black box, but the basic view of the rela-
tion between subject and object remains. In human factors engineering, hu-
man-machine relations are seen as a circular composition of channels:
Machine operation Õ displays Õ sensing Õ data processing Õ controlling
Õ controls Õ machine operations Õ ...
Additive Models
From the viewpoint of experimental psychology, FittsÕ law is an unquestion-
able fact, due to the overwhelming amount of empirical evidence. When we
move outside the laboratory, however, this fact appears to be questionable.
The implicit assumption underlying FittsÕ law is that it is possible to de-
compose human performance into basic tasks and add up the times for all
these tasks to get the total performance time. This strategy, known as addi-
tive models, is an old idea and has been questioned for at least the last
hundred years [9]. Simplistically stated, the assumption underlying addi-
tive models is that e.g. a mouse operation is the same thing no matter what
context it is performed in. In HCI additive models have been widely used
(e.g. the GOMS- and keystroke level models by Card et al. [4])
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An experiment reported in [9] shows that additive models cannot describe
even simple and controllable tasks. The subjects were solving so-called
ÒSterzinger linesÓ, i.e. nonsense lines of letters and spaces. The task was to
step from space to space, using the arrow keys on the computer console, until
a space separating two equal letters was reached and then to indicate that
by pressing the arrow-up key. In contrast to the studies by Card et al. [4],
Gediga and Greif were able to monitor the performance of single keystrokes
and thus discover that, although the total performance time could be de-
scribed by an additive model, the time taken to perform the single key-press
changed as the subject moved the cursor through the line.
The significance of these result with respect to FittsÕ law is that if it is im-
possible to build additive models, then we may expect that the parameters
in FittsÕ law change according to changes in the (micro) context.
Furthermore, the relevance of FittsÕ law as a prescriptive tool depends on
the general validity of additive performance models.
The ÒSterzinger lineÓ experiments can be seen as a critique of additive mod-
els from within experimental psychology showing that the relation between
the human being and the surrounding world is dialectical and not mechani-
cal Ñ while the subject changes the object, the object also acts on the sub-
ject. There is no stable engine inside the subject. A more fundamental cri-
tique can be made by questioning the validity of laboratory experiments as
a source of design relevant knowledge. Chapanis [5] has pointed out that,
due to the complexity of human beings, it is almost impossible to keep track
of the variables. This critique can be radicalised from the point of view of ac-
tivity theory by stating that the human being in the controlled environment
of the laboratory, is fundamentally different from the human being in Òthe
real worldÓ [12]. Although some aspects of human performance are evident
from a laboratory experimental point of view, these aspects may not exist
outside the experimental setting.
Fitts' Law in HCI Ñsome Examples
FittsÕ law studies expose great diversity in the way the law is used and the
approach to the given (design) problem. Two general approaches can be iden-
tified. One tries to find general quantitative properties of the human motor
system, constants of the human that are independent of the specific circum-
stances. In this group we find studies that have great resemblance to FittsÕ
reciprocal tapping set-up, but no resemblance to any practical situation (e.g.
[11]). These studies are based on the implicit assumption that FittsÕ law is
part of a cognitive psychology that can form a universal framework for stud-
ies and design of HCI. At the other extreme, we find approaches more con-
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cerned with specific issues of specific (types of) interfaces, and thus more re-
alistic in the experimental set-up (e.g. [7]), here we see studies that use
FittsÕ law solely as a source of inspiration. We are dealing with two funda-
mentally different approaches to the possibilities of a HCI-science. Either
you try to establish anthropometric laws based on a ÒtheoryÓ about human
cognition, or you can, based on specific metaphors, study specific interface
classes. The classic FittsÕ law study in HCI by Card, English, and Burr [2]
comparing the performance of various devices in text selection, can belong to
both categories. Some see these experiments as the determination of Ip in
the mouse version of FittsÕ law, others see the studies as a concrete, al-
though reductionist, investigation of specific input devices. I prefer the latter
interpretation.
Gillan et al. [7] report that FittsÕ law can account for some of the perfor-
mance variations in text selection with a mouse, but that other variations
can neither be predicted nor described by FittsÕ law. Two cases that theoreti-
cally should have the same Ip were examined, nevertheless the two Ip ap-
peared to be different. Gillan et al. conclude that a general theory of mouse
performance in a direct manipulation interface has to include parameters
for aspects not covered by Fitts law, e.g. cognitive processes and user strate-
gies. They point out that development of design oriented metrics has to be
based upon detailed investigations of what the user does in concrete situa-
tions. Thus they give up the efforts to find the parameters in the mouse ver-
sion of FittsÕ law, and view their studies as dealing with some concrete prop-
erties of direct manipulation interfaces.
The applicability of FittsÕ law in a practical design task is illustrated by an
example regarding the placement of Òsoft buttonsÓ in a hypertext browser
screen layout [10]. FittsÕ law was utilised to minimise the time required for
mouse operation.
We probably saved tens of milliseconds per 5-minute browse. This re-
ally is not bad, as such things go; it's often not done in commercial sys-
tems, and is economical worthwhile in our expected applications, which
have large multipliers. I think saving small fractions of a second by op-
timal button placement is probably a good illustration of the real but
limited impact that traditional psychological theory can have if dili-
gently applied. [10, p.65].
This indicates that artefacts like FittsÕ law can be used to solve specific iso-
lated design problems, whereas they are almost useless as general perspec-
tives on human-computer interaction.
Laboratory experiments by Gediga and Wolff [8] confirm that target size in-
fluence movement time in ÒmousingÓ, at the same time as the quantitative
contents of FittsÕ law are considered too unpredictable to be applied in de-
sign. They suggest a distinction between FittsÕ law and a FittsÕ effect that
103
merely states that movement time is inversely proportional to target size,
and proportional to movement length. They say that only the latter is rele-
vant in HCI. This seems to preclude FittsÕ law from being a part of the world
of Òtask analysis, approximation and calculationÓ.
FittsÕ Law as a Design Artefact
Fitts  made sense of a ÒchaoticÓ world by constructing a consistent predictive
scheme. Although this scheme predicts and describes empirical data it pro-
vides no suggestions for an understanding of the observed phenomenon and
its relations to its surroundings. Thus FittsÕ law can be seen as a detached
predictive metaphor. FittsÕ law is basically a performance model in line with
the time and motion study tradition founded by Taylor and Gilbreth.
Together with this tradition it tends to reduce design of work environments,
e.g. computer artefacts, to a matter of economical optimisation. No matter
how much it is claimed that Fitts law is merely a useful metaphor, it will
make us perceive the human being as a channel. The danger is that viewing
the human being as a channel will make us treat her as a mechanical device.
The significance of these basic assumptions about the human psyche de-
pends on the part FittsÕ law plays in the game of design.
The above examples show at least three different roles. In the HCI psychol-
ogy by Card et al. [4], FittsÕ law was part of the world view. To play this role,
FittsÕ law must be placed in a context where human beings are seen as me-
chanical devices, i.e. cognitive science. Landauer [10] used FittsÕ law as a
tool for specific calculations in the design process, without adopting cognitive
science as his main perspective on HCI. Gillan et al. [7] used FittsÕ law as a
metaphor for research on specific aspects of acting with a mouse. In design
this amounts to the use of the FittsÕ effect as a thinking tool [8]. The borders
between these three roles are not clear-cut. By thinking about interface
problems in FittsÕ law terms (the metaphor role), other views are excluded
and one is led towards mechanistic reduction. The use of a specific perfor-
mance calculation serves as a thinking tool, too. Theories always play differ-
ent roles at the same time.
In NewellÕs implicit dichotomy between true and applicable theory the
metaphor role could be added as a third distinction. I would rather prefer to
view the three above roles as modes of acting with and developing under-
standing of the world. The methodological pragmatism expressed by Newell
rejects that value statements can have any relevance in the real world of de-
sign, and that differences in the overall understanding of the use of com-
puter artefacts can have any practical significance. A simple notion of theo-
ries as design artefacts, based on this view, would state that theories are
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tools for prediction, calculation, and generation of visions; and that some-
times they work and sometimes they do not. Furthermore, such an idea
would claim that the only valid world view should be the collection of tools
for calculation, or performance models, just like the Model Human Processor
[4].
In contrast to this, I will claim that value statements must be the basis for
every science no matter whether they are implicit or explicit. Performance
models like FittsÕ law are based on specific (implicit) assumptions about the
human being and her relation to her surroundings. By applying such models
as tools in design we will automatically share this world view, unless we
strongly specify another one. We can not avoid this ontological discussion.
Our implicit or explicit choice of world view is also a choice of the world in
which we want to live; disinterested sciences do not exist [1].
The absence of value statements in the methodological pragmatism of
Newell [13] and Card et al. [3, 4] leads to either a position saying that any
statement  is valid if you like it to be so (i.e. relativism), or a position saying
that only statements that can be inspected are valid in science (i.e. logical
positivism). In the latter case, the scientific method is installed as a substi-
tute/proxy/go-between for the assessment of theories, as it is seen in the
idea that the psychology of the human-computer interface should be a hard
science [14].
When designers build specific computer systems they use what they have
and what they know, no matter how incompatible from a theoretical point of
view. Current social- and cognitive science tend to misunderstand the
strengths of science and just collect everything that seems to be right to-
gether. Scientific theories are not one-to-one reflections of the world, but
artefacts mediating understanding of, and action in the world, through re-
duction. By stuffing everything together, nothing interesting about the world
will appear, powerful theories have to be based on cruel reductions.
Conclusion
The fact that cognitive science is able to predict and describe many phenom-
ena relating to HCI, should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that cogni-
tive science must be (part of) the scientific framework for HCI. I still agree
with Card, Moran and Newell that HCI design might benefit from a tighter
connection between science and design, but as the use of FittsÕ law in HCI
indicates it is not likely that mechanistic psychology will form a fruitful ba-
sis for this connection. A pragmatic science of HCI will have to take into ac-
count the context of the use of computer artefacts, and the context of design
of computer artefacts as well as the relation between science and design.
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In a way it is both too optimistic and too pessimistic to state that:
ÒScientific models do not eliminate the design problem, but only help the
designer control the different aspectsÓ [3]. Of course, no science will ever be
able to see into, or build the future. Human beings are fundamentally con-
tingent, one is never sure of their next moves, and thus science will never
fully control any aspects of the interface. On the other hand, a radical prag-
matic science of HCI, a science not based on ideal natural science, can yield
design-knowledge and understanding that goes beyond technical control.
Such a radical pragmatic science of HCI will necessarily be based on dialec-
tical, as opposed to mechanical materialism.
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Supporting the Development of
Transparent Interaction
Co-authored with Jakob E. Bardram
Abstract: Transparency has been seen as a significant aspect of successful
human-computer interaction. In this paper we investigate this concept from
the point of view of activity theory. We show that transparency cannot be un-
derstood as a static feature of the interface, but that the crucial point in
achieving transparent interaction is the ongoing development of unconscious
operations, embedded in the process of use. We suggest that the process of
deliberate formation and refinement of operations during the course of
interaction, is supported by setting conditions for the creation of a zone of
proximal development in the interface.
Introduction
Better interfaces is a goal shared by most people in the HCI community, but
it is harder to agree on what constitutes a good interface; and to what extent
a scientific foundation for design is necessary. In the visionary contribution
to a scientific foundation of HCI by Card, Moran, & Newell (1983; Newell &
Card 1985), the criteria for good interaction were mostly of quantitative na-
ture; maximum speed, minimum errors, fast learning, and other measurable
quantities. The degree to which such criteria are met is easily assessed in
an objective manner; unfortunately, many important usability aspects are
not covered by such metrics.
A recent report sponsored by the US National Science Foundation claims
that ÒThe aim of HCI research should be to understand the principles be-
hind what is necessary for transparent interaction.Ó (Strong 1994, p.19),
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thus suggesting that transparency could be a measure for good interface de-
sign. It has been recognised by many in the HCI community (e.g. Hutchins et
al. 1986; Laurel 1986, Winograd & Flores 1986; Shneiderman 1992) that
people want to think about the job they are doing and not about the com-
puter artefact they are using; but it is hard to find substantial explanations
of the concept of transparency.
In specific situations it may be easy to see whether a computer artefact ap-
pears to be transparent to the user. Experienced Emacs users interact
transparently with the editor although it appeared completely opaque at
their first encounter with it. Emacs is a very powerful and transparent tool
for many programmers, but it will probably be hard to persuade writers to
use it. On the other hand, it is not likely that an artefact like MS-Word that
many writers interact transparently with, can become a transparent tool for
programming. This small example illustrates two things about trans-
parency. Firstly, that transparent interaction is not a property of the inter-
face by itself, but a quality of the use activity; and secondly, that transpar-
ent interaction is developed by the user during interaction.
In this paper we discuss the concept of transparency from the point of view of
activity theory, and we try to identify how transparency is developed during
use, and how this ongoing process can be supported by conditions in the in-
terface.
HCI and the information processing
paradigm
From the very beginning two distinct tendencies have coexisted in the field
of HCI. One side mainly motivated by a practically oriented concern for the
usability of computer artefacts; the other side more oriented towards the
theoretical foundation of HCI. NormanÕs (1981) classical analysis of UNIX
can be seen as an instance of the first, Card, Moran and Newell (op. cit.) as
an instance of the later. On both sides information processing is the common
framework; thus, understanding the user is often referred to as,
Òunderstanding the limitations of human information processingÓ (Strong
op. cit., p.5). The predominant tendency in the field has been pragmatic and
inclusive; a book like User Centred Systems Design (Norman and Draper
(eds.) 1986), is an example of this, although often referred to as cognitive
science.
With respect to aspects of interaction that can be regarded stable, or con-
stant over time, the information processing based tradition has established
valuable knowledge concerning cognitive abilities of generalised users like
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the Òexpert userÓ, ranging from studies of performance at a keystroke level
(Card, Moran & Newell, 1983) to high level concepts like direct engagement
(Hutchins et. al. 1986). Due to the explicit or implicit idea of information
processing, the recurrent problem is that the HCI community tends to see
their task as one of fitting two separated, more or less stable engines to
each other.
The most simple information processing based models like GOMS (Card et
al. op cit.) are extremely additive, and any notion of context is absent; typing
an ÒHÓ is basically the same thing no matter whether it is the first letter in
ÒHoovercraftÓ or it is pressed to get on-line help. It is impossible to explain
how the same text editor can be different things in different situations Ñ
how the use qualities of computer artefacts develop in the process of use.
Within such cognitive models accounts on learning are mostly of a quantita-
tive nature, the power law of practice (Snoddy 1926; Card et al. 1983) de-
scribing how the speed of a human act develops as a function of repetition,
being one of the most prominent examples.
In more elaborate models like production systems as ACT* (Anderson 1983)
and SOAR (Newell 1990) the additivity is not obvious, and the models ex-
plicitly try to deal with more qualitative aspects of learning and develop-
ment. The problem remains that the way human beings relate to their sur-
roundings is understood as a kind of problem solving, or search in a problem
space; and skill acquisition is thus understood in terms of chunking or other
ÒshortcutsÓ in the problem-space-search.
Such models can describe how skills in operating an advanced piece of tech-
nology can become automatic. The way users relate to their surroundings is
however still seen as an exchange of information between distinct entities;
thus the subject-object relation is seen as secondary compared to the inter-
nal and isolated processing of information. By drawing this distinction be-
tween the users as information processing engines and their surrounding,
the information processing paradigm precludes itself from understanding
how the objective conditions of the world and their cognitive representations
are inseparable parts of cognition. This separation is problematic in under-
standing transparency because it separates the description of development
from the description of the use-activity in which development is embedded.
Although it is possible to deal with some of the dynamic aspects of the rela-
tion between users and artefacts within information processing psychology,
such accounts tend to become exorbitantly complicated. We will not enter
into a philosophical discussion about the general validity of different ap-
proaches to human cognition; after all, no objective or value-free methods for
settling such abstract controversies exist; the choice of scientific foundation
can never be legitimated by an external norm or method; we have to take the
responsibility for the way we choose to understand and act in the world in
which we live (Feyerabend 1975, Habermas 1972). We will, however, show
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that a theoretical foundation for HCI, based on the dialectical nature, and
fundamental situatedness of the user-computer relation, can yield a more
useful understanding of transparency than an approach dealing with the dy-
namic relations as an exception. By changing the basic assumptions from
the mechanical materialism of cognitive science to the dialectical material-
ism of activity theory, it becomes possible to understand how transparency
is tied to the concrete context of use, and how transparency develops within
this context.
The structure and development of human
activity
Human activity has three fundamental characteristics; firstly, it is directed
towards a material or ideal object which distinguishes one activity from an-
other; secondly, it is mediated by artefacts (tools, language etc.); and thirdly,
it is social within a culture (Vygotsky 1978). Computer artefacts, like all
other artefacts, in this way mediate human activity within a practice. By
acting in the world, human beings meet the objective world, which is experi-
enced through the activity. Thus, human knowledge about the world is reflec-
tion obtained through activity, constituting the basis for expectations, and
desires about activities in this world.
Human activity can be described as a hierarchy with three levels: activities
realised through chains of actions, which are carried out through operations.
At each of these levels the objective world is reflected through the activity.
Human activity is always directed toward a material or ideal object satisfy-
ing a need. The subjectÕs reflection of, and expectation to, this object charac-
terises the motive of the activity. Human activity is carried out through ac-
tions, realising objective results. These actions are controlled by the subjects
conscious goals. Goals are the reflection of the objective results of the action.
Actions are realised through a series of operations; each determined by the
concrete physical conditions of the action. These operations are performed
without thinking consciously but are oriented in the world by a non-con-
scious orienting basis of the operation. This orienting basis is established
through experience with the concrete material conditions for the operation,
and is a system of expectations about the execution of each operation con-
trolling the operation, in the process of the activity (Leontjev 1978).
Human work is collaboration mediated by different artefacts in order to re-
alise common objectives. The overall objective of the organisation is divided
into various activities, each having its own object and performed by different
persons. Each person takes part in the activity of getting the whole organi-
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sation to work. The collaborative way of doing things and the division of
work between workers in the organisation form a working culture Ñ a prac-
tice. Means of dividing work, norms, and language can all be seen as arte-
facts mediating this practice: they are made by human beings and mediate
the relations between human beings and their material and social surround-
ings. A secretary may need to write a letter to remind Mr. Smith that he is
late with his payments and is therefore motivated to initiate actions to
achieve this. This activity is carried out through actions, realising objective
results: to write a letter the secretary must find an address, formulate the
letter, get a signature, etc. Activity and actions cannot be reduced to each
other: Various actions can result in a letter Ñ handwriting, typing or using a
word-processor Ñ all different actions, mediated by different artefacts, ob-
taining different results but still fulfilling the same objective of writing a
letter. On the other hand, the same action can be a part of realising different
activities. Printing a letter on the laser-writer can both be part of the paper-
archive-maintenance activity and the send-a-reminder-to-Jack-Smith activ-
ity. The analytical level of actions describes the intention of an activity Ñ
what results there are or should be obtained. Operations describe the opera-
tional level of the activity Ñ how the action is realised, determined by the
actual physical conditions of the action. The layout of the keyboard, the word
processorÕs interface, etc. determine how the secretary uses the computer to
realise the goal of writing the letter. The non-conscious orienting basis of the
operation enables the skilled secretary to write the letter without directing
attention to the layout of the keyboard.
Within the framework of activity theory, transparent interaction can be de-
fined as handling the computer through operations. In this way the computer
artefact mediates the activity by allowing users to perform intended actions
directed on the object (inside or outside the computer) through the interface.
At a given moment the user has a certain repertoire of operations; the only
way interaction can be transparent is if conditions of the interface triggers
operations in this repertoire (B¿dker 1991).
Human activity is not stable but is transformed constantly. An activity can
loose its motive and become an action with the former motive as goal. An ac-
tion can loose its conscious goal and be subsumed under another action as
an operation. This process of automation happens through practice. The re-
verse process of conceptualisation happens when the conditions for the oper-
ation force users to think consciously about what they are doing. This hap-
pens in a breakdown situation (Winograd & Flores 1986), where the physi-
cal conditions for the operation do not match the operations orienting basis,
or it happens due to deliberate focus shift from the goal of the action to the
conditions for the operation (B¿dker 1991). Such breakdown situations or
intended focus shifts where the computer becomes object of conscious exam-
ination interrupt the transparency.
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The userÕs repertoire of operations is constantly developing, allowing the
computer artefact to become an effective support in a work situation. The
operations used by skilled Emacs users were not present when they started
to use the editor, they were established during use. At first the act of mark-
ing, copying and pasting some text is done by consciously taking one step at
a time, deliberately making sure that the different acts obtain the desired
result. The conditions of the editor for placing the cursor, marking the text,
etc., are incorporated into the orienting basis. Through practice the different
parts of the action become automatic and finally the total action is auto-
mated into an operation, which can be executed without conscious reflection.
But if for instance the conditions for an operation change due to changing
mode of the editor, the user may experience a breakdown. This conceptuali-
sation makes the relation between the conditions and the orienting basis of
the operation an object for conscious reflection, in order to fix the discrep-
ancy.
Development of operation through
automatisation of actions
The main mechanism for the development of a repertoire of operations is au-
tomatisation of actions to operations, where the conscious guidance of the ac-
tion toward a goal has stopped. This does not mean that the user does not
perceive the conditions for the operation, instead the operation is oriented
by an unconscious perception of these conditions.
The efficiency of the transformation of actions into operations is determined
by the formation of the actions. According to GalÕperin (1969) there are three
basic parameters characterising the quality of an action. Its generality, its
level of abbreviation and the extent to which the action is mastered.
The generality of an action is determined by the orienting basis of the ac-
tion. To generalise an action is to distinguish the cues of the objective condi-
tions, which are necessary for the fulfilment of the action. We can differenti-
ate various forms of orienting bases for an action, each determined by the
learning process in which the action is developed. Trial and error learning
results in an orienting basis solely directed towards the actual action. Such
an orienting cannot be transferred to other actions and represents the low-
est generality. The most general orienting basis is established through ana-
lytic learning of general methods of analysing the conditions of the action.
These methods of analysis are incorporated into the orienting basis of the
operation as methods for recovering from breakdown situations permitting
the user to isolate the structure of the conditions for later recognition or rep-
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etition. Transparency of interaction is closely connected to the generality of
the orienting basis. Abbreviation is the process of optimising the action by
skipping unnecessary operations and replacing difficult operations with
simpler ones, as a result of possibilities in their conditions and knowledge of
their result.
When generalising an action users come to know the full scope of conditions
in the surroundings that the action matches; and the full scope of potential
desirable goals that the action can fulfil. When generalising the action of in-
voking the UNIX ÒcatÓ-command users begin to use the command not only
for concatenating files but also for printing files on the screen, feeding them
into pipes etc. To do this users need a general orienting basis. Similarly, ab-
breviation depends on the creation of the orienting basis. Removing a file
from a UNIX file system may, for the ÒinexperiencedÓ user, involve the exe-
cution of one or more ÒlsÓ-commands (list files in the current directory) to
make sure what is going on, in addition to the Òrm <filename>Ó-command
(remove the file) . When the user gets to know what is going on the remove
action is abbreviated by skipping the ÒlsÓ-commands. Similarly, using a
keyboard short-cut on a window based interface can be seen as an abbrevia-
tion of the more complex mouse-operated menu selection.
Finally mastering the new action is the ability to independently perform the
action with new materials in unanticipated contexts, in order to obtain a
new result. If users learn to drag and drop objects into the Macintosh trash
can the mastering of the drag and drop action implies that users, on their
own, are able to drag and drop objects into folders etc. Users do not come to
master an action by watching others, but only by practising the operation
themselves.
The process of establishing the action is a conscious process in which the
user forms an orienting basis according to the material conditions for the ac-
tion. Once the action has attained a certain level of generalisation, abbrevi-
ation, and mastery, it can be automated as an operation. Once the action
has been automated, the process of enhancement has stopped. It is only pos-
sible to develop the operation by conceptualising it back to an action, con-
sciously reforming this action and then automating the changed action.
When development is embedded in the daily work, one problem is that the
process of refining a new action requires time. In a given work situation
users may not be interested in mastering brief and general operations; the
primary motive is to get the job done (quickly). In such situations learning is
biased toward trial-and-error learning which establishes infertile opera-
tions only adjusted to the conditions for this specific situation.
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Setting the conditions for development of
transparent interaction
Mediated and social human activity builds up the human world as artefacts
embodying human capabilities, developed through socio-historical practice.
Human work is characterised by the collaborative production of artefacts,
each made with the purpose of mediating a certain activity. This activity is
therefore objectified (or crystallised) into these artefacts, and through use,
the artefacts are again modified and shaped to meet the evolving human
needs. Window based interfaces are artefacts, which objectify human expe-
riences with computer interaction. An artefact like the Macintosh is a mate-
rial objectification of a large number of experiences obtained during several
years, ranging from the invention of the mouse by Doug Engelbart over the
pioneering steps of the Xerox Star to the latest work on intelligent agents.
To assimilate the human world as made by artefact embodying human ex-
periences, the human being must perform overt activity with the artefacts;
activity adequate to the human activity embodied in these artefacts.
Furthermore, this activity should be socially mediated by other people
within the culture. It is a fundamental notion of activity theory that human
beings, guided by other human beings, gradually assimilate the human
world by reproducing the activity embodied in the artefacts. The child learns
to use a spoon, not on its own, but with the help of the mother. By imitating
the activity that was originally crystallised into the spoon the child tries to
master it as a human artefact. Similarly, users rely heavily on colleagues for
developing their skills and learning about the computer, especially novice
users (Bannon 1986). Vygotsky captures this social mediation of human
cognitive development in the concepts of Òthe zone of proximal developmentÓ:
ÒIt is the distance between the actual developmental level as deter-
mined by independent problem solving and the level of potential devel-
opment as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or
in collaboration with more capable peersÓ ÑVygotsky 1978, p. 86
The concept of a zone of proximal development describes how the mediated
activity develops dialectically through contradiction between what users can
do with the tool today, their actual competence, and what they want to be
able to do in a near future, their potential competence.
The actual competence of the user forms the basis for development; it is the
userÕs species specific, cultural and individual experiences Ñ what the user
has learned up to this point in time. Traditionally HCI has looked at the ac-
tual competence of the general user. Direct manipulation, for instance, cap-
tures some of the human experience as a specie and enables a ÒnaturalÓ in-
teraction: human beings manipulate objects by grabbing, dragging, lifting
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them; the shape of objects is perceived according to the normal direction of
light from the sun, etc. A more significant part of the userÕs actual compe-
tence is the Òcomputer-cultural experienceÓ; i.e. culturally established ways
of interacting with computers. Window based operating systems provides a
type of interaction, which is becoming gradually more culturally objectified
through the common use of windows, mouse, buttons, scroll bars, pull-down
menus, etc. Consistency in the use of a window based interaction makes it
possible to transfer experience from one system to another. Hence, tradi-
tional HCI has searched for general principles of how computer artefacts can
conform to the cultural- and species specific experiences of users. The indi-
vidual experience, however, is impossible to grasp in general terms, and
thus widely ignored by the field of HCI. It is, nevertheless, a fundamental
part of the actual competence that has to be considered.
Based on the actual competencies the user must be able to look ahead of the
actual zone of mastery and create a zone of proximal development. GalÕperin
(1969) points out that children are unable to perform a task independently,
if they have no complete orienting basis. Thus, learning of a new task re-
quires that users are given an initial familiarity with the task; otherwise
learning will be reduced to ÔblindÕ trial and error. Human beings can deliber-
ately create or seek special conditions with the purpose of learning, engaging
themselves in an exploratory learning activity. According to Bol (1984),
Vygotsky's concept of a zone of proximal development has a double function
with respect to cognitive development. Firstly, learning activity creates a
zone of proximal development and, secondly, learning is collaboration with
"more capable peers". To develop transparent human-computer interaction
we need to establish the right conditions for this learning activity Ñ be it
with or without "more capable peers". In this paper we use the concept of the
zone of proximal development in the metaphorical sense as a zone the user
is able to set, supported by the conditions built into the interface.
Three issues concerning the development of transparent interaction emerge
from the general understanding of the development of human activity:
Firstly, development only takes place within a purposeful use-activity.
Establishing competencies as a repertoire of operations must correspond to
a certain goal and motive. Without establishing this dialectic relation be-
tween learning and use, development is impossible. Secondly, the user must
be able to reflect the potential mastering of the computer, and how that level
of the use-activity can be reached. Learning of a new task requires an initial
familiarity with it in order to Òlook intoÓ the zone of proximal development
Ñ otherwise learning will be ÔblindÕ trial and error. Finally, the user must be
provided with conditions for consciously establishing actions that are gen-
eral, abbreviated and mastered to a certain degree; and for automating
these new action into new operations through practice. In this way, the ori-
enting basis of the coming operation is consciously formed and optimised ac-
cording to the material conditions.
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These issues concern general aspects of usersÕ surroundings that should be
met to enable the development of new operations. For example: the abbrevi-
ation of mouse operations into keyboard short-cuts depends on conditions
set at the interface by indicating the short-cuts next to the command names
in the menu instead of placing a description of all shortcuts in a manual,
forcing the user to interrupt the work-activity and go look for the manual.
Similarly, the mastering of brief and general operations requires time, but
this may be inhibited by conditions of the work environment such as stress,
causing the user to develop infertile operations. Development of interaction
is not isolate from Òthe rest of the worldÓ, and the concept of human activity
emphasises this connectedness.
Designing for transparency
It is impossible to identify general Òtransparent featuresÓ to be included in
all user interfaces and list these as general applicable guidelines for Òthe
design of transparent computer applicationsÓ. The conditions in the inter-
face that are necessary for the development of transparent interaction de-
pend on the users and their jobs, and the way the introduction of the new
computer artefact intervenes and changes this relation. This means that in
the design of computer applications we have to rely on participatory design
methods like prototyping and organisational games (cf. Greenbaum & Kyng
(eds.), 1991), and a broad range of more traditional user testing techniques
in order to ensure the presence of conditions for development and trans-
parency, in the interface. For example; Frederiksen et al. (in press) has
showed that inconsistency in scrolling direction on word-processors and
scrolling direction in molecule-modelling tools yields the most transparent
interaction for chemistry students; questioning the universality of the com-
mon belief that the universal direction of scroll bars should be Òup moves
the window upÓ.
The challenge in designing for transparency is to ensure that the user inter-
face provides the conditions for creating a zone of proximal development of
operations. That is: designing the interface to mediate the initiation of and
learning through exploratory actions, subsumed under the overall use-activ-
ity; that the interface enables the user to look ahead of the zone of actual
development, and to explore conditions for obtaining different new results;
and through this exploration support the development of new ways of realis-
ing the object of the activity, without entering another separately motivated
activity.
While it is impossible to give general guidelines concerning specific features
of Òtransparent interfacesÓ; it is possible to elaborate on the three issues
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concerning the development of transparent interaction stated above, in order
to yield a more design oriented understanding of the conditions for develop-
ment of transparency. That is, supporting development in use, ensuring a
certain degree of initial familiarity and setting conditions for the formation
of new operations.
Development in use
The first issue deals with the necessity to support the development of the
use-activity within the use-activity. In general, we cannot completely avoid
separately motivated learning activities like reading introductory documen-
tation, attending guided tours, etc. If users do not know what a mouse is and
how to operate it, they will not be able to do anything with, e.g. a Macintosh
computer. In such situations the only solution is a more explicit socially me-
diated way of learning; via personal guidance, or by written advises on the
screen or in a manual. With respect to transparent interaction the interest-
ing issue, however, is how support for development can be an integrated part
of day to day use, when a use situation is established.
The main problem with UNIX and Emacs is that although the possibilities
for transparent interaction exist for programmers the actualisation of these
possibilities is difficult due to the absence of support for learning within the
use activity. To learn something about the systems it is necessary to consult
manuals or colleagues, which possess more knowledge about the system,
thus separating learning from doing. The use of on-line help systems, espe-
cially context sensitive help-systems, can be seen as a way of supporting de-
velopment in use. However, an on-line help system can also drag the user
away from the use-activity by being too difficult to use. Furthermore, the en-
tire concept of on-line help is based on the idea of separating learning from
doing by providing users with external descriptions instead of supporting
development directly by features of the interface.
Initial familiarity
The second issue deals with the userÕs ability to reflect the potential mas-
tering of the computer Ñ to look into a zone of proximal development. The
interface must provide users with an idea or initial familiarity of what they
might be able to do in near future, and thereby encourage them to initiate
exploratory learning actions. The concept of affordance (Gibson 1979) cap-
tures this at a very low level of interaction; the properties of an object give
the user an idea of its potential use. On a more overall level the use of
metaphors can give the user an idea of potential use of the artefact by pro-
viding an analogy between something known and concrete, and something
unknown and abstract. In the same manner, consistency between applica-
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tions, e.g. the organisation of menus on the Macintosh, supports the transfer
of skills from one application into initial familiarity with another.
Because learning (as opposed to mere adapting) requires conscious reflec-
tion of the conditions for the future operation, an exploratory learning action
will interrupt the transparent flow of operations. This issue of providing
users with an initial familiarity, therefore implies a trade-off between invit-
ing (or even forcing) them to initiate learning; and allowing them to continue
the accomplishment of their jobs. Therefore we propose that the emphasis
must be on the clues built into the interface; this could be called graceful tu-
toring.
The initial familiarity encouraging exploration must not inhibit the ongoing
use of the artefact but, on the other hand, the interface must exhibit the
possibilities of the artefact in order to give users ideas of its future use. The
way this trade-off has to be solved cannot be answered in general. It very
much depends on who is going to use it, their use activity, the need the arte-
fact tries to solve, the motive for the users to use it, the context of use, etc. A
simple issue as whether it is sufficient to present the functionality of a win-
dow based application in pull down menus or whether it should be repre-
sented as buttons and icons, depends on the way the application is going to
be used. If it is going to be used often, having buttons and icons all over the
screen might be very annoying, especially if the space could be used for an-
other application supporting the current activity. But, on the other hand,
hiding functionality away in a pull down menu might prevent the casual
user from learning about the different possibilities of the application. Thus,
it is necessary to know how the artefact is going to be used in order to estab-
lish exactly how the interface should invite users to exploration.
The formation of new operations
The third issue deals with the formation of operations. Once exploratory ac-
tions have been initiated, the conditions provided by the interface determine
how an operation is established. Thus the interface should set conditions
that support the formation and mastering of actions that are generalised
and brief. The essential aspect of the formation of new actions is the devel-
opment of the orienting basis for the actions. Thus, designers should con-
sider how the creation of a generalised orienting basis can be supported.
UNIX has highly general commands and a basic structure (pipe-lining etc.)
that supports this generality, thus the operating system yields a possibility
for highly generalised actions of using the commands. Furthermore, it has
the potentials for abbreviated actions. UNIX does not, however, support the
development of a generalised orienting basis for the actions of execution of
these commands. Hence the general and brief usage of UNIX is seldom
achieved through use.
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Feedback from the artefact about results obtained in the course of master-
ing an exploratory action determines how the user learns about the artefact.
The command based interaction of UNIX only supports trial-and-error
learning because the feedback on commands consists only of prompting for a
new command, indicating that the system has done something, or displaying
uninformative error messages like ÒCommand not foundÓ. A more analytical
learning of UNIX requires that users get to understand the structure of the
operating system Ñ the file system, pipes etc. The only obvious way for
users to obtain this knowledge is to enter a separately motivated and de-
tached activity of learning the basic concepts of the operating system.
To support the development of transparent interaction the designer must
ensure that feedback from the artefact provides users with a general under-
standing of the artefact and its use. From the feedback and other cues users
must be able to achieve an understanding of the full range of an action, the
underlying assumptions, the different results that can be obtained, and how
it can be performed in a brief way. This is to learn how the artefact mediates
an activity directed toward an object and master the operation necessary for
using the artefact in an activity. If the object of the interaction is to handle
files and programs in an operating system like UNIX, feedback about the
state of the file system (e.g. the directory structure, list of files in a directory
etc.) is essential. Emacs supports feedback about matching parenthesis, in-
dentation of nested loops, etc. and therefore mediates a transparent interac-
tion toward the object of writing source code. Mastering an action is the abil-
ity to perform it in novel situations with unexpected materials; if users are
supplied with sensible feedback and the possibility of reversing actions with
unwanted results, the distance between exploring and using the artefact be-
comes smaller.
The designer supports the development of transparent interaction embed-
ded in use through the lay-out of the artefact and the various kinds of feed-
back from the artefact. The overall arrangement and behaviour of items on a
screen can provide cues to the underlying structure of the application and
thereby support the development of transparency in use. How the initial fa-
miliarity and the feedback during use should be designed in a specific arte-
fact, depends on the object of the interaction. Therefore, in order to design
the way the artefact looks and responds during use we need knowledge
about the structure of the activity that the computer artefact is intended to
mediate and the object of this activity. Because knowledge about how a new
artefact will mediate an activity cannot be obtained separated from the ac-
tivity the designer needs to apply methods for designing the artefact in use.
This calls for prototyping and other participatory design techniques.
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Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was that HCI research based on information
processing psychology is unable to comprehend the conditions for the widely
accepted desire to design for transparency. This deficiency was identified as
a result of the failure to recognise the dialectical nature of human beingsÕ re-
lations to their surroundings. The conceptual framework of activity theory
made it possible to analyse the otherwise vague concept of transparency.
This showed that transparency is not a static feature of the interface but an
evolving qualitative aspect of the relation between human beings and com-
puter artefacts. Transparency of interaction depends on the learning process
that goes on synchronously with the process of use; thus, the important issue
for the interface designer is to design the conditions for this development.
We have pointed at the need for a thorough reconsideration of the theoretical
foundation for human-computer interaction. We do not reject the estab-
lished pool of results from mainstream HCI research and practice, but we
find that the present lack of a coherent theoretical foundation is preventing
the field from taking the next great step forward. We have pointed at activ-
ity theory as a possible foundation for HCI. By doing this we do not suggest
that activity theory is the only valid theoretical foundation or that it does
not have limitations, but we think it is worthwhile to catch up on the grow-
ing interest in activity theory in the HCI community (e.g. B¿dker 1991,
Nardi 1995, Bannon & B¿dker 1991, Bannon & Kuutti 1993).
The main conclusions with respect to design is that the inseparability of
learning and doing should be taken into account by designing a curriculum
for development integrated in the computer artefact. Development of trans-
parent interaction can be supported by providing cues and feedback accord-
ing to the structure of this object. This should be based on analysis of the ob-
ject of the activity, that the artefact is supposed to mediate. The aspects of
transparent interaction discussed can serve as points to consider during the
design process. We hope that our theoretical contribution can be a source of
inspiration for designers.
Acknowledgements
We want to thank Annette Aboulafia, Susanne B¿dker, Tania Funston, Kim
Halskov Madsen, Niels Jacobsen and the anonymous reviewers for com-
ments on this paper.
121
References
Anderson, John R. (1983), The Architecture of Cognition, Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press.
Bannon, L. (1986) Helping Users Help Each Other, in Norman & Draper
(eds.), User Centered System Design, San Diego.
Bannon, L. & B¿dker, S. (1991) Beyond the Interface: Encountering Artifacts
in Use, in Carroll, John M. (ed.) Designing Interaction.
Bannon, L. J. & Kuutti, K. (1993) Searching for Unity among Diversity:
Exploring the ÒInterfaceÓ Concept, in Proceedings of INTERCHI 1993.
Bol, E. (1984) On the Development of Learning Activity. In Hedegaard, M.,
Hakkarainen, P. & Engestrm, Y. (Eds.) Learning and Teaching on a
Scientific Basis, Aarhus University, Institute of Psychology.
B¿dker, S. (1991) Through the interface: a human activity approach to user
interface design, Hillsdale, N.J.
Card, S. K.; Moran, T. P. & Newell, A. (1983): The Psychology of Human-
Computer Interaction, Hillsdale NJ.
Feyerabend, P. (1975), Against Method, London.
Frederiksen, N., Grudin, J. & Laursen, B. (In press) Inseparability of Design
and Use:
An Experimental Study of Design Consistency. To appear in Proceedings of
the Computer In Context Conference, Aarhus Denmark, August 1995.
GalÕperin, P. Y (1969) Stages in the Development of Mental Acts, in Cole &
Maltzman (eds.) A Handbook of Contemporary Soviet Psychology, New York:
Basic Books.
Gibson, J. (1979) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Houghton
Mifflin, Boston.
Greenbaum, J. & Kyng, M. (eds.) (1991), Design at Work, Hillsdale: LEA.
Habermas, J. (1972) Knowledge and Human Interests,  Boston: Beacon Press.
Hutchins, E.L.; Hollan, J. D. & Norman D.A. (1986), Direct manipulation
interfaces. in Norman & Draper (eds.), User Centered System Design., San
Diego.
Laurel, B. (1986), Interface as Mimesis, in Norman & Draper (eds.),User
Centered System Design., San Diego.
Leontjev, A. N. (1978) Activity, consciousness, and personality, Engelwood
Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall.
122
Leontjev, A. N. (1981) Problems of the development of the mind, Moscow:
Progress
Nardi, B. (ed.) (1995) Context and Consciousness: Activity Theory and Human
Computer Interaction, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Newell, A. & Card, S. K. (1985): The Prospects for Psychological Science in
Human-Computer Interaction, in Human Computer Interaction 1985 vol. 1,
pp. 209-242.
Newell, Allen (1990), Unified Theories of Cognition, Cambridge Ma.
Norman, D. A. (1981) The Trouble with UNIX, in Datamation vol. 27 no 7.
Norman, D. A. & Draper, S. (eds.) (1986),User Centered System Design., San
Diego.
Shneiderman, B. (1992) Designing the user interface, Reading MA.
Snoddy, G. S. (1926), Learning and Stability, in The Journal of Applied
Psychology vol. 10 pp. 1-36.
Strong, G. W. (ed.) (1994), New Directions in Human-Computer Interaction
Education, Research, and Practice, Drexel.
Vygotsky, L.(1978) Mind in society: The development of higher mental
processes, Cambridge, MA.
Winograd, T. & Flores, F. (1986), Understanding Computers and Cognition --
a new foundation for design, Norwood, N.J: Ablex.
123
Fourth paper
Contradictions in the Festival
Project: Activity systems,
obstacles, and dynamic forces in
design
Abstract: The paper describes a research project which conducted participa-
tory design in a non-profit organisation based on the work of volunteers. The
project is analysed by identifying contradictions in the course of the project,
and then fitting these contradictions into the activity theory based,
developmental work research framework. It is concluded that the
perspectives of contradiction and activity theory are valuable tools for
making sense of design projects, and challenges for the further development
of activity theory related to heterogeneity issues are identified.
Introduction
In this paper a case story about a project involving a group of researchers
and people from a non-profit organisation, the Festival, producing an annual
music festival is outlined. As a design project the project was not a success,
but since it can induce and inform general discussions and challenge exist-
ing methods for cooperative design, it was a clear success as a research pro-
ject. In this paper the Festival project is analysed in terms of contradictions.
Contradictions, mostly as obstacles for the design project, have been identi-
fied without a special theoretical perspective; subsequently these contradic-
tions are classified as contradictions in and between activity systems
(Engestrm 1987). It is concluded that notions off economical contradiction
are still a necessary basis in understanding and acting in the design of com-
puter artefacts no matter how much such ideas seem to be out of vogue after
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demolition of the Berlin wall
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The Festival Project
The project took place during the first half of 1995, and involved a group of
researchers from a university, and a music Festival organisation. In the fall
of 1994 The Festival decided that they needed an IT-strategy: an internal IT
group was formed, and the Festival contacted the researchers to initiate a
project eliciting the possible advantages of introducing IT in the planing and
production of the festival. A member of the Sound and Light group (see be-
low) who had IT experiences from another music festival started discussions
internally in the Sound and Light group about ideas for computer support
for pre-production, prior to the project start. Also, it was decided by the
Festival organisation to buy a number of PCs and a local area network with
a server and printers, in a configuration similar to the installation the head
of the internal IT group was the administrator of in his daytime job, and a
number of laptop PCs were given to key volunteers at Òmiddle managementÓ
level in the organisation.
Participants in the project were different members of operation groups from
The Festival, and a group of researchers, consisting of three senior partici-
patory design researchers, and two apprentice participatory design re-
searchers.
The Festival
The Festival is a non-profit organisation with the production of an annual
music festival as its main objective. In 1995, the festival took place over 4
days, with concerts on 8 different stages, presenting a total of more than 140
different acts. The making of a music festival involves many different tasks:
engaging the artists, establishing camping areas for the audience, selling
tickets, selling food, controlling access to the festival site, informing the
press, building the festival site, etc. The volunteers working in The Festival
are organised in 35 operation groups; 150 are working throughout the year
and in the time around the festival additional 2500 volunteers are enrolled.
9000 members of external organisations (e.g. boy scouts and sports clubs)
are working during the festival. 10 people have a regular, paid job at The
Festival.
The focus of the project was on technical production and pre-production, in-
volving people from the Booking group, Sound and Light group, Transit
group, Catering group, and the eight stage groups (Green, Red, etc.), each
consisting of 3 to 5 persons. The Booking group is responsible for deciding
which artists are going to play at the festival, and for negotiating the condi-
tions and prices with the agents. The Sound and Light group is responsible
for the technical side of the artists performances. They are responsible for
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making arrangements with sub-contractors running the basic sound (PA)
and light equipment on the individual stages, and for making sure that all
the artists will have the requisites needed for their performances equip-
ment-wise, including instrument amplifiers, piano tuners, and help with
special effects. In addition, the Sound and Light group has a co-ordinating
role in the pre-production. The Transit group is responsible for the trans-
portation of the artists from airport to hotels to festival, etc., and the book-
ing of hotel rooms. The Catering group is responsible for dressing rooms,
meals, and other backstage facilities for the artists. The festival takes place
at eight different stages. The stage groups are responsible for the production
at the stages, including establishing the facilities at the backstage area, e.g.
stage and production offices, stage hands, etc.
Pre-Production
During the spring, the head of the Sound and Light group is employed at The
Festival to take care of the technical pre-production, and to distribute rele-
vant information to other operation groups. The most important means of
communication throughout this process is telefax, and to some extent tele-
phone. Pre-production work is a kind of detectiveÕs work; when an artist is
booked for the Festival, the normal situation is that the only information
The Festival gets is the name of an agency somewhere. Thus the first diffi-
cult task in pre-production is to find somebody who actually knows some-
thing about the artist, and then to convince this person that The Festival
needs up-to-date information as soon as possible. Pre-production work is
complicated by several factors. People in the music business are always late
with everything; it can be hard to make people understand that The Festival
needs information in advance. Also, it is very important for especially the
bigger artists to show off by demanding specific resources for their appear-
ance at the Festival, and these demands then have to be negotiated in some
way. Finally, information about the Festival program, and information
about arrival times and hotels for the artists has to be treated confiden-
tially. Program information has to be kept secret until it is given to the pub-
lic, to maintain the advertising value; information about hotels and arrival,
likewise to protect the artists during the booking negotiations and during
the Festival (e.g. stars do not like to have their hotels invaded by fans and
the press). The general understanding in the Sound and Light group is that
the festival could be produced without pre-production, but that it then would
be more chaotic. Thus the purpose of pre-production is to facilitate a smooth
production with a relaxed and friendly atmosphere.
During pre-production, Sound and Light builds a band file, a plastic folder
enclosing documents, for each performance. These files are kept in a matrix
of cardboard boxes, with one column per stage and one row per day. The first
document in the file would normally be the checklist (see: below). A sheet of
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paper organised in the same way, with the total plan of performances - the
play plan - is used both as a tool for locating the files in the cardboard boxes,
and for recording central information about the specific performances, e.g.
the state of the information gathering, and the need for special equipment.
The play plan is always situated on the desk in the Sound and Light office;
when someone calls on the phone, the Sound and Light person will look at
the play plan, locate the artist in question, and examine the state of the pre-
production for this performance; then the pre-production person will take the
file in the cardboard box while continuing the discussion on the phone.
The checklist is a sheet of paper with pre-printed fields for information re-
lated to a specific artists performance at the festival. The checklist was orig-
inally invented in the Green stage group. This list contained fields for all the
information that should be available or collected when an artist arrived at
the backstage area at the Festival site. The checklist was filled in when the
Sound and Light group handed information from the pre-production over to
the stage groups, and it was later used when the artist arrived.
Subsequently it was adopted by the Sound and Light group, and used during
the pre-production process as the central overview of the individual artists.
From 1993, the Sound and Light group produced a common checklist for all
the stages, and filled in the available information about the artists before
handing over the complete files to the stage groups. Thus the checklist had
three functions: firstly, as a tool for the collection of information during pre-
production, secondly, as a medium for forwarding information from the
Sound and Light group to the stage groups, and thirdly, as a tool at the
stages when receiving the artists and facilitating the performances.
The project
The first meeting between The Festival and the researchers took place in
the middle of January, and in the beginning of February the researchers de-
cided to engage in the project followed by the forming of an agreement for the
project.
The first project meeting took place at the end of February; the Sound and
Light group told the researchers about The Festival from their perspective,
and about their work. The researchers demonstrated some of their own
software as inspiration for the Sound and Light activists. The Sound and
Light group had prepared for the meeting, by making two descriptions on
paper, one describing the Òflow of informationÓ to and from the Sound and
Light group during pre-production, the other a sketch of a database for pre-
production represented as a screen layout.
During March, a series of interviews with two of the stage groups, the
Catering group, the group responsible for access to the festival area, the
Transit group, the Booking group, festival management, and a secretary,
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were conducted. The first of April a workshop with Sound and Light, Transit,
Catering, and the Yellow stage groups took place. After the workshop the re-
searchers decided to use a database management system (hereafter The
DBMS) to have a prototype ready before the big rush of the pre-production
activities. During April, the researchers designed and implemented a first
prototype of a system for Pre-production.
By mid-April, the Festival management became nervous about the project,
fearing that too much information would flow too freely inside and outside
the organisation, and therefore they dictated that the project could only con-
tinue with the Sound and Light group. As a consequence, the second and
third planned workshops with the operation groups had to be cancelled. This
breach of the original agreement made it difficult for the researchers to con-
tinue the work in a decent manner; in particular it became impossible to
confront their understanding of the festival with the actual reality. A further
complication during this period was that it was unclear if the Festival man-
agement would allocate a PC in the pre-production office.
During May, the first version of the prototype was installed at the Sound
and Light office, and some of the existing data was entered into the system
by the researchers. This version was never used by the Sound and Light
group. At the end of May a revised (simplified) version of the prototype,
more suited for the situation with the Sound and Light group as the only
users, was installed. Because of expectations to the prototype, and because
of difficulties induced by reorganisations of the Festival secretariat, Sound
and Light had not made the checklists as they did it during the previous
yearÕs pre-production at this time. Some of the data was entered into the
database, but most of it was only available on faxes, and ad hoc notes. The
final result was low quality checklists delivered to the stage groups.
During Festival 95 in the last week of June, the researchers conducted field
studies at the Festival-site; interviews with activists as well as observa-
tions of work.
On the 25th of August, the researchers sent the first version of a report on
ways to improve the work of The Festival by the use of IT, to the internal IT
group and Festival management; the report was also sent to the people who
had been involved in the project or in other ways contributed to the report,
for them to correct possible mistakes.
On the 5th of September the Festival management sent a letter to the re-
searchers, stating that they saw the fact that the report was sent to the vol-
unteers as a violation as the conditions for the project. Management stated
that the researchers had continued work without respecting the Festivals or
the general reality, which according to management was that
Òa strategy must be ready before possible affected parties are involved. [if
this had been respected] then the researchers would have avoided unrealis-
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tic expectations [among the volunteers] and subsequent frustration and dis-
appointment.Ó (Letter from the Festival management September 5, 1995,
my translation)
Designing computer support for pre-production work
The checklist became the central point in the design process, despite all the
technological visions the researchers tried to introduce to the users. The
most important reason for that was that the Sound and Light group already
had a very strong vision about a relational database. One member of the
Sound and Light group had earlier experiences with computer support for
festival pre-production. This support was implemented in a relational
database management system, and looked very much like a Òsmart check-
listÓ. The Sound and Light group had discussed this concept and made a
sketch of a relational database screen layout as they would like it. This
database sketch was basically a slightly expanded transformation of the
checklist. The entire design project can be analysed as a transformation of
the checklist (Bertelsen, in prep)
According to the original plan, design together with the users was to take
place as a series of workshops; only one of these was realised. This
Workshop took place in The Festival buildings, and was scheduled to cover 5
hours. The planned participants were members of four Festival operation
groups: Sound and Light (3 persons), Yellow stage (one person), Catering
(one person), and Transit (one person), plus the three seniors researchers
and two apprentice participatory design researchers.
The plan for the workshop was to enact or simulate a series of work situa-
tions, both routine and problematic, from the planning (pre-production) and
production of the festival. The participants were encouraged to bring real or
made up scenarios that they found interesting, Òfocusing on the exchange of
informationÓ and how IT can be used, to the workshop. The idea was fur-
thermore that the researchers would introduce various kinds of technologies
into the game to elicit how, e.g. computerised telefax, central and local
databases, e-mail, or hypermedia would change work at the Festival (Kyng
1995, Ehn & Sjgreen 1991).
The workshop was situated around a table with large pieces of paper
mounted on the surrounding walls. One piece of paper was laid out with
columns for various kinds of technologies; local databases, centralised
databases, hypermedia, computer integrated telefax, etc. Cardboard lids
were available to be used as database mock-ups, and yarn for simulating
hyper-links between documents. Other pieces of wall paper were used to
record situations and problems during the workshop. Material from the pre-
vious yearÕs Festival was photocopied in advance together with some made-
up ideal typical material produced by the Sound and Light group.
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The first problem the researchers encountered at the workshop was that the
participant from the Yellow stage never showed, after an hour of waiting and
several phone calls, his seat was filled out with one of the Sound and Light
guys who had previously worked at the Orange stage group. This changed the
balance of the workshop dramatically in a Sound and Light, and planning
direction, and it became much harder to generate situations where the stage
claimed not to have the information they needed. These situations would
probably have arisen if the activist from Yellow stage had participated, be-
cause that group emphasised the lack of information during the preceding
interviews.
The simulation games ended up focusing on how things were done the previ-
ous year; the workshop basically became a discussion repeating the infor-
mation the researcher already got from the interviews. The cardboard lids
and the yarn were never used, and the technology wall paper did not make
its way into the situation. The design, or construction related part of the
workshop was limited to the last half hour, when the original database
sketch, produced by the Sound and Light group was examined with respect
to suppliers and users of the information. This part of the workshop was
important for building a prototype, but it did not break the meeting-ness of
the workshop.
The design of the prototype took place right after the workshop. The first
step was to make an object oriented description of pre-production and pro-
duction, based on OMT (Rumbaugh et al. 1991). The main functions of this
description became to generate discussions between the researchers about
data formats, and to serve as a vehicle for the establishment of a shared
understanding of The Festival among the researchers. In this process the
understanding of the Festival the researchers got from the interviews was
an important resource.
The transformation of the object-oriented description was done by mapping
objects to tables in a straightforward manner. The issue of data-ownership
distribution of the database over several non-networked PCs was already
dealt with in the object-oriented model by reflecting the ownership of data in
the division of objects. The construction of the user interface of the prototype
started out on paper, but the researchers soon agreed that it was easier to
program the interface directly without making a specification first. The task
was uncomplicated because most of the prototype was specified in the
Sound and Light database sketch, and on the pre-printed checklist made by
Sound and Light the previous year.
The use of The DBMS yielded the possibility of designing the prototype in-
terface directly on the computer without separate specifications; but at the
same time, design was constricted by the lack of features for distribution in
the database tool. This was obviously, at least seen in retrospect, a danger-
ous cocktail. To some degree, the technical limitations of the design artefact,
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The DBMS, and not the obtained knowledge about The Festival determined
the design. This unfortunate situation could have been avoided, had the re-
searchers had a design artefact directly prescribing how to design user inter-
faces, as opposed to The DBMS, which prescribed this at a more implicit
manner. In general, the absence of explicit theories and methods leaves
room for the implicit world views of, e.g. the database tools to take over (see
Bertelsen 1994, for a discussion of theories as design artefacts).
Contradictions and Activity systems
In the following sections the Festival project will be analysed in terms of
contradictions. Contradictions are oppositions between things, concepts,
persons, etc. E.g., good/bad, old/new, female/male, red/green, night/day de-
sire/reality, labour/capital. Partial synonyms for contradiction are; tension,
contrast, opposition, dichotomy, conflict, disconnection. Contradictions are
basic in understanding the world: structuralist anthropology and linguistics
understand the world in terms of binary oppositions (e.g. Lvi-Strauss); in
dialectical thinking (Hegel, Marx etc.), the world in general, and its dynam-
ics in particular is understood as the eternal resolving of inner antagonist
contradictions. From a common sense perspective, a definition of something
will usually specify what the defined is not, e.g. a community is always by
the exclusion of others.
In the critical Scandinavian system development tradition (see e.g. Bansler
1987) the notion of hard contradictions and conflict has been predominant.
Organisations have been understood as a battlefield, or frame of conflict
(Borum and Enderud 1981), and ideal design as the negotiation between
conflicting parties (Ehn & Sandberg 1979).
Engestrm (1987) classifies contradictions in, and between activity systems.
The basic unit of analysis in activity theory is human activity (e.g. work), i.e.
the endeavour of a group of people to realise some object. Activity is socially
mediated by artefacts, i.e. division of labour, rules, social formations, lan-
guage and instruments. Engestrm depict this unit of analysis as a triangu-
lar figure (fig 1), (For a thorough introduction to activity theory see e.g.








Figure 1: LeontjevÕs theory in Engestrms triangle.
Developmental research (Engestrm 1987, 1990), deals with how contradic-
tions, both internally in a considered central activity, and between the cen-
tral activity and related activities, are the driving forces in development of
the central activity.
The primary contradiction is the contradiction of commodity between use
and exchange value. This double nature is a basic feature of the economic
structure in capitalist culture; this contradiction penetrates every single
corner of the triangle and is the basic source of instability and development
(Marx 1962, pp. 49-55; Engestrm, 1987 pp. 82-91).
The secondary contradictions of an activity system are contradictions be-
tween the corners of the triangle, e.g. between the skills of the subject and
the instrument, or between rigid rules and new flexible instruments.
Tertiary contradictions are contradictions between the central activity
and a culturally more advanced activity. Such contradictions can be gener-
ated by representatives from an other culture introducing culturally more
advanced objects or motives into the central activity. The obvious problem is
to know what is more advanced without subscribing to a very deterministic
idea of history. However, the concept of a culturally more advanced activity
does not necessarily imply historical determinism; it can also be interpreted
as actual or potential different ways of conducting the central activity. Thus,
the conflict between the history-determinism, still present somewhere in the
basis of activity theory, and notions of heterogeneity (e.g. Star 1989) is not
necessarily unsolvable.
Quaternary contradictions are contradictions between the central activity
and the neighbouring activities; i.e.: 1) object-activities where the immedi-
ate objects of the central activity are embedded, 2) instrument producing ac-
tivities where key instruments of the central activity are produced, 3) sub-
ject producing activities educating the subject of the central activity, and fi-
nally 4) rule producing activities like administration and legislation. An ex-
ample of a quaternary contradiction is the contradiction between education
of computer scientists at the university, focusing on mathematical formali-
sation and the central activity of computer scientists working as system de-
velopers in the industry.
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An obvious (methodological) difficulty in applying activity theory to the
analysis of a project like the Festival project is to identify one central activ-
ity.
Naturally the Ô neighbour activitiesÕ also include central activities which
are in some other way, for a longer or shorter period, connected or re-
lated to the given central activity, potentially hybridizing each other
through their exchanges. (Engestrm 1987, p.88)
Both the day-to-day work of the Festival, e.g. pre-production work, and the
day-to-day work of design with users has to be considered. Furthermore the
design artefact producing activity (what the researchers do at home) should
also be included in the analysis. Instead of starting out by identifying a cen-
tral activity, I start out by identifying contradictions in the project.
Contradictions in the project
In making sense of what happened during the Festival project the identifica-
tion of contradictions became an important ÒtoolÓ. This section describes
contradictions in the Festival project identified without the use of a theoret-
ical framework, and fit these contradiction into EngestrmÕs classification of
contradiction.
Management vs. Volunteers
The initial impression of the Festival organisation was that it was totally
harmonious; the motive shared throughout the organisation was to make a
good festival; everybody had a say, no one gained economically from the
Festival, most people were working voluntarily in the organisation, etc.
Furthermore, since the initiative to start the project came from activists in
the organisation, and later was approved by management, we believed that
the project agreement reflected an objective shared by the whole organisa-
tion.
However, the most important contradiction in the Festival organisation, as
it appeared during the project, is between management and the volunteers.
Formally, the organisation has a very democratic structure; everybody have
a say, the strategy of the organisation is set on annual meetings with all the
operation groups etc. However, Festival management tries to maintain de-
tailed control over the organisation and keep the level of information low on
key issues. Management governs the organisation by decree and rigid rules,
but due to managementÕs limited means of detailed control, the operation
groups have a great deal of autonomy in how they carry out their tasks.
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A lot of what is done by management and the booking group is known in de-
tail only by these persons. Knowledge about which artists are being booked
for the festival is the most prominent example; knowledge about which ho-
tels the artists stay at during the festival is another. Obviously, there are
good reasons for keeping this information secret. On the other hand, the or-
ganisation depends on the work and goodwill of the volunteers in the opera-
tion groups, who see themselves as necessary and trusted parts of the organ-
isation. This contradiction between openness and security is an in-
stance of the management versus volunteers contradiction. For example, a
field for information about where the artists are accommodated, is present
on the List of Acts (LoA), but this information is never filled into the LoA,
distributed to the stage groups. The volunteers in the stage groups believed
that this was due to technical difficulties. However, as the final lists, includ-
ing hotel information, was typed by a secretary several days before the festi-
val, this was not the real reason.
Another example of how the openness versus security contradiction is man-
aged at the Festival by implicit and technical mean, is that the volunteers
are located in a building physically separated from management and the
Festival secretariat. Thus technical limitations are used to cover up politi-
cal decisions.
The contradictions between management and the operation groups are qua-
ternary contradiction, management being the rule producing activity for the
others. The confusing part is that the shared motive of these activities
should be to make a good festival, however, this shared motive is primarily
a part of the shared tales and anecdotes. The obvious main motive for some
of the operation groups was to have a good time doing an interesting job to-
gether with good friends, whereas power internally in the organisation as
well as externally, e.g. in relation to artist agencies, seemed to be the main
motive of management. A more detailed analysis of such conflicting motives
would generally be of great value as part of the establishment of a design
project.
Use vs. Design
The basic contradiction in design is between use and design, both because
design is a heteropraxial endeavour, involving designers from a design
praxis, (the researchers), and users from the considered domain (the Sound
and Light group); and because the temporary activity of design always will
be opposed to the praxis which the object of design is aimed at supporting.
This contradiction is a basic dynamic force in design, but it also has to be
dissolved via simulations of work in design to ensure the suitability of the
designed computer artefact.
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The contradiction between use and design has a tertiary character because
the contradiction impose learning and development on both sides. No one
side of the use versus design contradiction can be regarded as culturally
more advanced, but rather culturally different. However, it is also the mat-
ter of users having resources to invest in design activities; this was an obvi-
ous problem in introducing and evaluating the prototype in the Festival pro-
ject.
In the Festival project, the tension between design and use never became di-
alectical because Festival Management prohibited the planned use of par-
ticipatory design techniques.
Epaulettes vs. Utensils
The researchers understood the aim of the design project as one of develop-
ing a new tool which would make the planning and production of the Festival
to proceed in a smoother and more efficient way; for them  computers and
computer based tools were useful tools for the organisation. However, this
view was not shared throughout the organisation; especially the Festival
management perceived computers as a reward to acknowledge volunteers
who had done a good job in the organisation. This is illustrated through at
least three examples during the project. The difficulties in having one of the
purchased PCs allocated at pre-production office, were grounded in that the
head of the Sound and Light group already had a paid job at the Festival,
thus he did not need to have a PC also. Much the same problem was re-
vealed during an interview with the general manager of equipment at the
Festival; he had tried to convince Management of his need for a PC to keep
track of a budget at more than 2 mill Danish kroners including e.g. 500,000
pieces of equipment, and beds for 500 persons. This was refused in spite of
the fact that it in a longer run would result in decreased need for paid per-
sonnel. The clearest expression of ManagementÕs perception of computers as
rewards appeared in their letter sent to the researchers at 5th of
September. Here, Management states that because the researchers had in-
volved parties possibly affected by the future IT-strategy, these parties had
acquired expectations to get computers, and was thus likely to be disap-
pointed or even frustrated.
Bjerknes & Bratteteig (1988) refers to the contradiction in systems devel-
opment between what is technically interesting for system developers (or re-
searchers?) versus what is applicable for users, as a contradiction between
computers as epaulettes versus as utensils. To some degree, this contradic-
tion also existed in the Festival project, and will always be present in a re-
search project due to the contradiction between the researchersÕ and
the usersÕ motives. This is the reason why the Festival project can be both
a failed design project and a successful research project.
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I will adopt the notion of utensils versus epaulettes to describe the contra-
diction in the Festival project between computers as useful tools versus as
rewards to the volunteers. This contradiction is an instance of the primary
contradiction of commodity between exchange value and use value.
One important reason for the IT-initiatives in the Festival organisation was
that the volunteers wanted computers as a new kind of rewards. However,
this double nature of computers as being both epaulettes and utensils was
not fully realised by the researchers during the project.
Good solutions vs. Easy solutions
The guiding principle in deciding which hardware and basic software config-
uration to buy, was convenience. Thus the Festival or the internal IT-group
did not make any assessment of different configurations and architectures
suitability for the actual situation in the Festival organisation, but went di-
rectly on to buy a configuration which was a copy of the configuration the
head of the internal IT-group was managing in an engineering firm.
This is a kind of quaternary contradiction between the introducing-IT-in-the-
Festival activity and the managing-IT-in-the-engineering-firm activity, the
second producing the IT skills of the head of the Festivals internal IT group.
This contradiction can also be seen as the contradiction between the central
activity of the IT group and the object activity using IT in the Festival.
Furthermore, it is a contradiction between the researchers Festival-project
activity, regarded as central, and the activity of the IT-group as instrument
producing.
Planning vs. Production
The cyclic nature of festival work was a source of unexpected problems in the
project. Not only was it impossible, or at best difficult, for the researchers to
learn about the different phases of work at the Festival before these actu-
ally happened. The project started when planning of the next festival was
just about to start, at that time it was very hard to get any impression of
how hectic things would be when the festival approached, not to mention
during the festival days. But it was not only hard for the researchers to un-
derstand, the people at the Festival also belonged to different praxises dur-
ing the year. A lot of anecdotes were shared in the operation groups and
across operation groups, serving as secondary artefacts (Wartofsky 1973,
see also Bertelsen in prep) maintaining skill and experience; these anec-
dotes were a very important source of knowledge for the researchers. Thus
the operation groups were able to tell a lot about the Festival, but when it
came to actual enactment of work during the workshop, it was nearly impos-
sible for the Festival people to engage in situations other than the actual.
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According to what the Sound and Light group told the researchers early in
the planning period, their main task during the festival would be to drink
coffee and listen to music, but according to what was actually observed dur-
ing the festival, they were very busy solving all kinds of predictable and un-
predictable problems.
This heterogeneity of festival work across the year was further emphasis
during the workshop as none of the stage group activists were present, thus
creating a very strong bias on planning versus production.
The contradiction between planning and production can be seen as quater-
nary, planning activities producing instruments for production activities,
one of which have overlapping subjects.
However, in a Sound and Light group perspective both planning and produc-
tion are directed towards the same motive, e.g. making a good festival, indi-
cating that they are different sides of the same activity. Thus the Festival
project points to a weakness of the activity triangle approach in analysing
activities with a cyclic nature.
Design situations vs. Design artefacts
Due to the heterogeneity of the Festival year, the researchersÕ methods for
enacting work-like situations did not work as expected, pointing to the need
for new instruments for the design activity, new design artefacts. A more
straightforward instance of contradictions between design situation and de-
sign artefact was the contradiction between the DBMS and the need in the
situation to support cooperation in a non-networked architecture.
The design artefact versus design situation contradiction is an unavoidable
secondary contradiction between instrument and object, but it was also a
quaternary contradiction between the production of instruments for coopera-
tiv design in a non-cyclic setting, and the use of these artefacts in the
Festival project.
In general, a contradiction between actual design praxis and prescription
embedded in the design artefacts should be expected (Bertelsen, in
progress).
Discussion
Systematic application of the notion of contradiction yielded important
knowledge about the structure behind fundamental obstacles in the Festival
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project. The activity theory framework served as a good way of structuring
the analysis.
The primary contradiction between use and exchange value was present as a
contradiction of computers as being both utensils and epaulettes. The only
secondary contradiction identified in the analysis was between design and
the existing methods for enactment of work-like situations. As the project
aimed at developing new instruments for pre-production, secondary contra-
dictions between the available instruments and other corners of the pre-
production activity should be expected. However, being a computer scientist,
the author did not see a need for new instruments as a necessary precondi-
tion for the initiation of a design project. A detailed analysis of contradic-
tions between instruments and other corners of a considered activity will be
a valuable resource in a design project. However, secondary contradictions
emerged in the Festival activities, due to general knowledge among volun-
teers about how tedious office work can be done easier with computers. Thus
tertiary contradiction subsequently induced secondary contradictions in
Festival activities. The relation between use and design in the project has
some elements of a tertiary contradiction, but in relation to the development
of computer support in the Festival, the surrounding culture, e.g. at the vol-
unteers daytime workplaces, was clearly examples of more advanced activi-
ties. Most of the identified contradictions were quaternary, which should
come as no surprise since the analysis did not depart from the identifica-
tions of one central activity.
The main difficulties in applying the activity theory framework for analysis
of the project are related to the heterogeneity of the considered project.
When heterogeneity can be captured in terms of quaternary contradictions,
the Finnish approach (Engestrm 1987) is very fruitful, but if the considered
activity systems have the cyclic nature of the festival activities, the Finnish
approach is not straight forward to use. In terms of process-structure and
structure-process diagrams (Mathiassen 1981), the problem is that the
Finnish triangle models do not capture the situation when the considered
activity is a structure subsuming a processual succession of more or less
stable structures.
Thus key definitions in the Finnish approach may have to be adjusted or re-
interpreted. Firstly, The notion of a more advance activity should be re-in-
terpreted in a direction emphasising heterogeneity on the expense of histori-
cal materialism. Secondly, analysis of the Festival project showed the need
for methods to deal with interwoven activity systems, and activity systems
that have a very cyclic nature. It will be possible to deal with both these is-
sues without rejecting the basis of activity theory, e.g. by incorporating Leigh
StarÕs (1989) notion of boundary objects (see, Bertelsen in prep, for a discus-
sion of boundary objects in the festival project). Thirdly, the Festival project
showed that politics and power are issues which it is necessary to take into
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consideration, but due to its strong emphasis on production, activity theory
did not yield much in the analysis of this and other strange cultural phe-
nomena.
ManagementÕs constant obstruction of the project was to some extend
grounded in false fear of the consequences of new technology, thus some bar-
riers could have been overcome by applying socio-technical techniques (e.g.
Mumford & Ward 1968) for motivation and elimination of false fear. We
may, humorously, call this a reversed socio-technical approach. However,
contradictions between parties with different amount of power in the
Festival organisation was the one most important reason why the project
did not become a successful design project, despite the absence of tradition-
ally recognised sources of conflicting interests, e.g. private economic gain.
Thus, the project indicates that power struggle is a universal feature of or-
ganisations that should be made explicit and controlled by organising the
design project as a negotiation between conflicting parties (Ehn & Sandberg
1979).
When developing computer support for praxises with a strongly cyclic na-
ture, it is difficult to establish simulated work situations, because the dif-
ferent phases of the work cycle are only present during the full cycle in the
form of anecdotes. Thus simulations of work are likely to degenerate into
discussions about work. The project points to a need for the development of
methods for simulation of work in such situations.
As system development researchers, we tend to believe that computer sup-
port is a mean for improving production: computers are utensils used to
carry out a job. It is not new knowledge that computers are also epaulettes;
they have been so on managing directorsÕ desks for years. The new is that
this aspect of computer support seems to have reached the floor. In the fu-
ture, computer support will not only be a possible change of working condi-
tion and a de-skilling factor, but new computer technology will also be sym-
bols of social status, epaulettes. In such a situation, the real challenge in
system development may be to develop computer support without any func-
tionality.
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design as the transformation of
artefacts
Abstract: The idea that computer systems should be designed through
abstract representations of the use domain has been systematically
challenged in the Scandinavian tradition of user involvement in design. In
this paper it is suggested that ideal design should happen as a
transformation of artefacts rather than through abstract representations of
domains. Thus the paper emphasises that design and design
representations have to be tied to concrete material reality. The
transformation idea is based on notions of secondary artefacts and
boundary objects. The general ideas in the paper are introduced through a
case story about a design project involving a music festival organisation and
a group of university researchers, aiming at developing computer support for
the planning and production of the festival.
Keywords: Transformation, representations, design artefacts, user in-
volvement, secondary artefacts, boundary objects, case story.
Introduction
Traditionally, methods for development of computer artefacts have con-
sisted of a, possibly iterative, sequence of the following steps. First, the con-
sidered domain of the future system is analysed, then abstract representa-
tions of the domain are constructed, which in turn are the basis for abstract
representations of the system to be . Finally, the system is implemented by
constructing material artefacts based on the abstract representation, and
then introducing these artefacts into the considered domain. However, e.g. in
the UTOPIA project (B¿dker et al., 1987), it turned out that abstract repre-
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sentations are very difficult for users to understand, thus there was a need
for methods offering a more concrete way of investigating the future, past,
and present. This paper aims at a further investigation of this theme by in-
troducing the notion of transformation of artefacts as an alternative to the
traditional emphasis on the representational aspects of design.
The first half of the paper reports on an action research project together with
a music festival organisation. It tells a story about an artefact, the festival
checklist, which emerged in a corner of an organisation as crystallised work
praxis, and then made its way to other parts of the organisation. At a point
the checklist made its way into a design project, in form of a database inter-
face proposal. This proposal became the central document in the design of a
new computer artefact which, among other things, was able to print out
checklists. In the second half of the paper the transformation idea is devel-
oped based on activity theory (Engestrm 1987), secondary artefacts
(Wartofsky 1973), and boundary objects (Star 1989).
The Festival
The Festival is a non-profit organisation with the production of an annual
music festival as its main objective. In 1995 the festival took place during 4
days, with concerts on 8 different stages, presenting a total of more than 140
different acts. Making a music festival involves many different tasks: engag-
ing the artists, establishing camping areas for the audience, selling tickets,
selling foods, controlling access to the festival site, informing the press,
building the festival site, etc. The volunteers working in The Festival are or-
ganised in 35 operation groups, 150 persons are working throughout the year
and during the festival additional 2500 volunteers are enrolled. 9000 mem-
bers of external organisations (e.g. boy scouts and sports clubs) are working
during the festival. 10 people have a regular, paid job at The Festival.
The focus of the project was on technical production and pre-production, in-
volving people from the Booking group, Sound and Light group, Transit
group, Catering group, and the eight stage groups (Green, Red, etc.). The
Booking group is responsible for deciding which artists are going to play at
the festival, and for negotiating the conditions and prices with the agents.
The Sound and Light group is responsible for the technical side of the
artistsÕ performances. They are responsible for making arrangements with
sub-contractors running the basic sound (PA) and light equipment on the in-
dividual stages, and for making sure that all the artists will have the condi-
tions needed for their performances, equipment-wise, including instrument
amplifiers, piano tuners, and help with special effects. In addition, the
Sound and Light group has a co-ordinating role in the pre-production. The
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Transit group is responsible for the transportation of the artists from air-
port to hotels to festival, etc., and the booking of hotel rooms. The Catering
group is responsible for dressing rooms, meals, and other backstage facili-
ties for the artists. The festival takes place at eight different stages. The
stage groups are responsible for the production at the stages including es-
tablishing the facilities at the backstage area, e.g. stage and production of-
fices, stage hands, etc.
The Project
The project took place during the first half of 1995, and involved a group of
five researchers from a university, and various members of operation groups
from a music Festival organisation. In the fall of 1994 The Festival decided
that they needed an IT-strategy: an internal IT group was formed, and The
Festival contacted the researchers to initiate a project eliciting the possible
advantages of introducing IT in the planning and production of the festival.
The project was initiated by the festival, because of a widespread expecta-
tion in the organisation to the  possible benefits of the introduction of com-
puter support. E.g. smoother coordination of work between different groups,
and the possibility of getting rid of tedious manual routines.
The first meeting between The Festival and the researchers took place in
the middle of January 1995, in the beginning of February the researchers
decided to engage in the project, and an agreement for the project was
formed. The first project meeting at The Festival took place at the end of
February. The Sound and Light group told the researchers about The
Festival from their perspective, and about their work. The researchers
demonstrated some of their own software as inspiration for the Sound and
Light activists. The Sound and Light group had prepared for the meeting, by
making two descriptions on paper, one describing the Òflow of informationÓ
to and from the Sound and Light group during pre-production, the other a
sketch of a database for pre-production represented as a screen layout
(figure 2).
During March a series of interviews with two of the stage groups, the
Catering group, the group responsible for access to the festival area, the
Transit group, the Booking group, festival management, and a secretary,
were conducted. On the first of April a workshop with Sound and Light,
Transit, Catering, and the Yellow stage groups took place. After the work-
shop the researchers decided to use a database management system
(hereafter The DBMS) to have a prototype ready before the big rush of the
pre-production activities. During April the researchers designed and imple-
mented a first prototype of a system for Pre-production.
In the middle of April, the Festival management became nervous about the
project, fearing that too much information would flow too freely around in
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the organisation, therefore they dictated that the project could only continue
with the Sound and Light group. As a consequence the second and third
planned workshops with the operation groups had to be cancelled. This
breach of the original agreement, made it difficult for the researchers to con-
tinue the work in a decent manner, especially it became impossible to con-
front their understanding of the festival with the actual reality.
During May, the first version of the prototype were installed at the Sound
and Light office, and some of the existing data was entered into the system
by the researchers. This version was never used by the Sound and Light
group. At the end of May, a revised (simplified) version of the prototype
more suited for the situation with Sound and Light as the only users was in-
stalled. At this time, Sound and Light had not made the checklists as they
did it during the previous yearÕs pre-production, some of the data were en-
tered into the database, but most information were only available on faxes,
and ad hoc notes. The final result was low quality checklists delivered to the
stage groups.
During the last week of June, Festival 95 took place. The researchers con-
ducted field studies at the Festival site. On the 25th of August the re-
searchers sent the first version of a report on ways to improve the work of
The Festival by the use of IT.
Pre-Production Work
During the spring, the head of the Sound and Light group is employed at The
Festival to take care of the technical pre-production, and to distribute rele-
vant information to other operation groups. The most important means of
communication throughout this process is telefax, and to some extent tele-
phone. Pre-production work is a kind of detectiveÕs work; when an artist is
booked for the Festival and pre-production starts, the normal situation is
that the only information the Sound and Light group has, is the name of an
artist agent somewhere. Thus the first difficult task in pre-production is to
find somebody who actually knows something about the artist and then to
convince this person that The Festival needs up-to-date information as soon
as possible. Pre-production work is complicated by several factors. People in
the music business are always late with everything; it can be hard to make
people understand that The Festival needs information in advance. Also, it
is very important for especially the bigger artists to show off by demanding
specific resources for their appearance at the Festival, these demands then
have to be negotiated in some way. Finally, information about the Festival
program, and information about arrival times and hotels of the artists has
to be treated confidentially, both to maintain the advertising value of a co-
ordinated release of program information to the public, and to protect the
artists during the booking negotiations and during the festival. The general
understanding in the Sound and Light group is that the festival could be
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produced without pre-production, but that it then would be more chaotic.
Thus, for the Sound and Light group, the purpose of pre-production is to fa-
cilitate a smooth production with a relaxed and friendly atmosphere.
Figure 1: The Sound and Light 94 checklist.
During pre-production Sound and Light builds a band file, a plastic folder
enclosing documents, for each performance. These files are kept in a matrix
of cardboard boxes, with one column per stage and one row per day. The first
document in the file would normally be the checklist (see: below). One sheet
of paper with the total plan of performances, the performance plan, organ-
ised in the same way is used both as a tool for locating the files in the card-
board boxes, and for recording central information about the specific perfor-
mances, e.g. the state of the information gathering, and the need for special
equipment. The performance plan is always situated on the desk in the
Sound and Light office; when someone calls on the phone the Sound and
Light person will look at the performance plan, locate the artist in question,
and examine the state of the pre-production for this performance; then he
will take the file in the cardboard box while continuing the discussion on the
phone.
The checklist
The checklist is a sheet of paper with pre-printed fields for information re-
lated to a specific artistÕs performance at the festival (see figure 1). It was
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originally invented by members of the Green stage group. This list contained
fields for all the information that should be available or collected when an
artist arrived at the backstage area at the Festival site. The checklist was
filled in when the Sound and Light group handed information from the pre-
production over to the stage groups, and it was later used when the artist
arrived. Subsequently, it was adopted by the Sound and Light group, and
used during the pre-production process as the central overview of the indi-
vidual artists. From 1993 the Sound and Light group produced a common
checklist for all the stages, and filled in the available information about the
artists before carrying the complete files over to the stage groups. Thus the
checklist had three functions: as a tool for the collection of information dur-
ing pre-production, secondly as a medium for forwarding information from
the Sound and Light group to the stage groups and, finally, as a tool at the
stages when receiving the artists and carrying out the performances.
Constructing the computer artefact
The checklist became the central point in the design process. The most im-
portant reason for that was that the Sound and Light group already had a
vision about a relational database that was far stronger than the technolog-
ical visions about hyper-linking, etc. the researchers tried to introduce. The
Sound and Light groupÕs technological vision originated from a member who
had experience with computer support from the pre-production of an other
music festival. This support was implemented by means of a relational
database management system, and looked very much like a Òsmart check-
listÓ. The Sound and Light group had discussed this concept and made a
sketch of a relational database screen layout as they would like it (figure 2).
This database sketch was basically a slightly expanded transformation of
the paper based checklist.
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Figure 2: The database sketch.
The workshop
It was planned that design should take place together with the users in a se-
ries of workshops; unfortunately only one of these was realised. This
Workshop took place in The Festival buildings, and was scheduled to 5
hours. The planned participants were members of four festival operation
groups: Sound and Light (3 persons), Yellow stage (one person), Catering
(one person), and Transit (one person);  and five researchers.
The plan for the workshop was to enact or simulate a series of work situa-
tions, both routine and problematic, from the planning (pre-production) and
production of the festival. The participants were encouraged to bring real or
made up situations that they found interesting, Òfocusing on the exchange of
informationÓ and how IT can be used, to the workshop. The idea was fur-
thermore that the researchers would introduce various kinds of technologies
into the game to elicit how, e.g. computerised telefax, central and local
databases, e-mail, or hypermedia would change work at the festival (Kyng
1995, Ehn & Sjgreen 1991).
The workshop took place around a table, on the walls were mounted large
pieces of paper. One piece of paper was laid out with columns for various
kinds of technologies; local databases, centralised databases, hypermedia,
computer integrated telefax, etc. Cardboard lids were available to be used
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as database mock-ups, and yarn for simulating hyper-links between docu-
ments. Other pieces of wall paper were used to record situations and prob-
lems during the workshop. Material from the previous yearÕs Festival was
photocopied in advance together with some made-up ideal typical material
produced by the Sound and Light group.
The first problem which the researchers encountered at the workshop was
that the participant from the Yellow stage never came, after an hour of wait-
ing and several phone calls his seat was filled out with one of the Sound and
Light guys, who had previously worked at the Orange stage group. This
changed the balance of the workshop dramatically in a Sound and Light, and
planning direction, and it became much harder to generate situations where
the stage claimed not to have the information they needed. These situations
would probably have arisen if the activist from Yellow stage had partici-
pated, because that group emphasised the lack of information during the
preceding interviews.
The simulation games ended up focusing on how things were done the previ-
ous year; the workshop basically became a discussion repeating the infor-
mation the researcher already got from the interviews. The cardboard lids
and the yarn were never used, and the technology wall paper did not make
its way into the situation. The design, or construction related part of the
workshop was limited to the last half hour, when the original, database
sketch, produced by the Sound and Light group (figure 2) was examined with
respect to suppliers and users of the information. This part of the workshop
was important for building a prototype, but it did not break the meeting-
ness of the workshop.
Building the prototype
The design of the prototype took place right after the workshop. The first
step was to make an object oriented description of pre-production and pro-
duction, based on OMT (Rumbaugh et al. 1991). The main functions of this
description became to generate discussions between the researchers about
data formats, and to serve as a vehicle for the establishment of a shared
understanding of The Festival among the researchers. In this process the
understanding of the Festival the researchers got from the interviews was
an important resource.
The transformation of the object-oriented description was done by mapping
objects to tables in a straightforward manner. The issue of data-ownership
and access when the database was to be distributed  over several non-net-
worked PCÕs was already dealt with in the object-oriented model by reflect-
ing the ownership of data in the structure of objects. The construction of the
user interface of the prototype started out on paper but the researchers soon
agreed that it was easier to program the interface right away without mak-
ing a specification first. The task was, apart from data format issues, rela-
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tively uncomplicated because most of the prototype was specified in the
Sound and Light database sketch, and on the pre-printed checklist made by
Sound and Light the previous year.
The use of The DBMS yielded the possibility of designing the prototype in-
terface directly on the computer without separate specifications, further-
more the design was heavily influenced by the lack of features for distribu-
tion in the database tool. In retrospect, this was obviously a dangerous cock-
tail. The design artefact, and not the obtained knowledge about The
Festival, determined design. This was both a result of technical limitations
of the DBMS, and a result of the world view, and implicit prescriptions for
design embedded in this design artefact. If the world view and prescriptions
for design embedded in the design artefact had been more explicit, the con-
flict between this and the world view of the researchers would have been
manifest, and then it would have been easier for the researchers to stick to
chosen principles. This points to the general problem of implicit theories de-
termining design (Bertelsen, 1994).
Using the computer generated checklist
As the Sound and Light group expected to get a working system, they did not
use the printed paper checklist during the pre-production for Festival 95.
Some of the pre-production information was entered into the system, but
most of it was only present in the original letters, and telefaxes, and on the
performance plan. Thus the Sound and Light group was in a dilemma at the
time when they were about to hand the pre-production files over to the stage
groups; should they abandon the design project and fill in paper checklists
directly, or should they try to enter information into the prototype and print
out the checklists. They ended up making the checklist via the prototype,
which generated a lot of extra work because it was too late to use the infor-
mation entered into the prototype for making lists and sum totals of, e.g.
equipment requirements.
Possible reasons why the first prototype was never used by the Sound and
Light group are that the facilities for getting the information entered into
the system out on paper were not ready yet, and that the database was de-
signed to support several groupsÕ work with the pre-production information,
thus the database was fragmented into various tables with their own
screens, reflecting the ownership (right to update) of information, e.g. only
Transit has the right to allocate hotel rooms.
The stage groups were disappointed with the checklists in the band files
they got from Sound and Light prior to Festival 95. The 95 checklists did not
contain as much information as the checklists from earlier years, but a lot of
empty fields were also missing. Thus at least one of the stage groups made
their own checklist in which they entered the information they got. This was
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a surprise for the researchers, because they had seen the checklist exclu-
sively from a pre-production perspective, thus overlooking that the checklist
was also a checklist used when an artist arrived at the festival, i.e. the origi-
nal use of the checklist.
This shows how unfortunate The Festival managementÕs reduction of the
project was. Had the project proceeded as planned with three workshops
during the spring, the stage use of the checklists would have been elicited at
a time when it was possible to change the design. A complicating aspect of
the project with the festival was that festival work goes on in one-year cy-
cles; thus versioning would take unrealistically long time. In such situations
the use of simulated work situations is the only possible solution.
Transformation and Design
In the following sections the notion of design as a transformation process is
introduced and exemplified by the Festival case.
Heteropraxiality and design artefacts
Design can be described as an activity where a designing subject designs the
design object by means of some design artefacts. This activity is motivated
by the artefact being designed, and it can be characterised as an aggregated
meta-activity. However, this meta-activity does not exist as a concrete activ-
ity because the designing subject does not exist as concrete persons.
Design is basically heteropraxial, i.e., involving groups of people originating
from different activity systems, (e.g. the researchers, the Sound and Light
group, Festival management) in such a way that the individual activity sys-
tems can not be regarded as the basic unit of analysis. This heteropraxial
nature of design is an obstacle in basing studies of design on approaches
based on the identification of a central activity, e.g. EngestrmÕs (1987) de-
velopmental work research. It is possible to get fruitful knowledge about
what goes on in design by looking at the involved, often conflicting, activity
systems, but it is difficult to identify a Òcentral activityÓ with a uniform mo-
tive to base the study on. In the Festival project the checklist was created
and recreated in a number of heterogeneous, and tightly intertwined activity
systems, which were not simply ordered as central, instrument producing,
consuming, etc.
To comprehend the central aspects of design it is necessary to apply a unit of
analysis that transcends the division into activity systems. Thus I will sug-
gest the perspective of the mediating artefacts in understanding design.
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Design activity is mediated by design artefacts, utilised but not consumed
during the process, serving as conditions or environment for the design pro-
cess, thus opposed to materials. Examples of design artefacts are: object-
oriented modelling techniques; principles of relational databases; The
DBMS; material from last yearÕs Festival; the concepts ÒsituationÓ, and
Òproblematic situationÓ; technological visions (hypermedia, systems from
other festivals, etc.); the semi-structured interview guide; a workshop layout;
CSCW-perspectives, focus on communication and co-ordination, e.g. Òshared
materialÓ (suggesting that the exchange of information between the opera-
tion groups was a bottleneck).
Design artefacts can be either general or local to a project. General design
artefacts exist before the project, and are brought into, and utilised during
the design process; generating a contradiction between what the design arte-
facts prescribe, and the praxis they induce (e.g. as a result of the contradic-
tion between the central, and the instrument producing activities); and em-
phasising the role of basic assumptions (world views), and of explicit ideo-
logical statements. Local design artefacts are created inside a project, the
database sketch is one example. Local design artefacts are often represen-
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Relational Databases
DBMSs
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The Prototype
Figure 3: Influences in the development of the checklist. Solid arrows mate-
rial transformation, dashed arrows indicate mediated relations.
Often the creation of local design artefacts is mediated by a general design
artefact, e.g. the creation of the database sketch was mediated by general
relational database concepts. In the festival case, the general relational
database concepts were mediated by the actual system from the other festi-
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val, in the creation of the database sketch. This kind of multiple mediation
is illustrated in figure 3.
Design as transformation
Most system development methods put strong emphasise on representa-
tions, by basing design on descriptions of the domain of the future system
(e.g. Jackson 1983, Mathiassen 1981, Rumbaugh 1991, Yourdon 1982). The
fundamental difficulty in verifying the sanity of such representations before
the system is implemented, was one of the driving forces in the early devel-
opment of participatory design within, e.g. the UTOPIA project (see e.g. Ehn
1988). However, during the last years the issue of representations has got
renewed attention among researchers in the field of user sensitive design of
computer artefacts. (e.g. Suchman (ed.) 1995). The project with the festival
can be analysed as a gradual transformation of the checklist. This will em-
phasise that representations are objects and that these objects are related
to the considered praxis; that representations are material.
In general, artefacts are crystallisations of the use of an earlier artefact
(B¾rentsen 1989, Bannon and B¿dker 1991). The original checklist as it
was made by the Green stage group was a crystallisation of festival work.
They were doing the same things every year when they received the files
from pre-production, and when the artists arrived at the festival. They made
notes on sheets of paper and these notes gradually became more standard-
ised and, in the end, the pre-printed checklist was made. Thus knowledge
about how to receive the artists and what to look out for was embedded in
the checklist. The use of the files without checklists was crystallised into the
new artefact, the pre-printed checklist.
When the Sound and Light group took over the checklist, it was transformed
from a local artefact supporting work in the Green stage group, into a gen-
eral artefact used across different groups in the festival organisation. In this
ÒnewÓ form the checklist served a broader range of functions, it became a
planning tool and a media for information exchange. The checklist became a
boundary object (Star 1989, see below).
In the design process, the checklist was first transformed into the database
sketch by the Sound and Light group; the checklist became a local design
artefact. For Sound and Light it was an incarnation of a technological vision,
and it was a reminder of pre-production work, and of how this work supports
the production at the stages. For the researchers the database sketch was
first a too narrow technical vision, but later, during the last part of the
workshop, it became the specification for the prototype. The object oriented
descriptions made by the researchers were transformations of the checklist
in the sense that they were a step in the definition of the relational tables in
the prototype. For the researchers the prototype was the new checklist, with
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which the Sound and Light group could do everything they previously did
with the paper checklist. An important aspect of the paper based checklist
was that it was handed over to, and used by the stage groups. The way this
was done with the prototype was that the information in the database was
printed out on paper and attached to the band file. In this way, the reincar-
nated checklist returned to the stage groups, but for them it was not a check-
list anymore, because it had become a mere printout of the pre-production
database.
The transformation of the checklist is illustrated in figure 4. The big arrow
is the checklist transformed over time, the ovals are the main actors in the
transformation. The horizontal arrows at the left side indicate important




































Figure 4: The checklist transformation history.
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Representations: secondary artefacts and Boundary
objects
In understanding design the role of representationsÑhow they are related in
general to human praxisÑis central.
ÒÉwhat constitutes a distinctively human form of action is the creation
and use of artifacts, as tools, in the production of the means of existence
and in the reproduction of the species. Primary artifacts are those di-
rectly used in this production; secondary artifacts are those used in the
preservation and transmission of the acquired skills or modes of action
or praxis by which this production is carried out. Secondary artifacts are
therefore representations of such modes of action, and in this sense they
are mimetic, not simply of the objects of an environment which are of in-
terest or use in this production, but of those objects as they are acted
upon, or of the modes of operation or action involving such objects.Ó
(Wartofsky 1973, p.202)
Representations and images are secondary artefacts, but secondary arte-
facts also exist in our heads related to our use of primary artefacts. Thus all
artefacts have an element of secondary-ness. Design artefacts are both pri-
mary and secondary artefacts. As primary artefacts, design artefacts like
CASE-tools and debuggers are very similar to hammers and spectacles. The
specific features of design artefacts are tied to their representational func-
tion in design but, in general, design artefacts have a double role of being
both primary and secondary artefacts. System descriptions are both specifi-
cation of the new to be refined and filled out (primary artefact) and a place
holder for knowledge and learning about the new (secondary artefact).
In the project, The DBMS served the double role as both mediating the pro-
duction of machine executable code and as vehicle for the establishment of
secondary artefacts, i.e. the relational tables as they were used for under-
standing the festival. In general, this double character is a problem in the
design of computer artefacts, because the plasticity of secondary artefacts is
obstructing or obstructed by the naturalism and formalisation of primary
artefactness. In some situations, the formalised features are weak enough to
allow the formalised description to acquire other meanings, in other situa-
tions, the models are so complicated that they are impossible to transcend
because all attention is used in making sense of the formal contents of the
figure. In some situations, formal descriptions offer openings into a poetic
world of new possibilities, whereas in others they only offer the frustrating
experiences of trying to understand the technical formalism the description
is based on.
Star (1989) introduces the concept of boundary objects in trying to under-
stand how people with completely different backgrounds working on differ-
ent locations are actually able to work on the solution of the same scientific
problem. This is very similar to the heteropraxiality of design work.
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ÒBoundary objects are objects that are both plastic enough to adapt to
local needs and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet
robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They are
weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in
individual-site use. [É] a boundary object Òsits in the middleÓ of a
group of actors with divergent viewpoints. Crucially, however, there are
different types of boundary objects depending on the characteristics of
the heterogeneous information being joined to create them. The combi-
nation of different time horizons produces one kind of boundary objects;
joining concrete and abstract representations of the same data pro-
duces anotherÓ (Star 1989, pp. 46-47).
Boundary objects depend on the plasticity of secondary artefacts related to
the objects. But according to Wartofsky (op. sit.) representations are poten-
tial productive action. In the design of computer artefacts this relation be-
tween representation and action is more direct, or mechanical, because the
representations in design can very often be turned into running programs in
a formalised manner.
Design artefacts are boundary objects because they traverse the heteroge-
neous activity systems involved in the design process. When designers and
users work together on a system specification, designers tend to perceive the
specification as a sketch of the future program code, whereas the users may
understand the specification in a less formalised, more open way.
Design artefacts do not only take different shapes or serve different pur-
poses in different groups, they also change within one group, during the de-
sign process, and in the different rooms of a specific groups praxis. Thus a
system development method is a boundary object in the sense that it has
one function in the project organisationÕs internal education prior to a pro-
ject, and a totally different function during the project. Working in accor-
dance with the method means two different things in the two project rooms.
In a similar way, the checklist was a boundary object not only across differ-
ent groups in the festival organisation, but also across the different stages
of the transformation process.
In the project, the checklist existed both in the domain and in the design
process (database sketch). It was a boundary object in the sense that it ex-
isted in different activity systems, and tied these together; across different
activity groups; across the different, incommensurable stages of the individ-
ual groups cycle of the year; and across the transition from use to design.
However, the checklist was not robust enough to be carried from the
Festival, to the researchers and back into the Festival. In the transforma-
tion of the checklist from paper-based checklist into computer-based pre-
production support it lost its checklist-ness. The researchers saw the check-
list as a medium for the transfer of the information gathered together dur-
ing pre-production, for them it was an incomplete, non-computer version of
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the future computer system; but for the people working at the stages, the
checklist had its main function as a tool for the preparation and reception of
the individual artists. (Because of managementÕs sabotage of the project
this was not realised during the project)
The jungle is an artefact for the Natives living there, a crack of twig becomes
the image of an animal to hunt and eat (Wartofsky op. sit). The jungle is
also a boundary object; for the Native it is, among other things, a source of
food; for the tourist it is an adventure. However, this boundary objectness
breaks down when the paper industry represents the jungle as paper pulp.
In the same way, the boundary objectness of the checklist broke down during
the project, it lost the features that gave it meaning for the stage groups, the
crystallised stage work was lost.
The researchers believed that the fields on the checklist, both paper- and
computer-based, were place holders for the information filled in by Sound
and Light, instead of understanding it in terms of the work crystallised into
it.
The grey cross on the checklist transformation figure (figure 4) indicates
that the design proposals were never confronted with actual festival work.
The Sound and Light group was familiar with work in the stage groups, and
the database sketch initially represented support for this work. However,
without anchoring the representations attached to the database sketch all
the relevant parts of festival work, they lost their boundary objectness.
For the transformation process to be successful, the artefacts must main-
tain their boundary objectness across both sites, and across design phases;
and representations must remain representations of these artefacts or the
activity crystallised into them. The cancelled workshops were intended to
ensure this anchoring through the application of scenarios (e.g. Kyng 1995)
and organisational games (Ehn & Sjgreen 1991).
Discussion
Understanding design as transformation of artefacts is to emphasise mate-
rial praxis, and that representations have to be understood in terms of the
productive praxis they are aiming at. Thus, the transformation view be-
comes an ideal for the use of representations in design. In relation to object
oriented methods, the transformation view rejects the idea that it is possi-
ble to base design on a general representation of the domain, e.g. a full de-
scription of The Festival (e.g. Coad & Yourdon 1990), and supports accounts
focusing on modelling of artefacts like the checklist (e.g. S¿rgaard 1988).
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However, understanding design as transformation of artefacts also limits
the innovative aspects of design. In future works, the innovative or creative
side will be emphasised by introducing another class of design artefacts,
generators as a complementary to the transformers dealt with in this paper.
Examples of generators are future workshops (Jungk & Mllert 1987), and
springboards (Engestrm 1987). Generators will have an element of tertiary
artefactness (Wartofsky op. sit.), i.e. mediate the creation of autonomous
rooms for authentic creation, not related to the productive praxis in an obvi-
ous way.
The main shortcoming of the transformation perspective presented in this
paper is that it does not incorporate an understanding of politics and power
relations. In the project with the festival exactly such issues must be taken
into account to fully understand why the transformation of the checklist
broke down (Bertelsen 1996).
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Abstract: In this note I understand organisational learning in terms of
manifest crystallisation of collective experience into artefacts, and I attempt
to integrate an engineering and an emancipatory perspective. A Danish
music festival serves as an example.
Introduction
Recently I attended a seminar on the Capability Maturity Model (Paulk et
al. 1995), the current attempt to implement scientific management in the
field of software development. The seminar took place in Copenhagen, re-
quiring a four hours trip by train where I read a new paper by Yrj
Engestrm (1996) given at this years congress on Piaget and Vygotsky in
Geneva. The paper outlines a concept of development, radically different
from how the concept was formulated in ÒLearning by ExpandingÓ
(Engestrm 1987). Development is no longer depicted as a progression along
the straight line of history; instead Engestrm now understands develop-
ment in terms of groups crossing borders in meeting different needs develop-
ing new motives.
Apart from being very stimulating for a general understanding of develop-
ment, Engestrms Geneva paper also interfered with what I was going to
hear about during the next couple of days. It appeared to me that both the
CMM people and Engestrm were addressing the issue of organisational
learning.
CMM is a method for improving the working of software producing organisa-
tions; the goal is to be more rational, to be able to predict performance, to be
able to avoid errors and re-work, to reduce cost, etc. An important element in
the method is to measure what goes on and then learn from these measure-
161
ments. This can be seen as an engineering perspective on organisational
learning; the organisation is a piece of machinery with definable objectives,
and organisational learning becomes system optimisation. The obvious
problem with the engineering perspective is that the direction and motiva-
tion of the organisation and of organisational learning is to be defined out-
side the organisation. Thus the engineering perspective do not yield any
deeper understanding into the formation of directionality of development .
The emancipation perspective of Engestrms Geneva paper has the collec-
tive praxis of a group as itÕs main perspective, and expansive learning in-
cludes that the group transcends organisational and technical limitations.
Organisational and historical structures are subsumed under the process of
collective development of praxises. However, while this perspective offers an
understanding of how motives and direction of development are formed, it
does not deal with these issues in a way that is easily mapped onto the de-
sign of technical artefacts (including organisational structures).
Organisations are subsumed under the development of praxises, just as
other technical artefacts are. Thus we can take organisational learning as a
synonym for experience and development of a praxis made manifest in tech-
nical artefacts like company procedures, computer systems and standard
document forms.
Organisational learning crystallised into
artefacts
In trying to understand organisational learning in materialist terms, I em-
phasise that organisational learning is crystallised into artefacts. The re-
marks below are based on a recent project with a big Danish music festival
(Bertelsen 1996a,1996b).
In the festival project, we developed a tool for cooperative planning of techni-
cal production at the music festival. This tool was based on an existing arte-
fact, the checklist, that had emerged in the organisation as a crystallisation
of what the organisation had ÒlearnedÓ about technical planning and produc-
tion.
The checklist is a sheet of paper with pre-printed fields for information re-
lated to a specific artistÕs performance at the festival. It was originally in-
vented by members of a group of volunteers working at one of the festival
stages. This list contained fields for all the information that should be
available or collected when an artist arrived backstage at the Festival site.
The checklist was filled in when the people responsible for the technical
planning of the festival handed the information over to the stage groups, and
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it was later used when the artist arrived. Subsequently, it was adopted by
the planning group, and used during planning as the central overview of the
individual artists, and used as the central record when information was
handed over to the stage groups.
The checklist had three functions: as a tool for the collection of information
during planning, secondly as a medium for forwarding information from the
group responsible for technical planning to the stage personnel and, finally,
as a tool at the stages when receiving the artists and carrying out the per-
formances.
In our project with people from the festival, the checklist took the form of a
database interface proposal. This proposal became the central document in
the design of a new computer artefact which, among other things, was able
to print out checklists.
In general, artefacts are crystallisations of the use of an earlier artefact
(B¾rentsen 1989, Bannon and B¿dker 1991). The original checklist as it
was made by one of the stage groups was a crystallisation of festival work.
They were doing the same things every year when they received the files
from planning, and when the artists arrived at the festival. They made notes
on sheets of paper and these notes gradually became more standardised
and, in the end, the pre-printed checklist was made. Thus knowledge about
how to receive the artists and what to look out for was embedded in the
checklist. The use of the files without checklists was crystallised into the
new artefact, the pre-printed checklist.
When the technical planning group took over the checklist, it was trans-
formed from a local artefact supporting work in one specific stage group, into
a general artefact used across different groups in the festival organisation.
In this ÒnewÓ form the checklist served a broader range of functions, it be-
came a planning tool and a media for information exchange.
In the festival project we saw how learning in the organisation was crys-
tallised into the checklist. Thus in taking organisational learning into ac-
count in the design of CSCW applications implies firstly that design is
based on the transformation of the artefacts crystallising the organisational
know how. Secondly CSCW applications should be enable continuos crys-
tallisation of new modes of acting; thus pointing at the importance of issues
like tailorability and code reuse.
Beside being crystallised into artefacts like the checklist the Òlessons
learnedÓ in an organisation are crystallised into traditions. In the case of the
music festival, traditions were the main ÒstorageÓ for the organisations abil-
ities. Although a lot of procedures were formalised into rules the basics of
doing festival work was not made explicit. The festival organisation is very
efficient in making the big annual festival. However, when the organisation
for the first time engaged in making a one day festival with only one stage,
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they had severe difficulties transferring this effectiveness. The problem in
adapting to the new task of organising the smaller festival was that all pro-
cedures were hardwired into the organisation as unrecognised traditions.
The festival organisation had been better able to handle the new task had
the procedures been explicitly formalised. The problem of arranging the
smaller festival was not in the lack of information, but in the failing ability
to transfer existing procedures into appropriate action in the slightly
changed setting. This suggests that  an organisations ability to learn de-
pends on a certain degree of formalisation and explicitness of modus
operandi, parallel to the need for a developed orienting basis in the case of
development of mental acts in individuals (GalÕperin 1969).
Conclusion
A concept of organisational learning informing the design of CSCW applica-
tions, has to reflect both engineering and emancipation. The notion of crys-
tallisation of organisational learning into artefacts is suitable because it fo-
cuses on technical artefacts while taking praxis as the basis of analysis.
Thus, avoiding to understand organisational learning as mere system opti-
misation or gathering of information, but rather as the active acquisition
and construction of ability to act.
In reflecting a materialist understanding of organisational learning into de-
sign of CSCW applications we should maintain the procedural memory of
the organisation by transforming existing artefacts crystallising this mem-
ory into new artefacts. Further we should support continual crystallisation
of organisational procedures and knowledge into the CSCW application by
facilitating tailoring and easy redesign. Finally we should support continued
organisational learning by formalising and making explicit the current
modus operandi by the CSCW applications. Thus making the CSCW appli-
cation a Marxo-Freudian tool for building consciousness about the existing
limitations in order to transcend these and build a new emancipated praxis.
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Understanding objects in use-
oriented design
Abstract: The paper is an investigation into the relation between use-
oriented design and object-oriented methods. Based on the notions of
historical crystallisation of praxis into artefacts, the concept of secondary
artefacts, and the notion of boundary objects, it is argued that object-
oriented descriptions should be understood as transformations of artefacts
from the considered praxis rather than models of the domain. The
transformation idea is illustrated by a case story, from a design project with
a music festival.
Introduction
A persistent trend in computer programming languages and software devel-
opment methods is object-orientation. One of the basic concepts in object-
orientation is physical modelling, i.e. structuring computer programs, and
describing the real world, by constructing models as compositions of objects
with physical properties.
From the very beginning physical models have been regarded as modelling
somethingÑthe referent systemÑ which according to (Holb¾k-Hansen et
al., 1975) can be either mental or manifest:
ÒSystems existing in the human mind, physically materialised as
states of the cells of our brains, are called mental systems. Systems ex-
ternal to human minds are called manifest systems.Ó (ibid. , p.18).
A problem for the further advance of physical modelling based methods in
the design of computer artefacts, is the absence of a consistent framework
for understanding the relation between technical design and development of
use praxis that transcends the mechanical idea of the referent system.
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The question I try to answer in this paper is whether object-oriented meth-
ods are specially suited for involving users in design or not. At first glance
the two seem to contradict due to the radical difference in the way the world
is perceived according to object-oriented concepts and how it is understood
by non-computer professionals accommodated in the real world. I will show
that it is possible to establish an activity theory based framework for un-
derstanding the benefits of object-oriented methods in user oriented design
of computer artefacts. The basic idea is to focus on the transformation of
artefacts from the considered praxis, instead of focusing on the construction
of abstract, although in concrete terms, models of idealised domains.
Furthermore, it is argued that the principle of physical modelling is likely to
support some aspects of cocreation (users and designers) of new technologi-
cal visions.
The argument is based on three theoretical statements:
• Firstly, that activity with one generation of artefacts is crystallised into
the next generation of artefacts (B¾rentsen, 1989).
• Secondly, that artefacts mediating productive praxis also have a repre-
sentational side, secondary artefactness, maintaining and transferring
the modes of acting with the artefact, thus making a tight connection be-
tween perception and action (Wartofsky,1973).
• Thirdly, that the coexistence of heterogeneous praxises is mediated
through artefacts, boundary objects, that while stable across sites still
have different meanings to the involved praxises (Star, 1989).
Object-orientation
There are many different definitions of object-orientation. However, in this
paper I will stick to definitions of Òobject-orientedÓ in line with that given by
(Madsen et al., 1993). According to Madsen et al., object-oriented program-
ming means that:
ÒA program execution is regarded as a physical model, simulating the
behaviour of either a real or an imaginary part of the real worldÓ
(Madsen et al., 1993, p. 16).
This implies that programs are structured into objects that interact with
each other only through well-defined interface to other objects and the sur-
rounding world, and that the internal structure of the program can be per-
ceived as modelling something. In some respects object-orientation has
much in common with LEGO bricks.
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Furthermore, object-oriented programming is based on concept building
through classification and composition. Classification means that concrete
phenomena are understood as instances of concepts, which in turn may be
specialisations of more general concepts. E.g. OlavÕs bicycle is an instance of
the class bicycle and the concept (or class) bicycle is a specialisation of the
more general concept vehicle. Composition means that concepts and phe-
nomena are aggregates of other concepts or phenomena. Thus a bicycle is an
aggregate of wheels, frame, handlebars, pedals, transmission, etc.
Object-orientation has three benefits, still according to Madsen et al. (1993)
which are:
• real-world appreciation,
• stability of design, and
• reusability.
This paper focuses on the claims about Òreal-world appreciationÓ since that
is what most directly relates to the possible advantages of object-orienta-
tion seen from a user involvement perspective. Clearly re-use and design
stability are also important issues for user involvement in the obvious sense
that fast and safe is always a good thing. It is this apparent similarity with
the real world that makes it promising to apply object-orientation in, not
only programming, but also in earlier stages of system development: de-
scription of problem domain, often referred to as analysis, and description of
the coming software, often called design.
Real world appreciation in object-orientation has two elements:
¥ natural concept building, and
¥ physical modelling.
Coad and Yourdon (1990) describe the real world appreciation of object-ori-
entation in the following way:
ÒObject-oriented analysis is based upon concepts that we first learned
in kindergarten: objects and attributes, classes and members, whole
and parts.Ó (ibid., p.1)
Ò... OOA [object-oriented analysis] organizes analysis and specification
using methods of organization which pervade peopleÕs thinkingÓ (ibid.,
p.3)
The first quote explains why we may hope that users understand object-ori-
ented models. However, the second quote is more problematic, because it
implies that people perceive the world they live in by means of concepts with
well-defined features. An object-oriented model of a bank account will con-
sist of well-defined attributes such as owner, balance, etc., whereas several
different definitions of a the concept account exist among the different
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groups working in a concrete bank (Experience from a project with a bank,
reported by Heinz Zllighoven and co-workers, at a research seminar at
rhus University). Thus it can not be assumed that object-oriented models
are complete reflections of concepts in the considered praxis. In praxis con-
cepts have often no definition at all but work well anyway. In general, our
day-to-day life is not governed by strict definitions and pure rationality;
well-defined rationality is just a convenient artefact in some situations.
While the idea that concepts are well defined is not generally valid, the no-
tion of concept building makes sense as an integrated part of physical mod-
elling. Thus, in a physical model things are well defined in the sense that a
model is a composition of objects that have well-defined properties, and in-
teract in well-defined ways.
ÒObject models can represent the real world as you understand it.
Specifically, the real world can be represented as a collection of inter-
acting entities, each of which exhibits well-defined behaviours. It is not
necessarily true that the world is a collection of interacting entities, but
the object-oriented approach assumes that the aspects of the world in
which you are interested can be modelled in this way. [footnote: This
statement says that objects are not in the world but of the world]Ó
(Goldberg & Rubin, 1995, p.50).
Physical models are not only used in the design of computer artefacts, they
are an important part of most manual systems. Madsen et al. (Madsen et
al. , 1993) use a traditional, paper based Norwegian train reservation sys-
tem, and medical records as examples in introducing the idea of physical
modelling. In the train reservation system the physical model is a represen-
tation of the train sets with wagons with seats that can be reserved.
Similarly with the hospital record:
Ò... a medical record corresponding to each patient keeps track of the
relevant information related to that patient. This record may be consid-
ered to be a representation of the patient.Ó (Madsen et al., 1993, p.16)
However, it must be noticed that representations are always constructed
with a certain purpose in mind, and that they are part of a certain praxis
(Wartofsky, 1973, see below). Thus, the medical record does not comprise all
possible information about the patient but the information needed for the
people treating the patient, thus the Òrepresentation of the patientÓ is a
prescription for action on the patient.
Computerised physical models (or object-oriented programs) are composed
of objects which can be considered computerised material. Objects have at-
tributes of properties characterising the phenomenon being modelled, and
they have certain well-defined ways of interacting with other objects and
changing states of attributes. A computerised physical model can represent
real world phenomena in the same way as the manual Norwegian train
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reservation system or the medical record, but it can also model phenomena
not existing in the real world.
Thus, physical models, computerised or not, are not disinterested, natural-
istic description of a domain that can be used for what ever future action in,
or change of the modelled domain.
Design of computer artefacts
Design is about creating conditions and environments for human life. In the
design of computer artefacts we are mostly concerned with environments for
work. Designing and introducing a new computer artefact into a given praxis
is changing this praxis; development of technology is also organisational de-
velopment.
One of the main issues in designing computer artefacts, is to ensure that the
new artefact makes sense in the domain of future use. In the Participatory
design tradition (Bjerknes et al. (eds.), 1987, Greenbaum & Kyng (eds.),
1991) this is done by involving users in the design process and letting them
codetermine what are suitable solutions.
The involvement of users in design can be motivated by a general democratic
concern; but more generally imperative, users have to be involved because it
is impossible to formalise human activity to an extend where outsiders are
able to verify the sanity of design proposals.
The theory of Òtacit knowledgeÓ (Polanyi, 1966) describes how it is impossi-
ble for members of a given praxis to explicate, not to say formalise, their
own praxis. Thus, it is necessary to use non-formal and Òhands onÓ experi-
ences to ensure that the evolving artefacts make sense in the domain of fu-
ture use. The impossibility of using formal system descriptions together
with users was, e.g. recognised in the UTOPIA project (B¿dker et al., 1987,
Ehn & Sjgren, 1991).
The number of existing ÒmethodsÓ for object-oriented analysis and design is
exorbitant. The classics include JSD (Jackson, 1983), that was not called ob-
ject-oriented although it is in most respects; and Coad & YourdonÕs OOA
(Coad & Yourdon, 1990). Among the newer methods OMT (Rumbaugh et al.,
1991), Booch (1994), and the Òuse-case driven approachÓ (Jacobson et al.,
1992) have acquired a leading position. However, most methods are primar-
ily concerned with technical aspects, and are mostly differentiated by sup-
porting specific programming languages, or by variations of diagramming
syntax. Thus, most of the methods can be seen more as methods for Òvery
high level programmingÓ than as methods for design of environments and
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instruments for human work. The recent standard proposal for a Òunified
methodÓ is no exception from this.
Work activity and design activity
Design of computer artefacts is a process of changing a considered praxis
through the construction and introduction of new artefacts, and the process
of design is itself human activity. To understand the role which object-ori-
ented methods and physical modelling play in this game the general notion
of human activity is introduced below.
The basic unit of analysis in activity theory is human activity (e.g. work), i.e.
the endeavour of a group of people to realise some object (here the meaning
of ÒthingÓ). Activity is socially mediated by artefacts, i.e. division of labour,
rules, social formations, language and instruments. (For a thorough intro-
duction to activity theory see e.g. Engestrm, 1987, Bannon & Kuutti, 1993,
Bannon & B¿dker, 1991).
According to Vygotsky (1978) Human activity has three fundamental char-
acteristics;
• firstly, it is directed towards a material or ideal object which distin-
guishes one activity from another;
• secondly, it is mediated by artefacts (tools, language etc.); and
• thirdly, it is social within a culture.
Computer artefacts, like all other artefacts, in this way mediate human ac-
tivity within a practice.
Human beings meet the objective world through acts in the world. Thus,
human knowledge and experience about the world is reflection obtained
through activity, forming the basis for expectations, and desires about pos-
sible activities in this world.
Human activity can be analysed as a three level hierarchy: activities realised
through chains of actions, which are carried out through operations. At each
of these levels the objective world is reflected through the activity. Human
activity is always directed toward a material or ideal object satisfying a
need. The subjectÕs reflection of, and expectation to, this object characterises
the motive of the activity. Human activity is carried out through actions, re-
alising objective results. These actions are controlled by the subjectÕs con-
scious goals. Goals are the reflection of the objective results of the action.
Actions are realised through a series of operations; each determined by the
concrete physical conditions of the action. These operations are performed
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without thinking consciously but are oriented in the world by a non-con-
scious orienting basis of the operation. This orienting basis is established
through experience with the concrete material conditions for the operation,
and is a system of expectations about the execution of each operation con-
trolling the operation, in the process of the activity (Leontjev, 1978).
Heteropraxiality of design
Design can be described as an activity, motivated by the artefact being de-
signed, where a (collective) designing subject designs the design object by
means of some design artefacts. However, design is basically heteropraxial,
i.e., involving groups of people originating from different activity systems, in
such a way that the individual activity systems can not be regarded as the
basic unit of analysis.
To comprehend the central aspects of design it is necessary to apply a unit of
analysis that applies across the distinct praxises involved. Thus I will sug-
gest the perspective of the mediating artefacts in understanding design.
Design activity is mediated by design artefacts, utilised but not consumed
during the process, serving as conditions or environment for the design pro-
cess, thus opposed to materials. Examples of design artefacts are: object-
oriented modelling techniques; principles of relational databases.
Design artefacts can be either general or local to a project. General design
artefacts exist before the project, and are brought into, and utilised during
the design process; generating a contradiction between what the design arte-
facts prescribe, and the praxis they induce (e.g. as a result of the contradic-
tion between the central, and the instrument producing activities); and em-
phasising the role of basic assumptions (world views), and of explicit ideo-
logical statements. Local design artefacts are created inside a project, they
are often representations - descriptions or models - mediating the transfor-
mation of artefacts in the domain.
Crystallisation
In general, praxis is historically crystallised into artefacts, thus the histori-
cal development of praxis can be read from the development of artefacts
mediating the praxis (B¾rentsen, 1989, Bannon & B¿dker, 1991).
ÒArtifacts can be characterised as crystallized knowledge, which means
that operations that are developed in the use of one generation of tech-
nology are later incorporated into the artefact itself in the nextÓ
(Bannon & B¿dker, 1991, p.243).
Activity is crystallised into artefacts in two ways. Firstly as externalisation
of operations with earlier artefacts, and secondly as secondary artefacts rep-
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resenting modes of acting in the given activity (see below). Artefacts mediat-
ing human activity are not just more or less suitable attachments to human
praxis, but they are constituting activity. This suggests that the mediating
artefacts could be regarded more stable than the object of the activity; this
has consequences for the way physical modelling based techniques should be
used in the design of computer artefacts.
Perception and action: secondary artefacts
In understanding object-oriented methods the role of representations in gen-
eral human praxis is central.
ÒÉwhat constitutes a distinctively human form of action is the creation
and use of artifacts, as tools, in the production of the means of existence
and in the reproduction of the species. Primary artifacts are those di-
rectly used in this production; secondary artifacts are those used in the
preservation and transmission of the acquired skills or modes of action
or praxis by which this production is carried out. Secondary artifacts are
therefore representations of such modes of action, and in this sense they
are mimetic, not simply of the objects of an environment which are of
interest or use in this production, but of those objects as they are acted
upon, or of the modes of operation or action involving such objectsÓ
(Wartofsky, 1973, p.202) .
Representations and images are secondary artefacts, but secondary arte-
facts also exist in the praxis of using primary artefacts. Thus, all artefacts
have an element of secondary-ness. Design artefacts are, in a more radical
sense, both primary and secondary artefacts. They are primary artefacts be-
cause they mediate the productive act of constructing machine executable
code, and they are secondary artefacts because they reflect modes of acting
in the considered praxis as well as in design. An object-oriented model of a
train will both be a primary artefact mediating the production of new soft-
ware, and a secondary artefact preserving and transferring knowledge about,
e.g. train booking, and mediating the construction of visions of a new arte-
fact.
The Norwegian train and the medical record are examples of both primary
and secondary artefacts. They are secondary artefacts because they pre-
scribe acts in the world rather than merely describing it.
The double role of design artefacts as both mediating the production of ma-
chine executable code, and the establishment of secondary artefacts, e.g. re-
lational tables from a CASE tool may be used for understanding the consid-
ered praxis and establishing visions of the new is a general problem in the
design of computer artefacts; because the plasticity of secondary artefacts is
obstructing or obstructed by the naturalism and formalisation of primary
artefactness. In some situations, the formalised features are weak enough to
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allow the formalised description to acquire other meanings, in other situa-
tions, the models are so complicated that they are impossible to transcend
because all attention is used in making sense of the formal contents of the
figure. In some situations, formal descriptions offer openings into a poetic
world of new possibilities, whereas in others they only offer the frustrating
experiences of trying to understand the technical formalism the description
is based on.
Boundary objects
Design is complicated by the heterogeneity of the various groups participat-
ing. Star (1989) introduces the concept of boundary objects in trying to un-
derstand how people with completely different backgrounds working on dif-
ferent locations are able to contribute to, e.g. the solution of the same scien-
tific problem. The heteropraxiality of design is similar to this.
ÒBoundary objects are objects that are both plastic enough to adapt to
local needs and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet
robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They are
weakly structured in common use, and become strongly structured in
individual-site use. [É] a boundary object Òsits in the middleÓ of a
group of actors with divergent viewpoints. Crucially, however, there are
different types of boundary objects depending on the characteristics of
the heterogeneous information being joined to create them. The combi-
nation of different time horizons produces one kind of boundary objects;
joining concrete and abstract representations of the same data pro-
duces anotherÓ (Star, pp. 46-47).
Boundary objects depend on the plasticity of secondary artefacts related to
the objects. But according to Wartofsky (1973) representations are potential
productive action. In the design of computer artefacts this relation between
representation and action is more direct, or mechanical, because the repre-
sentations in design can very often be turned into running programs in a
formalised manner.
Design artefacts are always boundary objects. They traverse the heteroge-
neous activity systems involved in design, taking differing meaning and
function in each activity system: furthermore design artefacts are boundary
objects due to their double character as both primary and secondary arte-
facts, both serving as ÒhammersÓ for constructing running computer pro-
grams, and ÒbinocularsÓ for creating the future. When designers and users
work together on a system specification, designers tend to perceive the speci-
fication as a sketch of the future program code, whereas the users may un-
derstand the specification in a less formalised, more open way.
Design artefacts do not only take different shapes or serve different pur-
poses in different groups, they also change within one group, during the de-
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sign process, and in the different rooms of a specific groupÕs praxis. Thus a
system development method is a boundary object in the sense that it has
one function in the project organisationÕs internal education prior to a pro-
ject, and a totally different function during the project. Working in accor-
dance with the method means two different things in the two project rooms.
The jungle is an artefact for the Natives living there, a crack of twig becomes
the image of an animal to hunt and eat (Wartofsky, 1973). The jungle is also
a boundary object; for the Native it is, among other things, a source of food;
for the tourist it is an adventure. However, this boundary objectness breaks
down when the paper industry represents the jungle as paper pulp. In the
same way, the boundary objectness of the artefacts transformed during the
design process can break down by loosing the features giving them meaning
for the users, thus loosing the work praxis originally crystallised into them.
Shared understanding, i.e. that designers and users establish a common
understanding of the thing being designed, may not be important. Thus, in-
stead of defining participatory design as a process of shared sense making,
it is important to acknowledge that the Òshared understandingÓ constructed
during, e.g. a rapid prototyping session (B¿dker & Gr¿nb¾k, 1996), in gen-
eral only exists in a form crystallised into the prototype; the prototype in
turn being a boundary object tying the incommensurable praxises of design-
ers and users together, allowing them to design together but still perceive
the situation and the new artefact in different ways. In this sense, the notion
of boundary objects supports and explains the concerns stated by Ehn and
Kyng (1987) about codetermination, mutual learning, etc. The whole point in
doing design together with users is that designers will never learn to think
like users, however  they are able to engage in a fruitful cooperation.
Modelling as Transformation
Most system development methods put strong emphasise on representa-
tions, by basing design on descriptions of the domain of the future system
(e.g. Booch, 1994, Jackson, 1983, Jacobson et al., 1992, Mathiassen, 1981,
Rumbaugh et al., 1991, Yourdon, 1982). However, the fundamental difficulty
in verifying the sanity of such representations before the system is imple-
mented, was one of the driving forces in the development of methods for in-
volving users in design. Computer artefacts can not be designed at the mod-
elling board due to the fact that use aspects are constituted through the in-
troduction of the artefact into cultural praxis. Thus the notion of transfor-
mation is specially important in the design of computer artefacts as op-
posed to building houses. For the transformation process to be successful,
the artefacts must maintain their boundary objectness across both sites,
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and across design phases; and representations must remain representa-
tions of these artefacts or the activity crystallised into them.
Understanding design as a transformation of artefacts from the application
domain emphasises that representations are things and that these things
are related to the considered praxis; that representations are material.
Representations have to be understood in terms of the productive praxis
they are aiming at; thus, the transformation view becomes an ideal for the
use of representations in design.
Object-oriented, or physical modelling based, design artefacts can secure the
sanity of the relation between design and domain, by allowing all involved
parties to perceive, use and recreate the models in their own professional
terms not fully understandable for the other involved groups. The physical
model may change during the process, but it will maintain identity across
participating groups at any given point in time. Physical models are in this
sense instances that, due to their boundary objectness, mediate cooperation
between parties without the same language.
The festival checklist
The role of crystallisation and transformation can be illustrated with a re-
cent project with a big Danish music festival as an example (Bertelsen,
1996a&b, Madsen  1996).
In the festival project, we developed a tool for cooperative planning of techni-
cal production at the music festival. This tool was based on an existing arte-
fact, the checklist, that had emerged in the organisation as a crystallisation
of knowledge about technical planning and production.
The checklist is a sheet of paper with pre-printed fields for information re-
lated to a specific artistÕs performance at the festival. It was originally in-
vented by members of a group of volunteers working at one of the festival
stages. This list contained fields for all the information that should be
available or collected when an artist arrived backstage at the Festival site.
The original checklist was filled in when the people responsible for the tech-
nical planning of the festival handed the information over to the stage
groups, and it was later used when the artist arrived. Subsequently, the
checklist was adopted by the planning group, and used during planning as
the central overview of the individual artists, and used as the central record
when information was handed over to the stage groups.
The checklist had three functions: as a tool for the collection of information
during planning, secondly as a medium for forwarding information from the
group responsible for technical planning to the stage personnel and, finally,
as a tool at the stages when receiving the artists and carrying out the per-
formances.
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In the design project, the checklist was first transformed into the database
sketch by the technical planning group; the checklist became a local design
artefact. For the technical planning group this artefact was an incarnation of
a technological vision, and it was a reminder of pre-production work, and of
how this work supports the production at the stages. For the designers the
database sketch was first a too narrow technical vision, but later, during a
design workshop, it became an almost complete specification for a proto-
type.
The researchers had previously made a OMT-like (Rumbaugh et al., 1991)
object-oriented analysis of the festival, but this was put aside at the point
when the checklist came to act as design specification. The object-oriented
descriptions were too unfocused to make sense in the workshop with the
users, and they were not needed from a software perspective since we used a
DBMS that offered sufficient structuring. The object-oriented analysisÕ pri-
mary function was as a condensed memory for the designers.
The original checklist as it was made by one of the stage groups was a crys-
tallisation of festival work. They were doing the same things every year
when they received the files from planning, and when the artists arrived at
the festival. They made notes on sheets of paper and these notes gradually
became more standardised and, in the end, the pre-printed checklist was
made. Thus knowledge about how to receive the artists and what to look out
for was embedded in the checklist. The use of the files without checklists
was crystallised into the new artefact, the pre-printed checklist.
When the technical planning group took over the checklist, it was trans-
formed from a local artefact supporting work in one specific stage group, into
a general artefact used across different groups in the festival organisation.
In this ÒnewÓ form the checklist served a broader range of functions, it be-
came a planning tool and a media for information exchange. The checklist
became a boundary object having different meanings for the different groups
using and recreating it.
In the design project the researchers understood the developed prototype as
the new checklist, with which the technical planning group could do every-
thing they previously did with the paper checklist. An important aspect of
the paper-based checklist was that it was handed over to, and used by the
stage groups. The way this was done with the prototype was that the infor-
mation in the database was printed out on paper and attached to the band
file. In this way, the reincarnated checklist returned to the stage groups, but
for them it was not a checklist anymore, because it had become a mere
printout of the pre-production database. The boundary objectness of the
checklist was destroyed.
An object-oriented approach to support the transformation process in the
festival project, would have focused on modelling (historical stages of) the
checklist and possibly other artefacts existing in the festival. Then it would
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have analysed how different activities were mediated by these artefacts,
how they were similar, how they differed, and which problems existed.
Based on this it would have been possible to transform artefacts from the
festival through continued crystallisation  of acts with the artefacts into the
next version.
Physical modelling and Creativity
Understanding design in terms of transformation of artefacts is a vehicle for
insuring that the artefacts being designed come to fit the praxis they are in-
tended for. Transformation is in a way an imitation of how the notion of
crystallisation tells us that artefacts in a praxis develop. However, under-
standing design as transformation of artefacts also limits the innovative
aspects of design, in some sense prohibiting the greater quantum leaps. The
dilemma is that we want to maintain the praxis in question, but we do not
want it to stay the same. Thus, in addition to transformators, design arte-
facts mediating design as a transformation process, we need generators, de-
sign artefacts mediating creation of the radically new. Examples of genera-
tors are future workshops (Jungk & Mllert, 1987), and springboards
(Engestrm, 1987). The concept of tertiary artefacts (Wartofsky, 1973), i.e.
artefacts that mediate the creation of autonomous rooms for authentic cre-
ation, not related to the productive praxis in an obvious way, is close to the
concept of generators.
Object-oriented design artefacts have a potential role as generators. This is
one of the main elements in the APLEX (B¿dker et al., 1988), a vision of an
object-oriented environment for participatory design. Object-oriented design
artefacts are likely to enhance the participation of non-computer profession-
als in the creation of technical visions, because modularity and encapsula-
tion make it possible to build software like kids build LEGO models, and
because of a shorter time from idea to running prototype. However, the use
of object-oriented design artefacts in the generation of visions may ampu-
tate the process by enforcing a too narrow focus on information and com-
puter technology per se.
Conclusions and discussion
Above it is argued that object-oriented methods in the design of computer
artefacts can support the involvement of users in the design process, if the
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prevailing naturalism in the literature on object-oriented methods is re-
placed with an activity theory based understanding of the use of representa-
tions and models in human praxis.
The key to a new understanding of object-oriented methods is to realise that
representations are imbedded in human praxis, and mediating the contin-
uos reproduction of praxis. They are not only second best pictures of the un-
available, or more transparent selections of interesting features of some
part of the world, but tools mediating action in the world. Representations
are not like maps with a suitable detail and selection of features from a cho-
sen terrain, but rather place holders for directions of the continual develop-
ment of given praxises.
Object-oriented descriptions are intended to be translatable into machine
executable code in an unambiguous way, but at the same time they have to
serve as ambiguous instruments in the creation of new technological visions.
However, this is not different from the boundary objectness of other arte-
facts mediating heteropraxiality, but the possibility of loosing the plasticity
is obvious. In this respect, we should try to maintain the so-called CASE-
gab.
The use of object-oriented design artefacts is in itself not enough to ensure
usability and appropriateness of the artefacts being designed. Thus, I sug-
gest that future object-oriented development methods integrate notions of
heterogeneity. To maintain the boundary objectness of representations in
design, representations and models should be understood in terms of trans-
formation of artefacts rather than models of domains, thus making possible
the continuos confrontation, during design, of the representation with the
reality of praxises involved.
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